LIBRARY 

OF    THE 

Theological    Seminary, 

PRINCETON.     N.    J. 


Shelf 

noo/,- 


BL    240    .W4    1876 

Welch,  Ransom  B.  1824-1890 

Faith  and  modern  thought 


FAITH 


MODERN    THOUGHT 


Faith 


Modern    Thought 


RANSOM   B.  WELCH,  D.D.,  LL.D. 

Professor  in  Union  College. 
WITH    INTRODUCTION 

BY 

TAYLER     LEWIS,    LL.D. 


NEW    YORK: 
G.    P.    PUTNAM'S     SONS. 
Fourth  Avenue  and  Twenty-Third  Street. 
1876. 


Copyright. 
PUTNAM'S    SONS. 
1876, 


DEDICATION 


IN  HARMONY   WITH  THE  AUTHOR'S  DESIGN  TO  SEEK   AND 

SERVE   THE   TRUTH,   HE   HEARTILY    DEDICATES   THIS 

VOLUME  TO  THE  MANY  STUDENTS  WHO 

HAVE  ACCEPTED   HIS  GUIDANCE  IN 

THE  SAME  SEARCH  AND 

SERVICE. 


PREFACE 


''  I  ^HE  occasion  of  this  little  volume  may  be  found 
-■-      in  the  spirit  of  modern  discussion. 

The  title — Faith  and  Modern  Thought — was 
chosen  by  the  writer  long  before  he  knew  that  a 
similar  subject — Christianity  and  Modern  Thought — 
had  been  proposed  for  a  course  of  lectures  in  Boston, 
during  the  winter  of  1875-6. 

The  material  is  composed,  in  part,  of  essays  pre- 
pared for  special  occasions,  and  subsequently  pub- 
Hshed  in  Quarterly  Reviews. 

If,  in  defence  of  certain  positions,  plain  words 
have  been  employed,  they  are  in  reply  to  plain 
words  employed  in  attack. 

If  it  be  questioned  whether  the  spirit  of  the 
book  is  in  too  close  sympathy  with  the  spirit  of  the 
time,  the  author  has  no  reply  to  make ;  if  it  be 
asserted,  he  has  no  apology  to  offer. 

Earnest  inquiry  everywhere  prevails.  Old  theo- 
ries are  scrutinized  ;  new  theories  are  criticised. 


VI  PREFACE. 

By  the  best  and  safest  thinkers,  the  new  is  not 
discarded  because  of  its  novelty,  nor  the  old  because 
of  its  antiquity.  By  the  common  consent  of  all 
whose  judgment  is  worthy  of  consideration,  truth  is 
no  less  desirable  for  having  never  been  refuted  ;  nor 
is  error  more  desirable  for  having  never  been  vindi- 
cated. 

Now,  as  ever,  the  paramount  inquiry  should  be 
for  the  true,  the  beautiful,  the  good.  Spurious 
theories  invented  for  special  purposes  should 
share  the  same  fate,  be  they  modern  theories  or 
ancient.  The  laws  of  thought  have  not  changed, 
nor  have  the  principles  of  taste,  nor  the  sanctions  of 
reason  and  conscience.  Modern  complaining  can 
not  annul  or  transform  the  past  ;  modern  contriv- 
ing can  not  create  or  preform  the  future.  Mere 
Philistinism  can  effect  nothing  in  either  direction. 
Candid  criticism  alone  can  avail  us.  As  great  ques- 
tions like  evolution,  and  correlation,  and  descent, 
are  not  to  be  dismissed  with  prejudgment  or  without 
examination  ;  so,  essential  doctrines  of  religion  are 
not  to  be  condemned  and  abandoned  because  they 
seem  to  be  disturbed  by  innovation. 

Manly  fairness  and  patient  courage  are  demanded. 
It  is  not  yet  clear  how  far  Science  has  advanced 
toward  the  solution  of  its  own  problems  ;  nor  how 
such  solution,  if  reached,  would  affect  the  more  re- 


PREFACE.  Vll 

mote  questions  of  life,  and  thought,  and  being, — in 
a  word,  the  ultimate  principles  of  origin,  and  order, 
and  design,  and  consummation. 

At  last,  as  at  the  first,  these  questions  meet  us : 
What  are  the  laws  of  thought  ?  What  are  the  prin- 
ciples of  faith  ?  Where  can  Science  find  a  resting- 
place?  Where  can  religion  find  repose?  Toward 
this  goal  we  are  to  direct  impartial  inquiry. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGB 

Introduction xi 


CHAPTER  I. 
The  Modern  Theory  of  Forces.     The  True  Evolution?      3 

CHAPTER  11. 

Faith  and   Positivism.     The  Field  of  the   Philosophic 

AND  Finite 57 

CHAPTER  HI. 

Faith  and  Positivism.     The  Field  of  the  Religious  and 

Infinite no 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Faith    and   Positivism.     The  Written  and  the  Living 
Word 144 

CHAPTER  V. 
Admissions  of  Philosophical  Skepticism 176 

CHAPTER   VI. 
Modern  Thought , 223 


INTRODUCTORY    NOTICE. 


T~\R.  WELCH  is  a  very  calm  writer;  he  is  also 
^-^  remarkably  clear.  Both  of  these  qualities  of 
style  are  characteristic  of  strength.  Without  pre- 
tentiousness, or  anything  like  polemical  display, 
they  indicate  the  confidence  of  strong  conviction 
and  of  thorough  insight.  The  questions  presented 
are  fairly  as  well  as  ably  treated.  The  reader  will 
find  here  no  underrating  the  strength,  or  the  posi- 
tions, of  those  with  whom  the  author  is  contending. 
There  is  no  declamation  about  the  extinction  of  the 
purest  hopes,  and  of  the  most  elevated  motives  of 
human  conduct,  that  must  be  the  result  of  the  uni- 
versal prevalence  of  a  soulless  materialism.  The 
authors  and  defenders  of  such  a  hopeless  view  of 
the.  human  origin  and  destiny  are  supposed  to  know 
all  that.  There  is  a  keen  sarcasm  in  some  parts  of 
this  book,  but  no  trifling  witticism,  as  though  the 
opinions  of  Spencer  and  Tyndall  could  be  refuted 
by  a  jest  or  a  ludicrous  illustration.      There  is  no 


Xll  INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE. 

appeal  to  prejudice,  literary  or  religious,  no  use  of 
the  argiimcntuin  ad  verecundiani,  no  attempt  to 
arouse,  either  the  popular  feeling,  or  the  theolo- 
gical odium,  against  the  scientist  as  one  who  de- 
grades the  human  dignity  by  maintaining  our  kins- 
manship  with  the  ape  or  the  kangaroo.  The  subject 
is  too  grave  a  one  for  such  treatment.  Dr.  Welch 
is  too  grave  a  writer  thus  to  handle  it.  He  reveres 
his  Bible,  too,  and  he  knows  in  what  language  the 
Scriptures  describe  the  lowliness  of  man's  physical 
origin,  his  first  condition  as  "  of  the  earth  earthy," 
representing  it  as  allied  to  all  below,  comparing  him 
to  ''the  worm,"  to  ''corruption,"  to  "earth  and 
ashes,"  or  to  sum  up  all,  solemnly  Imnouncing  that 
as  he  was  made  from  the  dust  of  the  earth,  so 
unto  dust  should  he,  again,  because  of  sin,  return. 

It  is  not  for  maintaining  man's  natural  that  the 
author  contends  with  Darwin  and  Tyndall,  but  for 
denying  his  supernatural.  It  is  not  because  they 
make  him  a  physical  product,  or  from  the  earth,  as 
the  Scripture  does— from  "the  lowest  earth,"  the 
lowest  nature,  de  profundissimis  natures — but  be- 
cause they  deny  the  divine  inspiration,  the  seahng 
image  which  first  made  the  species  homo,  the  true 
creating  Word  which  pronounced  him  finished  man, 
a  "new  thing"  upon  the  earth  which  before  was 
not.     It  is  not  because  they  treat  him  as  a  physical 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE.  XIU 

being,  a  ''  natural  man,"  "kvxtm  avdpuTzo^,  animalis  homo, 
as  the  Apostle  styles  him,  in  his  fallen  state,  but 
because  they  deny  the  spiritual,  to  TrvevfiaTiKov,  which 
he  originally  had,  and  that  restoring  grace  which 
revives  him  again,  and  makes  him  a  ''  new  man " 
after  his  terrible  lapse  into  nature  and  animality. 
In  short,  the  great  strength  of  this  book  is  in  its 
higher  psychology,  its  view  of  man's  spiritual  and 
of  its  divine  origin,  as  not  only  overruling  the  low 
conclusions  of  the  physicist,  but  as  confirming  the 
glory  of  this  divine  human,  this  redeemed  human, 
by  the  closest  comparison  with  those  alleged  scien- 
tific statements  that  would  make  man  notJmtg  but 
dust,  nothing  but  nature. 

It  is  not  formally  laid  down  anywhere  in  Dr. 
Welch's  book,  but  it  is,  nevertheless,  a  thought 
suggested  in  every  chapter,  and  in  almost  every 
argument :  Only  let  our  Psychology  be  high  enough, 
and  we  need  never  be  afraid  of  naturalism.  Let 
our  view  of  the  human  spirit  only  be  in  accordance 
with  the  teachings  of  the  Scriptures,  and  the  noblest 
human  philosophy ;  let  it  take  into  account  the 
greatness  of  man's  rational  and  moral  being,  his 
insight  of  eternal  and  necessary  truth  as  reflected 
from  the  infinite  on  the  finite  mind, — in  a  word,  his 
reason,  comprehending  not  merely  the  halting  sense- 
induction  of  2., first  cause,  but  the  a  priori  necessity 


XIV  INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE. 

of  an  eternal  personal  mind,  the  ground  and  source 
of  all  truth,  of  all  rationality,  making  as  certain  as 
that  proposition,  cogito  ergo  sum,  the  belief  in  a 
higher  mind,  a  higher  thought,  as  the  most  necessary 
of  all  truths  (if  there  be  any  truths  to  which  the 
laws  of  our  thinking  compel  us  to  give  that  name) — 
let  us  hold  fast  to  this — let  us  study  our  own  souls, 
look  into  our  own  souls,  until  we  see  it  there,  and 
we  need  have  no  fears  of  nebular  principia,  or  evo- 
lution, or  development,  or  any  of  the  bugbear  names 
by  which  a  certain  class  of  scientists  may  assail  our 
faith.  *' As  Jehovah  liveth  and  as  thy  soul  liveth." 
This  sublime  Hebrew  oath  contains  all  that  we  need. 
'*  He  that  formed  the  eye,  shall  He  not  see?  He 
that  giveth  man  knowledge,  shall  He  not  know? 
Shall  He  not  know  us  ?  We  may  give  it  any  name  ; 
call  it  God  or  Nature  as  we  please,  but  personality 
as  well  as  intelligence,  a  near  personality,  the  infi- 
nitely near,  as  well  as  the  infinitely  far,  and  the  infi- 
nitely great,  are  inseparable  from  the  idea,  as  the 
idea  is  inseparable  from  the  necessities  of  our  own 
thinking,  finite  though  it  be.  ''Mens,  ratio,  in  nobis, 
nonin  coelof^  Mind,  reason,  in  us,  and  not  in  any 
sphere  above?  The  exclamation  of  Cicero  comes 
as  much  from  the  a  priori  reason  itself  as  the 
enthymeme  of  Descartes. 

*  Cicero,  De  Legibus.     Lib.  II.,  i6. 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE.  XV 

We  have  expressed  this  in  our  own  way,  and, 
perhaps,  very  imperfectly,  but  it  gives  us  the  spirit 
and  the  substance  of  Dr.  Welch's  strong  reasoning, 
not  as  confined   to  one   chapter,   but   as  pervading 
the  whole  book.     God  and  soul  present  themselves 
as  directly  to  the  reason,  or  to  faith,  which  is  reason 
in  its  highest  or  divinely  quickened  exercise,  as  na- 
ture mirrors  itself  in  the  eye  of  sense.     ''  The  elejtckos, 
the  conviction  of  the  things  unseen,"  whether  we 
call  it  reason  or  faith,  is  to  be  received  with  as  much 
confidence,  to  say  the  least,  as  the  piece-meal  reve- 
lations   of  ''the    things    seen,"    of  which    we    only 
know  in  part  (k  fief>ov')  as  the  Apostle  says, — and  oh, 
how  small  a  part,  how  infinitesimal  a  part,  as  com- 
pared with  the  great  whole,   without  a  knowledge 
of  which  our  inductions,  even  according  to  Bacon 
himself,  must  ever  be  unsafe, — as  far  short  of  cer- 
tainty, in  fact,  as  the  knowledge  of  a  single  leaf  falls 
short  of  enabling  us  to  decide,  by  sense  alone,   in 
respect  to  the  extent,  or  design,   of  an  Amazonian 
forest.     There  is  a  real  sense   in  which  it   may  be 
said  that  faith   is   essential    to  a  true  discernment, 
even  of  ''  the  things  seen,"  if  we  would  contemplate 
them    in    their   substantial  relations,   as   something 
more  than  dead  sequences,  the  only  view  which  this 
positive  sense-philosophy  can  take  of  them  without 
trespassing   on   domains  of  thought  which   it  con- 


XVI  INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE. 

temptuously  disowns  as  forming  any  part  of  science, 
or  as,  in  fact,  having  any  reality.  Shutting  out 
everything  else  but  the  antecedence  and  conse- 
quence of  facts,  without  any  other  causal  binding, 
they  make  nature  and  the  world  a  phantasmagoria, 
a  fleeting  series  of  unconnected  phenomena.  It 
might  have  been  anything  else ;  it  might  have  had 
any  other  sequences  ;  it  may  go  on ;  it  may  sud- 
denly and  universally  disappear.  There  is  no  rea- 
son in  it,  as  there  is  no  real  nexus  of  causation. 
The  moment  we  seek  this  we  are  departing  from 
sense  ;  we  are  in  the  region  of  the  unseen,  or,  to 
give  the  substance  of  Dr.  Welch's  varied  argument, 
we  are  in  the  province  of  faith.  He  means  by  this 
not  simply  religious  faith,  in  the  more  common 
acceptation  of  the  word.  The  drift  of  his  reasoning 
is  to  show  that,  in  the  end,  this  doctrine  of  bare 
sequences,  with  its  claim  to  be  the  only  real  and 
positive  knowledge,  is  the  annihilation  of  science 
as  well  as  of  theology. 

Another  aspect  of  the  matter  shows  the  same 
result.  In  the  extreme  nominalism  to  which  it  con- 
ducts us,  not  only  are  there  no  universals,  as  the 
elder  thinkers  of  this  school  maintained  (while  they 
admitted  the  existence  of  individual  things  capable 
of  being  classified  by  specific  differences),  but  even 
individual  things  themselves  disappear.     They  have 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE.  XVll 

no  true -individuality,  nothing  which  makes  a  thing 
to  be  a  thing  with  a  generic  character,  separating  it 
from  all  other  things.  The  atoms  are  the  only 
realities.  There  is  no  fixed  being  beside  them. 
All  the  classifications  on  which  science  has  hereto- 
fore built  up  herself  are  flowing  quantities.  They 
are  ever  losing  specific  character,  or  that  which 
makes  each  thing,  man  included,  to  be  what  it  75, 
a  something  more  than  a  changing  mass  of  atoms, 
having  no  more  of  true  being,  of  true  individuality, 
to  say  nothing  of  personality,  than  the  ever-shifthig 
sand  heaps  of  the  Sahara.  Nothing  remains  the 
same  for  two  consecutive  moments,  however  swift, 
or  however  slow,  to  our  keener  or  duller  sense-per- 
ception, the  rate  of  movement,  or  rate  of  time, 
through  which  the  change  is  disclosed.  Nothing 
stands,  as  some  of  the  old  philosophers  said.  Give 
it  time  enough,  and  everything  will  become  in  the 
future, — as  it  has  repeatedly  become  in  the  long 
past,  and  as  it  is  now  tending  to  become, — every- 
thing else. 

In  those  three  chapters,  having  the  word  for 
their  special  heading,  faith  would  seem  to  be  used 
by  Dr.  Welch  as  almost  synonymous  with  reason ; 
and  yet  it  is  not,  by  any  means,  out  of  harmony 
with  the  Christian  Scriptures.  The  applications, 
too,  to  scientific  reasoning  seem  warranted  by  the 


XVIU  INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE. 

Apostle's  wide  definition  of  faith  as  ''  the  elenchos 
or  conviction  of  the  things  unseen,"  (Heb.  xi,  i)  and 
his  making  it  (Heb.  xi,  3)  the  ground  of  our  ''  under- 
standing "  (our  spiritual  discerning)  that  the  worlds 
were    organized    {Ka-npriGdai,    brought    07it    in    order, 
evolved,  if  any  prefer  the  term),  by  the  Word  of  God, 
so  that  the  things  which  are  seen  were  not  made  (or 
had  their  being,  ytyovhat)  from  things  that  do  appear, 
£K  ^aivo/xevo)v.     In  Other  words,  the  world  of  sense  came 
from  "  the  things  unseen,"  which  are  the  objects  of 
fatt/i,  whether  philosophical  or  religious — or  visibilia 
ex  invisibilibus,  as  the  Vulgate  and  Syriac  have  it. 
So  when  Paul  says,  2  Cor.  iv.   18,  'The  things  that 
are  seen  are  temporal,"  {7:p6aKaipa)  belonging  to  time, 
'*  the  things  unseen  are  eternal,"  he  certainly  could 
not  have  meant  things  now  hidden  from  sight,  and 
to  be  shown  to  sense  in  some  future  existence,  but 
rather    the    supersensual    world    of  truth   and    true 
being.     Sight  is  representative  here  of  all  sentiency, 
and  Paul  seems  to  use  the  contrasted  terms  "  seen  " 
and  ''  unseen,"  very  much  as  Plato  uses  his  bparh  and 
cJaVra  as  contrasted  with  the  hu6fi  and  the  vorira,  though, 
on  the  part  of  the  Apostle,  with  a  far  higher  and 
holier  aim.     There  is  no  improbability  in  the  sup- 
position that  he  may  have  heard  this,  and  similar 
language,  in  the  schools  of  Tarsus,  before  employ- 
ing it  in  this  grand  application  to  the  things  neces- 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE.  XIX 

sary  and  eternal,  whether  as  contemplated  from  the 
philosophical  or  the  Christian  standpoint.- 

Dr.  Welch's  broad  view  of  faith  as  given  in 
chapters  II,  III,  and  IV,  no  more  than  the  definition 
of  the  Apostle  himself,  excludes  the  peculiar  saving 
faith  in  Christ,  and  in  his  sacrifice  upon  the  cross, 
which  is  the  ground  of  the  Christian's  hope  of  salva- 
tion. But  the  province  of  faith  as  the  divinely 
quickened  reason,  or  "  spirit  in  man,"  extends  to  all 
the  unseen  world.  It  is  that  which,  in  its  spiritual 
essence,  characterized  the  Old  Testament  saint,  as 
well  as  the  new :  the  "  enduring  as  seeing  Him  who 
is  invisible."  In  no  irreverent  way  may  we  also 
affirm,  that  it  is  the  ground  of  the  purest  insight  in 
philosophy  and  science,  as  well  as  in  religion. 
Without  the  cognition  of  the  sphere  of ''  the  unseen 
things,"  lying  above  sense,  and  above  the  science 
that  acknowledges  nothing  deeper  than  sense,  the 
universe  is  but  a  shadow,  with  motion,  force,  and 
matter,  as  its  only  realities. 

As  suggestive  of  the  train  of  thought  on  which 
we  have  been  dwelling,  and  of  similar  related  ideas, 
reference  might  be  made  to  other  portions  of  this 
book,  and  especially  to  chapter  VI,  entitled  "  Mod- 
ern Thought."  We  can  only  touch  briefly  on  some 
leading  points  :  Reality  demands  two  things.  These 
are  •'  a  substance  underlying  the  phenomenon,"  and 


XX  INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE. 

''  something  to  cognize  the  impression  or  sensation  " 
which  it  makes.  The  appearance  is  simply  evidence 
of  something  ''unseen"  that  may  be  said  to  appear 
throiigJi  it.  Thus  the  phenomenal  world  lies 
between  the  unseen  substantial,  and  soul  as  such 
cognizing  power.  Both  are  essential  to  all  phenom- 
enal existence.  ''  Modern  thought  "  tends  to  regard 
the  middle  or  intervening  sphere  as  the  only  reality, 
and  as  furnishing  the  only  field  of  science.  Very 
clear  and  able  is  the  refutation  given  of  this  funda- 
mental falsehood,  and  of  the  various  forms  in  which 
it  is  presented.  To  notice  them  specially  would 
interfere  with  the  design  of  an  introductory  notice, 
and  with  the  limits  of  the  space  to  which  it  is  ne- 
cessarily confined.  We  can  only  refer,  therefore,  to 
the  manner  in  which  the  author  meets  the  declara- 
tions of  Spencer  respecting  ''  force  as  the  ground  of 
all  phenomena,"  and  his  dictum  that  force  itself  is 
unknowable.  According  to  Spencer,  thought  can 
go  no  farther.  No  other  cause  can  be  known  ;  no 
other  cause,  therefore,  can  be  assigned.  This  he 
would  strangely  propose  as  a  sort  of  reconciliation  " 
between  science  and  religion ;  if  he  can  be  regarded 
as  really  in  earnest,  and  not  satirical,  in  presenting 
such  a  view  of  the  problem.  In  an  animated 
passage,  the  author  asks :  "  Is  science,  whose  very 
office  it  is  to  know — is  science   satisfied   with  this 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE.  XXI 

proposed  reconciliation,"  thus  terminating  in  a  con- 
fession of  utter  ignorance  in  respect  to  "  the  ground 
of  all  phenomena  ?  "  ''  Can  it  consent  to  a  postulate 
which  is  suicidal, — an  ultimate  which  would  swallow 
up  eveiy  scientific  labor  and  success  in  fathomless 
nescience."  ''  Can  religion  accept  this  theory,"  is  a 
question  which  he  next  presents,  and  presses  still 
more  earnestly.  But  we  are  here  principally  con- 
cerned with  it  as  showing  why  Spencer's  ''  force,"  or 
''  first  ground  of  all  phenomena,"  is  to  him  unknow- 
able. It  is  simply  because  he  will  not  acknowledge 
the  decision  of  consciousness  that  force  is  knowable 
only  through  spirit  as  an  idea,  that,  in  the  order  of 
our  thinking,  must  go  before.  Force  is  antagonism, 
resistance,  or  it  is  nothing.  Without  such  idea  of 
resistance  it  is  inconceivable ;  and  equally  unthinka- 
ble, again,  is  this  idea  of  resistance  without  that  of 
will  as  belonging  to  a  conscious  sentiency.  In  other 
words,  without  it  force  can  never  appear.  If  there 
were  no  conception  of  a  conscious  sentiency  in  the 
universe,  as  an  antecedent  ground  in  our  think- 
ing, force  could  not  be  distinguished  from  motion, 
even  though  the  latter  be  conceded  as  thinkable 
without  a  farther  causal  ground  ultimately  implying 
mind  and  will.  But  in  the  total  absence  of  such 
consciousness,  force,  both  as  phenomenon  and  as 
idea,    is   gone.      Even   the   sense   of  sight    implies 


XXU  INTRODUCTORY  XOTICE. 

resistance,  though  in  an  infinitesimal  degree,  per- 
haps, compared  with  touch,  or  sound.  But  could 
we  indulge  the  supposition  of  an  entirely  antitactic 
beholding,  we  might  boldly  say  that  forcc\  to  it, 
would  disappear,  and  a  phenomenon  of  cliange 
alone  remain.  The  explosion  of  a  dynamite  maga- 
zine would  give  only  the  thought  of  scattered 
motions.  Nay  more,  solidity  or  hardness  would  be 
inconceivable,  unthinkable.  The  granite,  and  the 
most  yielding  fluid,  would  be  alike  incapable  of 
giving  the  idea  of  resistance,  of  effort,  of  power  in 
any  form.  The  mightiest  collisions  would,  in  this 
respect,  be  like  the  whirling  dust,  or  the  spray  of  the 
ocean.  In  the  absence  of  mind,  force,  as  we  now 
concei\'e  it,  as  luc  are  7wzi'  compelled  to  think  it, 
would  vanish  from  the  universe.  It  would  have  no 
mode  of  manifestation.  .  It  would  present  no  test 
of  what  we  call  reality.  This  inherent  connection 
between  the  dynamical  and  the  spiritual  idea  has 
also  been  ably  set  forth  by  Dr.  Martin,  of  the  New 
York  University.  As  the  argument  is  used  here  by 
the  author,  in  opposition  to  Spencer,  it  is  unanswer- 
able. This  doctrine  of  force  as  the  sole  ''  ground  of 
all  phenomena"  may  be  called  the  key  position  of 
the  anti-religious  scientist.  To  turn  it,  as  we  think 
both  of  these  writers  have  done,  is,  in  fact,  to  enter 
the  citadel. 


IX TROD I'C TORY  XOTICE.  XXiil 

But  what  right,  it  may  be  asked,  has  one  who 
does  not  claim  to  be  a  scientinc  man,  or  to  have 
made  any  one  branch  of  science  his  special  study,  to 
enter  upon  such  discussions  ?  It  is  no  small  merit 
in  Dr.  Welch's  book  that  it  exposes  the  arrogant 
falsehood  on  which  an  exclusion  of  this  kind  is 
grounded.  A  man  of  liberal  culture,  with  a  knowl- 
edge of  science  such  as  belongs  to  general  liberal 
education,  (without  that  special  devotion  to  any  one 
branch  that  makes  what  we  call  a  scientist")  may  be 
amply  qualified  to  detect  false  logic,  even  in  what  is 
styled  scientinc  reasoning.  ?^Iuch  more  may  he  do 
this  when  those  whom  he  opposes  step  far  out  of 
their  own  proper  province,  and,  in  the  name  of  sci- 
ence, invade  other  departments  of  thought  and 
knowledge,  higher  than  their  own,  more  important 
in  their  aims,  and  more  deeply  grounded  in  the 
universal  human  consciousness.  ''He  that  is  spirit- 
ual judgeth  all.  whilst  he  himself  is  judged  of  no 
one  :  "  It  may  seem  like  an  arrogant  and  almost 
profane  accommodation  of  a  most  pregnant  passage 
of  Holy  Writ ;  but  it  suggests,  nevertheless,  an  idea 
having  a  close  application  to  our  subject.  The 
demands  of  thought  transcending  the  physical  must 
determine  the  bounds  of  the  physical,  and  of  physi- 
cal knowledge :  whilst  this  hyperphysical  region 
itself  can  have  no  limitations  set  to  it  bv  anv  thinsf 


xxiv  INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE. 

below.  Some  of  these  specialties  of  science  may 
actually  narrow  the  thinking  range  of  those  most 
devoted  to  them,  preventing  the  just  appreciation  of 
what  Hes  beyond  them,  and  over  them,  or  making 
the  occupants  of  these  limited  departments  the  least 
free  in  their  judgments  of  what  is  elsewhere  thought 
and  known. 

It  is  to  this  cause  we   may  trace  some  of  those 
extremely  deficient  and  one-sided  views  with  which 
the   scientific  boasting,  so   common   with   a    certain 
class  of  lecturers,  has  infected  even  our  literary  world. 
A  few  examples  of  this  may  suffice.     There  is,  in  the 
first  place,  that  unceasing  talk  about  "  law."     Empty 
reiterations  are  producing  the  impression  upon  such 
as  have  no  time  to  think,  that,  until  quite  lately,  this 
idea  of  "  physical  law,"  and  its  regularity  had  been 
a  stranger  to  the   human    mind.     No    less    a  writer 
than  Dr.  Draper  has  the  hardihood  to  represent  the- 
ologians, and   religionists   generally,   as  believers  in 
perpetual  miracle.     Such   a  view   is  constantly  put 
forth  in  defiance  of  the  fact,  that,  in  the  very  earliest 
Scripture,  (Gen.  viii,  22)  there   is  the   most  solemn 
declaration   of  the  constancy  of  nature,  and   a  most 
solemn  guaranty  given  of  it  for  our  behef,  stronger 
than  any  ever  furnished  by  any  inductive  or  experi- 
mental science.    This  claim  for  "  modern  thought  "  is, 
moreover,  in  defiance  of  what  an  ordinary  scholarship 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE.  XXV 

would  be  sufficient  to  prove,  namely,  that  the  unity 
and  harmony  of  the  cosmos — whence  the  very  name — 
was  an  idea  inseparable  from  that  of  law,  and  that  it 
belonged,  not  only  to  the  oldest  forms  of  philosophy, 
but  to  the  current  thinking,  as  manifest  in  the  cur- 
rent speech  of  the  race.  There  is  no  position  of  the 
lecturing  scientist  more  calculated  to  move  indigna- 
tion for  its  shallow  untruthfulness  than  this  foolish 
claim,  that  the  idea  of  "  the  reign  of  law  "  is  wholly 
due  to  modern  discovery  and  to  modern  thought. 

Take  another  example.  It  may  be  safely  main- 
tained, that  along  with  the  universal  belief  in  genera 
and  species,  out  of  which  physical  science  itself  has 
been  evolved,  thoughtful  observation  long  ago 
detected  apparent  deviations,  apparent  commin- 
glings  of  kinds,  apparent  hybrid  varieties,  prevailing 
to  a  limited  extent,  showing  either  defect  in  our 
classifications,  or  some  permitted  diversity  in  nature, 
though  always  ultimately  checked  by  the  great  con- 
trolling law  revealed  in  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis. 
But  this  is  now  treated  as  though  it  had  been  wholly 
a  new  discovery.  From  a  few  observations  of  this 
kind  in  respect  to  "  pigeons  "  and  *'  pitcher  plants," 
there  is  made  a  sweeping  generalization,  and  that 
opposed  to  all  previous  generalization,  and  carried 
even  to  the  denial  of  all  essential  species,  or  of  any- 
thing like  fixed  being  in  the  universe. 


XXVI  INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE. 

Again, — the  Influence  of  the  body  upon  the  soul 
is  another  of  these  oldest,  and  most  universal,  of 
human  beliefs.  It  has  been  the  theme  of  the  poet 
and  the  moralist,  as  well  as  of  the  physicist.  The 
Bible  most  plainly  declares  it,  and  the  theologian  has 
ever  found  in  it  a  practical  lesson  of  pious  interest. 
But  it  is  now  presented  as  an  entirely  new  idea  ;  men 
had  not  thought  of  it,  says  one  ;  the  erring  preacher 
had  wholly  overlooked  it  in  his  spiritual  exhortations. 
Science  has  changed  all  this.  It  has  not  only  taught 
us  what  poor  creatures  we  are — the  Bible  had 
abounded  in  that  lesson — but  has  used  this  very 
new  discovery  as  the  foundation  of  the  grossest 
materialism,  making  us  all  matter,  all  body,  and 
wholly  extinguishing  soul. 

Another  "  phase  "  of  this  "  modern  thought  "  we 
find  in  the  continual  treatment  of  pure  hypothesis 
as  though  it  were  ''  established  science."  This 
chorus,  too,  a  portion  of  the  literary  and  editorial 
world  has  taken  up,  as  though,  from  its  continual 
repetition,  there  could  be  no  kind  of  doubt  about  it. 
It  is  all  ''  established  science  ;  "  they  have  no  time 
to  inquire  ;  but  so  the  savans  talk,  and  even  if  not 
yet  quite  proved,  it  cannot  be  far  from  it.  Espe- 
cially does  this  ''  phase  "  show  itself  in  what  is  so 
confidently  said  about  atoms.  These  are  treated  as 
though  their  existence,  as  an  undeniable  reality  in 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE.  XXVI 1 

reriim  natura,   had   been  at  last   positively  settled. 
Our  periodicals    occasionally  present   some   curious 
illustrations  of  this  haste  to  believe  in  anything  that 
calls    itself   -science.       Lucretius,    for    example,    is 
praised    for   his    wonderful    forecasting    ''genius    in 
having  anticipated  one  of  the  most  brilliant  of  mod- 
ern discoveries."     The  reference  is  to  what  he  says 
about  atoms,  as   though   it  were   any  more,  or  any 
less,  hypothetical  in  the  brilliant  Latin  poet,  than  as 
it  now   appears   even  in  some  of  our  scientific  text 
books.     The  hypothesis  of  Dalton,  and  of  our  latest 
scientists,  may  have  more  of  what  may  be  called  a 
scientific  look  ;  but  atoms  are  still  a  sheer  imagina- 
tion.    No  eye  has  ever  seen  an  atom  ;  no  microscope 
has  ever  brought  one  into  visibility.     They  belong 
to  the  ''unseen  world,"  not  of  spirit   but  of  sense. 
They  lie  as  far  below  all  sense  vision,  with  its  high- 
est instrumental  aids,  as  they  did  in  the  old  days  of 
Democritus.     Lucretius  had  a  most  ingenious  mode 
of  getting  the  atoms  at  work,  in  his  hypothesis  of 
an  infinitesimal    deviation  from    the  perpendicular, 
or   the    original    direction    of  their   motion.      This 
would  be  enough,  in  time,  to  set  them  all  impinging, 
and    therefore,   in    a    still    longer   time,    of  running 
through   all   possible  collisions  and    cohesions  until 
they  had  produced  this  present  "  aspectable  world," 
as  he  styles  it.    It  had  as  much  "  established  science  " 


XXV iii  INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE. 

in  it  as  any  modern  hypothesis  built  on  similar  prem- 
ises. So  was  it  with  the  older  atomism  of  Democ- 
ritus.  Given  an  eternity  to  work  in,  wdiat  would 
they  not  accomplish  ?  Infinite  incongruities  falling 
at  last  into  congruities ;  or  after  infinite  misses  mak- 
ing, at  last,  some  lucky  hits,  so  as  to  get  in  some 
kind  of  position,  and  so  on,  and  so  on,  until,  after 
another  immeasurable  time,  some  kind  of  embryo 
world  would  begin  to  appear.  Tremendous  leaps 
did  these  old  world-builders  make,  but  not  more 
tremendous  than  are  now  made  by  the  modern  cos- 
mologists.  The  maxim  of  these  older  men  seems  to 
have  been  w^  ?}//<(7i'fp}oi»,  *' the  beginning  is  the  half 
of  the  work."  Get  the  atoms  in  motion,  get  them 
"  deviating  from  the  perpendicular,"  let  them  begin  to 
impinge  upon  one  another,  making  their  congruities 
and  their  natural  selections,  and  the  business  might 
be  regarded  as  virtually  done.  The  world, — w^ith  all 
its  freight  of  life  organic,  vegetable,  animal,  wdth  all 
its  load  of  sin  and  death  and  corruption,  with  all  its 
forces,  with  all  its  mind  and  consciousness,  would 
come  at  last,  as  it  would  all,  in  like  manner,  at  last 
disappear.  Only  give  it  time  enough,  and,  in  a  sim- 
ilar process,  all  things  would  come  out  of  the  nebula, 
that  favorite  hypothesis  of  modern  times.  We  are 
not  exaggerating  the  features  of  resemblance.  Any 
one  who  will  turn  to  Aristotle's  Physica,  Lib.  Ill, 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE.  XXIX 

Chap,  vlli.,  ''^'  will  see  how  old  is  the  doctrine  of 
"  natural  selections."  and  "  survival  of  the  fittest," 
out  of  which  Darwin  would  make  all  species. 

The  unscientific  mind,  it  is  said,  is  not  competent 
to  deal  with  these  matters.  The  objection  involves 
an  egregious  fallacy.  It  is  a  fact,  and  the  scientific 
men  who  make  this  plea  should  be  plainly  told  it, 
and  made  to  confess  it,  that  there  is  a  region  acces- 
sible to  the  common  cultivated  mind,  and  especially 
to  such  a  thinker  as  the  author  of  this  book,  where 
the  Darwins,  Tyndalls,  and  Huxleys — giving  them 
all  due  credit  for  the  great  eminence  they  have 
attained,  and  the  great  value  of  their  science,  so  far 
as  they  have  established  it — are  simply  on  a  par 
with  other  men  of  intelligence.  By  the  thoughtful 
man  this  science-transcending  region  is  soon  reached. 
A  few  steps,  and  we  are  where  the  great  philosophers 
of  old,  and  the  great  schoolmen  of  later  times,  (de- 
fective as  may  have  been  their  science)  showed  an 
acuteness  in  discussing  these  questions  of  primordial 

*  The  passage  is  quoted  and  well  translated  by  Mivart  in  his 
book  on  the  Genesis  of  Species,  page  306.  It  is  thus  Aristotle  states 
the  opinion  of  the  old  atheists  whom  he  refutes  :  "  For  when  the 
very  same  combinations  happened  to  be  produced  which  the  law  of 
final  causes  would  have  called  into  being,  those  which  proved  to  be 
advantageous  to  the  organism  were  preserved,  while  those  that  were 
not  so,  perished  like  the  minotaurs  and  sphinxes  of  Empedocles." 

The  illustrations  are  crude,  but  there  is  as  much  "established 
science  "  in  the  ancient  as  in  the  modern  Darwinism. 


XXX  INTRODUCTORY  NOTICE. 

causation,  and  a  power  of  thought,  of  which  the 
keenest  thinkers  of  this  or  any  other  age  might  well 
be  proud.  Inductive  science,  the  highest  range  of 
sense-knowledge,  gives  no  advantage  here,  except 
as  all  culture  quickens  the  mental  powers,  and  ex- 
tends the  sphere  of  philosophic  insight.  It  is  not 
presumptuous,  therefore,  in  men  like  Dr.  Welch  to 
enter  upon  discussions  like  these,  and  the  same  might 
be  said  of  Professor  Martin,  Mr.  Bowne,  and  others 
in  our  own  land  who  have  boldly  analyzed  the  boast- 
ful pretentions  of  what  calls  itself  "  modern  thought." 
We  are  tempted  to  say  more  of  this  little  book, 
but  the  Introduction  ought  to  bear  a  due  proportion 
to  the  modest  volume  it  announces  to  the  public. 
Our  thanks  are  due  to  the  publishing  house  of 
Putnam's  Sons  for  the  service  they  have  rendered  to 
the  cause  of  religion  and  revelation  by  adding  this 
to  the  valuable  course  of  similar  healthful  works 
they  have  lately  given  to  the  world. 

Tayler  Lewis. 

Schenectady,  February  3,  1876. 


FAITH   AND   MODERN   THOUGHT. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  MODERN  THEORY  OF  FORCES. 

'T~^HE  theory  of  force  is  as  old  as  the  process  of 
-^      speculation.     But  the  theory  of  forces  as  ap- 
plied to  the   great  questions  of  physics  and  philos- 
ophy is  of  modern  origin. 

Let  us  examine  this  modern  theory  :  first,  in  the 
light  of  its  own  definitions,  its  consequences,  and  its 
confessions  ;  and,  secondly,  in  the  light  of  conscious- 
ness, reason,  and  revelation. 

This  theory  proposes  not  only  to  explain  the 
phenomena  of  nature,  but  to  solve  the  problem  of 
being — to  tell  what  is,  and  how^  it  is — what  is  primi- 
tive and  what  derivative — where  the  process  of 
derivation  began,  and  how ;  and  how  it  proceeds, 
including  within  its  range,  not  only  matter  and  mind, 
but  problems  of  life,  and  liberty,  and  morality,  and 
religion. 


4  FAITH  AND   MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Wide  as  is  this  range,  it  is  to  be  penetrated 
everywhere  by  the  light  of  science,  which  is  to  guide 
the  explorer  in  every  direction  to  the  desired  solu- 
tion. In  this  bold  venture  science  claims  to  be  pos- 
itive, and  to  rest  solely  on  demonstration. 

The  canon  proclaimed  as  regulative,  at  least 
theoretically  regulative,  is :  *'  In  positive  science 
nothing  can  be  assumed." 

How  this  canon  is  observed,  and  this  claim 
is  maintained  by  the  modern  theory  of  forces,  will 
the  better  appear  as  we  advance. 

Observation  and  experiment  have  ascertained 
the  convertibility  of  light,  heat,  electricity,  magnet- 
ism, chemical  affinity,  etc.  Hence  has  been  deduced 
the  principle  of  correlation  of  forces.  And,  as  these 
forces  are  only  transmuted,  not  destroyed,  by  this 
correlation,  another  principle  has  been  deduced — the 
conservation  of  energy,  or  the  indestructibility  of 
force.  Indestructibility  relates  to  the  quantity  of 
force  ;  convertibility  relates  to  the  quality  of  force. 

For  ourselves,  we  are  ready  to  admit  that  there 
is  a  theory  of  forces  which  is  both  ultimate  and 
unquestionable — that  there  is  an  equivalence  and  a 
correlation  of  forces  which  the  world  has  been  only 
too  slow  to  recognize — that  the  conservation  of  force 
is  a  principle  which  science  may  well  maintain — that 
the  persistence  of  force,  if  properly  explained,  must 


THE  MODERN    THEORY  OF  FORCES.  5 

commend  itself  to  universal  acceptance,  and  that  the 
doctrine  of  evolution,  if  relieved  of  absurdities,  is 
valid.  But  this  conclusion  turns,  mainly,  upon  the 
conception  of  forces  and  the  scope  of  their  correla- 
tion, and  involves  the  essential  question,  whether  life 
and  mind  are  forces — a  question  which  runs  through 
the  entire  discussion. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Prof.  Grove,  among 
the  first  to  introduce  the  terms  correlation  and  con- 
servation, speaks  of  forces  as  related  to  matter,  and 
the  conservation  and  correlation  of  forces  as  confined 
within  the  range  of  material  nature.  (See  his  Lec- 
ture, 1842,  quoted  approvingly  by  himself  in  later 
lectures.) 

M.  Faraday,  who  regarded  the  conservation  and 
correlation  of  forces  as  the  highest  law  hitherto  dis- 
covered in  physics,  also  employed  the  term  force  as 
related  to  matter,  and  applied  correlation  and  con- 
servation of  forces  within  the  range  of  material 
nature. 

We  are  ready  not  only  to  accept  but  to  maintain 
this  view  of  the  correlation  and  conservation  of  forces 
as  presented  by  Grove  and  Faraday,  and  other  ear- 
lier advocates  of  the  theory  of  forces. 

But  within  the  last  decade  the  notion  of  force 
has  been  enlarged,  and  the  scope  of  correlation  has 
been  extended  far  beyond  the  realm  of  matter. 


O  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Although  the  general  principle  is  correct,  viz.  : 
Conservation  and  Correlation  ;  yet,  the  theory  of 
forces,  amplified  as  it  is,  and  diverse  and  contradic- 
tory as  we  shall  see,  shows  how  immature  are  many 
of  the  notions  on  this  subject,  and  how  easy  it  is  in 
the  enthusiasm  of  scientific  speculation  to  fall  into 
error  in  applying  the  general  principle. 

Let  us  examine  this  theory  in  the  light  of  its 
own  definitions.  While  these  definitions  should  be 
clear  they  should  not  be  contradictory.  They  should 
mark,  at  once,  the  precise  and  permanent  limit  to 
the  application  of  the  theory.  It  is  preposterous  to 
talk  of  the  correlation  of  forces  without  understand- 
ing what  force  is.  It  is  still  more  preposterous  to 
talk  of  forces  as  affections  of  matter  without  under- 
standing what  matter  is — whether  force  is  matter, 
and  whether  mind,  as  some  affirm,  is  the  most 
highly  concentrated  force. 

In  the  slightest  hazard  we  cannot  submit  to  guid- 
ance which  does  not  know  its  way.  A  fortiori^  we 
cannot  submit  ourselves  to  unwitting  guidance,  when 
the  very  nature  of  matter  and  mind  is  involved, 
when  our  own  origin  and  destiny,  the  very  origin 
and  destiny  of  thought  and  being,  are  involved. 

According  to  Mr.  Grove,  force,  though  so  subtle 
as  to  elude  the  senses,  is  real  and  casual — the  pro- 
ducer or  cause  of  motion  ;  (passim). 


THE   MODERN   THEORY  OF  FORCES.  7 

While  this  definition  may  apply  in  dynamics,  it 
is  evidently  inadequate  in  statics,  as  Mr.  Grove  him- 
self admits,  ''  in  the  case  of  equilibrium  of  two  arms 
of  a  balance  ;  "  and  so,  we  may  add,  in  every  case  of 
statics  where  balanced  forces  of  indefinite  degree 
may  produce  static  repose  in  any  degree. 

Dr.  Mayer,  of  Heilbronn,  in  his  paper  on  "  The 
Forces  of  Inorganic  Nature,"  p.  251,  says:  ''The 
term  force  conveys  the  idea  of  something  unknown 
and  hypothetical." 

On  the  other  hand,  he  tells  us,  p.  252,  that 
*'  forces  are  indestructible,  convertible,  imponderable 
objects." 

Dr.  Bray,  in  his  Anthropology,  etc.,  p.  164,  de- 
clares with  scientific  enthusiasm  :  "  Force  is  every- 
thing." And,  doubtless  to  be  more  explicit,  he  says 
on  p.  220,  "  The  scientific  idea  of  force  is  the  idea  of 
as  pure  and  mysterious  a  unity  as  the  one  of  Par- 
menides.  It  is  a  noumenal  integer  phenomenally 
differentiated  into  the  glittering  universe  of  things." 

It  is  a  relief  to  turn  from  this  dazzling  definition 
to  the  milder  utterance  of  Faraday  :  "  What  I  mean 
by  the  word  force  is,  the  cause  of  a  physical  action." 

As  this  restricts  the  effect  to  the  limit  of  physics, 
so  it  would  seem  to  restrict  the  cause — though  the 
statement  is  indefinite. 

Dr.  Bastian,  in  his  labored  work  on  "  Force  and 


8  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

Matter,"  I.  p.  4,  explains  force  to  be  a  mode  of  mo- 
tion, differing  again  from  all  that  precede  him  in 
regarding  force  as  neither  effect  nor  cause,  but  as 
the  mode  of  an  effect. 

Herbert  Spencer,  First  Princ,  p.  266,  says : 
"  Force,  as  we  know  it,  can  be  regarded  only  as  a 
certain  conditioned  effect  of  the  unconditioned  cause, 
as  the  relative  reality,  indicating  to  us  an  absolute 
reality  by  which  it  is  immediately  produced."  And 
Prof.  Barker,  as  if  deliberately  to  increase  the  con- 
fusion, says  in  a  lecture  devoted  to  the  elucidation 
of  this  subject :  *'  By  actual  energy  as  contradistin- 
guished from  potential  energy  is  meant  motion.  It 
is  in  this  latter  sense  that  we  shall  use  the  word 
force  in  this  lecture."  (Correlation  of  the  Vital  and 
Physical  Forces,  p.  7.) 

This  is  a  sample  of  the  definitions  which  could 
be  greatly  extended.  And,  yet,  under  the  threat  of 
censure  from  this  school  of  '■'■  more  advanced  think- 
ers," as  Prof.  Barker  styles  them,  we  are  required  to 
adopt  their  theory  of  forces. 

From  these  confused  and  contradictory  defini- 
tions of  force,  we  turn  to  the  view  of  matter  as  pre- 
sented by  this  modern  theory.  Does  it  distinguish 
or  identify  matter  and  force  ? 

As  we  have  already  seen,  Mr.  Grove  says, 
"  Forces  are  the  affections  of  matter,"  thus  distin- 


THE  MODERN   THEORY  OF  FORCES.  9 

guishing  between  the  two  ;  while  Faraday  declares, 
'*  matter  is  force,"  thus  identifying  the  two.  Fara- 
day reached  this  decision,  as  we  learn  from  his  *'  Life 
and  Letters,"  after  the  maturer  experience  of  a  life 
spent  in  scientific  observation,  pushing  his  analysis  to 
the  ultimate  conclusion  that  the  "  atoms  of  matter 
are  centres  ot  force." 

Winslow  says,  p.  70,  ''  Matter  is  of  itself  a  mere 
vehicle.  Its  fundamental  nature  is  to  possess  and 
hold  force  as  a  bladder  holds  water  ;  a  sack,  meal." 

Balfour  Stewart,  in  his  recent  work  on  **  The 
Conservation  of  Energy,"  says,  p.  133,  *'  Matter  is 
essentially  dynamic." 

Bastian,  one  of  the  most  radical  supporters  of 
the  modern  theory  of  forces,  says  "  Forces  are  the 
qualities  of  matter  "  ;  while  Bray,  no  less  radical 
than  Bastian,  says  "  Matter  is  force." 

Professor  Spiller  (see  Popular  Science  Monthly, 
Jan.  1874,  p.  351),  asserts  that  "  no  material  consti- 
tuent of  a  body,  no  atom,  is  in  itself  originally  en- 
dowed with  force,  but  that  every  such  atom  is  abso- 
lutely dead  and  without  any  inherent  power  to  act 
at  a  distance." 

He  fundamentally  distinguishes  matter  and  force, 
and  goes  on  to  show  that  force  is  an  entity  having 
an  existence  substantial  and  independent  of  matter. 

And  among  the  latest  utterances  in  the  same 
1* 


10  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

direction,  Prof.  Stallo  (P.  S.  Monthly,  p.  351),  con- 
demns both  the  hypothesis  of  "  corpuscular  atoms  " 
as  advocated  by  Spiller  and  others,  and  the  hypoth- 
esis of  ''centres  of  force  "  as  advocated  by  Faraday 
and  others  ;  and  to  complete  the  confusion  in  regard 
both  to  force  and  matter,  affirms  that  there  is  no 
force  without  matter,  and  no  matter  without  force, 
but  that  neither  of  these  elements  has  any  reality  as 
such. 

We  confess  our  inadequacy  to  adopt  these  con- 
tradictory definitions,  as  well  as  our  growing  suspi- 
cion of  a  theory  built  upon  such  a  foundation. 

Like  disagreement  prevails  among  this  school  of 
scientists  in  regard  to  Life. 

"What  is  its  origin,"  Prof.  Tiedemann  declares, 
*'  is  beyond  the  range  of  experiment."  Dr.  Bastian 
declares  life  to  be  "  the  result  of  molecular  combi- 
nation," and,  together  v/ith  his  coterie,  vociferously 
teaches  archebiosis — the  old  theory  of  Needham 
and  Redi,  and  older  still  of  Ovid  and  Lucretius, 
that  "  living  things  can  take  origin  from  non-living 
materials." 

While  another  coterie  as  vociferously  deny  arche- 
biosis and  teach  panspermism — the  theory  of  Spal- 
lanzani  and  Bonnet,  etc.,  that  the  atmosphere  bears 
with  it  everywhere  the  germs  of  infusorial  animalculae 
and  of  other  organic   forms,  from  which  generatio'n 


THE  MODERN   THEOR  V  OF  FORCES.  1 1 

proceeds,  generation  apparently  but  not  really  spon- 
taneous. 

''  Life,"  says  Schelling,  "  is  the  tendency  to  in- 
dividuation." Herbert  Spencer  says,  ''  Life  is  the 
continuous  adjustment  of  internal  relations  to  ex- 
ternal relations." 

Dr.  Meissner,  who  informs  us  that  he  "  succeeded 
in  directly  producing  life  in  inanimate  bodies," 
and  therefore  ought  to  know,  says  'VLife  is  but 
motion." 

We  had  supposed  it  neither  difficult  nor  uncom- 
mon to  transmit  motion  to  inanimate  bodies  ;  but 
this  error  Dr.  Meissner  would  promptly  correct  by 
the  oracular  announcement,  that  ''  motion  is  an  act- 
ual tangible  substance." 

Prof.  Owen  says  :  *'  Life  is  a  sound  expressing 
the  sum  of  living  phenomena." 

Now,  we  are  arrested  by  the  advocacy  of  epi- 
genesis,  with  the  rallying  cry  from  its  supporters  : 
"  Omne  vivum  ex  ovo,"  with  an  occasional  modifi- 
cation :  "  Omne  vivum  ex  vivo."  Anon,  the  adverse 
claims  of  heterogenesis  gain  the  ascendant ;  and, 
now,  homogenesis  increases  the  confusion.  Discord 
becomes  contagious  as  the  scientific  coteries  concen- 
trate upon  their  favorite  and  diverse  issues— biosis 
and  archebiosis,  spontaneity  and  heredity,  homogene- 
sis and  heterogenesis  and  epigenesis  and  pangenesis. 


12  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Dr.  Bastian  concluded  that  he  had  produced 
"  truly  organized  plants  and  small  ciliated  infusoria," 
out  of  inorganic  matter.  But  Schultz  and  Dalle 
claimed  to  correct  the  hasty  conclusion  by  their 
failure  to  vitalize  lifeless  matter,  organic  or  inorganic. 

Dr.  Bray  declares  that  Hfe  proceeds  only  from 
life  ;  while  Mr.  Crosse,  it  will  be  remembered  by  the 
readers  of ''  The  Vestiges  of  Creation,"  by  a  solution 
of  silex  in  water,  created  the  late  lamented  insect, 
so  precocious  that  it  promptly  became  a  shining 
mark  for  death,  but  which  during  its  brief  and  brill- 
iant life  received  the  name  of  its  fond  creator — 
Acarus  Crossii — the  first,  alas,  I  believe,  the  only 
one  of  his  spontaneous  offspring. 

On  the  one  hand,  are  arrayed  "  the  advanced 
thinkers  "  from  Lamarck  and  Burdach  to  Bastian 
and  Pouchet. 

On  the  other  hand,  are  arrayed  ''  the  advanced 
thinkers"  from  Schwann  and  Schultz  to  Pasteur 
and  Duthiers. 

But  this  discord  is  aggravated  by  the  special 
disagreement  of  what  were  deemed  friends  in  the 
larger  strife.  Even  Pouchet  cannot  agree  with  Bas- 
tian, nor  Burdach  with  Lamarck. 

Pineau  in  1845,  as  he  tells  us,  actually  watched, 
step  by  step,  the  heterogenetic  origin  and  develop- 
ment   of    one    microscopic    fungus,    the   penicilium 


THE  MODERN   THEORY  OF  FORCES.  1 3 

glaucum,  and  of  two  infusoria,  a  vorticella  and  a 
monas  lens  !  ! 

While  the  materialistic  Biichner  says  of  life : 
*^  The  final  results  are  separated  from  the  original 
causes  by  such  a  number  of  intermediate  links  that 
their  connection  is  not  easily  established." 

And  Bray,  one  of  the  most  advanced  of  *'  the 
more  advanced  thinkers,"  says  :  "  Life,  so  far  as  we 
yet  know,  proceeds  only  from  life  ;"  and  he  quotes  in 
confirmation  the  statement  of  Prof.  Huxley,  that 
**  constructive  chemistry  could  do  nothing  without 
the  influence  of  pre-existing  living  protoplasm." 
(Bray,  p.  34.) 

But  we  need  not  multiply  instances  of  disagree- 
ment and  contradiction  among  these  modern  theo- 
rists on  life  and  matter  and  force. 

Vagueness  in  the  general  statement  allows  ap- 
parent agreement ;  and  verbal  legerdemain  serves 
the  double  purpose  of  relieving  the  initiated,  and 
deceiving  the  uninitiated. 

It  is  under  the  cover  of  such  indefiniteness  that 
an  illicit  process  has  crept  in  which  would  forsooth 
clandestinely  commit  us  all,  and  all  things,  to  a  vague 
theory  of  the  correlation  and  conservation  of  forces. 
It  is  because  of  this  very  indefiniteness  of  terms  that 
so  many  vagrant  and  diverse  theorizers  can  be  clas- 
sified as  members  of  this  modern  school  of  scientists. 


14  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Precision  would  greatly  check  the  enthusiasm  of 
their  support  and  their  mutual  admiration.  And 
yet,  with  a  charitable  profession  that  would  hide  a 
multitude  of  faults,  and  at  the  same  time  prevent 
scrutiny  from  without  and  from  within,  Prof.  You- 
mans  industriously  heralds  the  new  scientific  broth- 
erhood with  this  announcement  :  ''  It  is  now  an 
axiom  that  not  he  who  guesses  is  to  be  adjudged  the 
true  discoverer,  but  he  who  demonstrates  the  new 
truth." 

This  confusion  would  be  comparatively  harmless 
and  insignificant,  like  the  play  at  blind  man's  buff, 
did  it  concern  only  the  players.  While  this  theory 
confined  itself  to  the  material  field,  if  not  helpful,  it 
was  at  least  harmless.  Although  it  could  not  agree 
upon  a  definition  of  force,  nor  of  matter,  nor  of  for- 
ces— now  distinguishing  and  now  identifying  that 
which  it  had  just  distinguished,  and  so  plunging 
itself  and  those  who  relied  upon  it  into  inextricable 
confusion  ;  yet  the  speculative  and  the  practical 
thinkers  remained  unaffected — accepting  the  conclu- 
sions of  this  theory,  and  disregarding  its  verbal 
contradictions — as  hitherto,  so  now,  applying  forces 
freely  and  converting  them  into  each  other  as  occa- 
sion demanded. 

But  overstepping  this  limit  and  applying  its  hy- 
pothesis to  life  and  thought,  this  modern  theory  of 


THE  MODERN   THEORY  OF  FORCES.  I  5 

forces  by  its  rough  play  of  confused  definitions  and 
eager  generalizations,  and  scientific  dogmatizing,  can 
but  work  mischief;  for,  though  it  cannot  tell  what 
force  is,  nor  what  is  matter,  nor  what  are  forces  ; 
yet,  it  declares  that  vitality  and  thought,  life  and 
mind,  are  the  same  as  matter — forces  the  same  in 
kind  as  physical  forces— thus  destroying  all  funda- 
mental distinctions  ;  correlating  thought  with  heat, 
choice  with  physical  compulsion,  and  life  with  the 
sweep  of  a  lever  ;  correlating,  confounding,  human 
morality  with  material  mechanism,  freedom  with 
fate,  moral  government  with  natural  necessity  ;  in  a 
word,  making  life  and  mind  material,  the  same  in 
kind  as  a  stock  or  a  stone,  imperiling,  at  once,  moral 
government,  human  responsibility,  and  individual 
freedom. 

Such  is  the  scope  of  the  theory  logically  implied 
and  openly  avowed. 

That  I  do  not  overstate  this,  a  few  references 
will  abundantly  prove. 

Dr.  Maudsley  in  his  '*  Physiology  and  Pathology 
of  the  Mind,"  styles  mind  "  the  highest  development 
of  force,"  where  it  appears  in  its  most  compressed 
form  as  consciousness. 

Dr.  Hammond  in  his  "  Physics  and  Physiology 
of  Spiritualism  "  says  :  ''  Mind  is  a  force,  the  result 
of  nervous  action." 


1 6  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Dr.  Bray  in  his  "  Manual  of  Anthropology  "  says 
concisely  :  ''  Mind  is  force."  In  the  same  category 
he  places  heat,  light,  electricity,  chemical  affinity, 
life  and  mind,  as  forces  known  to  us  only  in  their 
modes  of  motion  ;  and  characterizes  heat  as  the 
most  diffuse,  and  mind  as  the  most  condensed  form 
of  force.  "  Therefore  mental  philosophy  becomes  a 
pure  system  of  dynamics  or  measuring  of  forces." 

Prof.  Youmans,  after  enumerating  the  forces 
manifested  in  the  living  system, — mechanical,  chem- 
ical, thermal,  luminous,  electric,  nervous,  sensory, 
emotional,  and  intellectual,  asserts :  "  That  these 
forces  are  perfectly  coordinated  .  .  .  does  not 
admit  of  doubt."  And,  kindling  with  enthusiasm, 
he  exclaims  :  "  This  law  of  force  spans  all  orders  of 
existence,  not  only  governing  the  motions  of  plan- 
ets, but  ruling  the  actions  and  relations  of  men." 
("  Correlation,  etc.,  p.  xli.) 

Moleschott  declares  :  ''  Thought  is  a  motion  of 
matter." 

Buchner,  in  his  work  on  "  Force  and  Matter," 
clamorously  avows  blank  materialism.,  and  proposes 
to  establish  the  identity  of  the  laws  of  thought  with 
the  mechanical  laws  of  external  nature,  and  con- 
cludes with  this  materialistic  quotation  :  '*  The  senses 
are  the  source  of  all  truth  and  of  all  error,  and  the 
human  mind  is  the  product  of  the  change  of  matter.' 


THE  MODERN   THEORY  OF  FORCES.  1/ 

Carl  Vogt,  courageously  pressing  the  modern 
theory  of  forces  to  its  logical  materialistic  limit, 
asserts  that  thought  is  a  secretion  of  the  brain,  that 
•'just  as  the  liver  secretes  bile,  so  the  brain  secretes 
thought." 

Herbert  Spencer  says :  ''  Those  modes  of  the 
unknowable  which  we  call  motion,  heat,  light,  chem- 
ical affinity,  etc.,  are  ahke  transformable  into  each 
other,  and  into  those  modes  of  the  unknowable 
which  we  distinguish  as  sensation,  emotion,  thought ; 
those  in  their  turns  being  directly  and  indirectly 
re-transformable  into  the  original  shapes." 

Prof.  Youmans  does  not,  indeed,  claim  that  this 
has  been  proved,  only  that  "  it  seems  abundantly 
evident."  As  if  willing  to  set  logic  at  defiance,  he 
argues  thus  :  "  If  the  forces  are  correlated  in  organic 
growth  and  nutrition,  they  must  be  in  organic 
action  ;  and  thus  human  activity  in  all  its  forms  is 
brought  within  the  operation  of  this  law  " — the 
correlation  of  forces.  Even  the  logic  of  the  most 
modern  science  must  rebuke  the  rashness  of  such  a 
defence.  Apparently  rebuked  by  his  own  reflec- 
tion, he  offers  this  apology :  ''  From  the  great  com- 
plexity of  the  conditions,  the  same  exactness  will 
not,  of  course,  be  expected  here  as  in  the  inorganic 
field." 

We  would  say — the    greatness  of  the  issue  in- 


l8  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

volved  demands  at  least  equal  exactness.  We  com- 
mend to  the  careful  consideration  of  the  professor, 
his  own  axiom  marked  with  his  own  emphasis . 
*' Not  he  \n\vo  guesses  is  to  be  adjudged  the  true 
discoverer,  but  he  who  demonstrates  the  new  truth." 
— p.  xvi. 

Prof.  Barker  supplements  the  want  of  demon- 
stration by  this  appeal :  '*  Can  we  longer  refuse  to 
believe  that  our  thought  is  in  some  way  correlated 
to  the  natural  forces  ?  And  this,"  he  significantly 
adds,  '*  and  this  even  in  the  face  of  the  fact  that  it 
has  never  yet  been  measured." 

Really  the  refusal  does  not  seem  to  us  difficult ; 
indeed,  according  to  the  axiom  of  popular  science 
announced  by  the  American  editor,  it  seems  to  us 
obligatory.  Verily,  the  supporters  of  the  modern 
theory  of  forces  exhibit  remarkable  facility  of  belief 
in  this  direction. 

Their  readiness  to  adopt  the  modern  theory 
awakens  the  suspicion  of  a  zeal  not  according  to 
knowledge.  They  may  moderate  their  zeal  by 
reflecting  upon  the  involuntary  confession  of  Prof. 
Tyndall  :  "  The  passage  from  the  physics  of  the 
brain  to  the  corresponding  facts  of  consciousness  is 
unthinkable  ;  "  or,  upon  the  friendly  warning  of  Dr. 
Bray  :  '*  There  is  no  bridge  from  physics  to  meta- 


THE   MODERN    THEORY  OF  FORCES.  1 9 

physics — there  is  no  road  that  way  ;  the  only  road  is 
from  metaphysics  to  physics." 

It  is  not  at  all  surprising  that  Prof.  Barker,  in 
view  of  the  difficulty  in  his  line  of  advance,  should 
prefer  appeal  to  demonstration.  An  authority  on 
this  point,  whom  Prof.  Barker  will  neither  gainsay 
nor  suspect  of  unfriendly  prejudice,  Dr.  Bastian, 
frankly  admits  that  "  however  probable  it  may  be 
that  what  we  know  as  sensation  and  thought  are  as 
truly  the  direct  results  of  the  molecular  activity  of 
certain  nerve-centres,  as  mechanical  energy  is  the 
direct  result  of  a  muscle,  this  cannot  be  proved!^  (The 
Beginnings  of  Life,  I.  p.  49.) 

While  Herbert  Spencer,  for  whose  authority 
Prof.  Barker  will  entertain  no  less  regard,  favorably 
discussing  this  very  question  (Principles  of  Psychol- 
ogy, 1869,  p.  194),  asserts:  "There  is  no  fixed  or 
even  approximate  quantitative  relation  between  the 
amount  of  molecular  transformation  in  the  senti- 
ent centre  and  the  peripheral  disturbance  originally 
causing  it.  Between  the  outer  force  and  the  inner 
feeling  it  excites,  there  is  no  such  correlation  as  that 
which  the  physicist  calls  equivalence — nay,  the  two 
do  not  even  maintain  an  unvarying  proportion. 
Equal  amounts  of  the  same  force  arouse  different 
amounts  of  the  same  feeling,  if  the  circumstances 
differ.     Only  while  all  the  conditions  remain  constant 


20  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

is  there  something  hke  a  constant  ratio  between  the 
physical  antecedent  and  the  physical  consequent." 

At  this  essential  point  the  case  requires,  and  we 
demand,  a  precise  statement  of  the  correlation  if  it 
exist,  and  an  exact  quantitative  estimate  of  the 
relation  assumed  by  this  theory. 

On  the  contrary,  we  are  met  by  the  admissions 
of  Barker,  and  Bastian,  and  Bray,  and  Spencer,  and 
Tyndall,  that  it  is  a  hopeless  attempt  to  establish 
anything  like  a  quantitative  estimate. 

Thus  the  modern  theory  of  forces  breaks  down 
of  its  own  weakness  at  its  very  entrance  upon  this 
disputed  field.  Viewed  in  the  light  of  its  own  defi- 
nitions and  consequences  and  confessions,  it  is  inevi- 
tably condemned  ;  awaiting  greater  condemnation, 
as  vv'e  shall  see,  when  viewed  in  the  higher  light  of 
consciousness  and  reason  and  revelation. 

It  may  well  be  questioned  whether  this  modern 
theory  of  forces  would  ever  have  received  the  advo- 
cacy of  such  confessors,  were  not  the  theory  sup- 
posed to  be  serviceable  to  another,  dear  as  a  nursling 
to  this  school  of  thinkers — a  theory  of  evolution. 
But  it  is  quite  illogical  and  imprudent  to  support 
a  fallacy  in  order  to  maintain  a  dependent  hypoth- 
esis. A  fallacy  can  be  serviceable  only  in  maintain- 
ing a  fiction,  like  this  counterfeit  theory  of  evolution 
—  for  there  is  a  theory  of  evolution  that  is  true. 


THE  MODERN    THEORY  OF  FORCES.  21 

If,  we  ask,  the  modern  theory  of  forces  proves  so 
defective  and  treacherous  on  the  very  margin  of  this 
disputed  territory  in  estimating  the  quantitative 
equivalent  of  the  nervous  system,  "  because  the 
manifestations  of  this  activity  are  so  subtle  and 
eluding,"  what  must  be  its  more  disastrous  failure 
when  the  complication  is  increased  by  the  addition 
of  other  factors  no  less  elusive,  such  as  muscular 
activity  mingling  with  nervous,  and  physical  nutri- 
tion mingling  with  both,  and  yet  other  factors  no 
less  elusive  and  still  more  subtle, — consciousness  and 
volition  and  conscience  and  reason  ? 

From  its  definitions  confused  and  contradictory, 
its  confessions  of  inconclusiveness  and  invalidity,  and 
its  inevitable  consequences  of  materialism  and 
fatalism,  we  pass  to  consider  this  theory  in  reference 
to  life  and  mind,  and  examine  it  in  the  light  of  con- 
sciousness, reason,  and  revelation.  First,  in  refer- 
ence to  mind. 

In  this  higher  field  of  observation  the  subject  is 
psychical,  not  ph3^sical,  else  it  were  the  same  field 
still,  lan^uaq;e  itself  were  false,  consciousness  itself 
deceptive,  and  the  term  correlation  meaningless,  and 
all  measurement  impracticable,  for  matter  cannot 
measure  itself,  and  all  knowledge  impossible,  for 
there  would  be  nothing  that  could  know,  perhaps 
nothing  that  could  be  known.     Who,  at  least,  could 


22  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

say  that  there  would  be  anything  that  could  be 
known  ?  This  alternative  would  prove  more  disas- 
trous to  the  supporters  of  this  theory  than  to  admit 
the  existence  of  mind.  In  this  higher  field,  then, 
the  subject  is  psychical,  not  physical  ;  the  agent  is 
spontaneous,  not  mechanical  ;  hence,  no  common 
gauge  can  here  apply  its  measurement.  More  than 
this  :  in  this  higher  field,  this  psychical  subject,  this 
spontaneous  agent,  is  a  rational  person,  not  a  mate- 
rial thing — knowing  itself  and  knowing  surrounding 
things,  but  not  known  of  them  ;  knowing  forces,  con- 
trolling, employing,  applying  forces,  yet  not  itself  a 
force  ;  capable  of  thinking,  of  feeling,  of  willing,  as 
forces  are  not  ;  competent  to  reflect,  reason,  love, 
and  worship,  as  forces  are  not  ;  conscious  of  freedom 
and  obligation  and  responsibility,  as  forces  are  not  ; 
cognizant  of  justice  and  injustice,  of  right  and  wrong, 
of  merit  and  demerit,  as  forces  are  not.  No  theory 
of  forces,  however  modern,  can  degrade  a  person,  a 
psychical,  spontaneous  person,  to  a  force.  Conscious 
of  such  a  nature  and  such  ability,  the  mind  sees,  be- 
tween itself  and  material  things,  a  distinction  which 
no  theory  of  forces  can  obliterate — a  distinction 
more  indestructible  than  any  force. 

Through  the  mind  we  learn  of  matter  by  tracing 
material  facts,  although  matter  cannot  reverse  the 
process  and  learn    of  mind.     To   know   matter   we 


THE   MODERN   THEORY  OF  FORCES.  23 

must  study  the  facts ;  so  to  know  the  mind  we 
must  study  the  facts.  While  the  facts  of  mind  are 
utterly  diverse  from  those  of  matter,  they  are,  to 
say  the  least,  no  less  certain.  The  knowledge  of 
mind  is,  at  least,  as  valid  as  the  knowledge  of  matter. 
Only  by  our  knowledge  of  mind  can  we  verify  any 
knowledge  of  matter.  Mental  consciousness  is  the 
primary  essential.  In  this  fact  of  mind  our  knowl- 
edge begins,  and  through  it  absolutely  does  our 
knowledge  extend  ;  and  by  this  testimony  we  learn 
how  distinct  and  different  are  the  fundamental  char- 
acteristics of  mind  and  matter.  Consciousness  and 
thought  and  choice,  which  are  characteristic  of  the 
one,  are  impossible  to  the  other.  Again  we  ask, 
what  common  measurement  can  be  applied  to  such 
diverse  facts?  What  common  gauge  will  answer  for 
mind  and  matter? 

But  more  than  this  :  how  can  we  know  ourselves  ? 
Only  by  our  own  consciousness.  And  how  shall 
others  know  us  ?  Not  by  the  appliance  of  any  me- 
chanical measurement,  but  by  studying  our  manifes- 
tations of  mind  and  character  in  the  light  of  their 
own  consciousness.  Our  deeds  may  be  entirely  de- 
ceptive. How,  then,  does  the  estimate  of  their  ap- 
parent and  their  real  values  vary  ?  The  very  action, 
which  at  first  the  public  deemed  commendable,  may, 
when    understood,   appear  culpable.     Why  is  this? 


24  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT, 

Because  conscious  intention  gives  real  character  to 
human  action.  "  A  man  may  smile  and  be  a  villain." 
On  the  other  hand,  a  frown  may  be  in  sport,  like  the 
play  of  a  father  with  his  children,  and  thus  be  a  sign, 
not  of  anger,  but  of  love.  The  same  blow  may  smite 
down  an  enemy,  or  quicken  the  merriment  of  a 
friend.  The  same  act  may  be  the  salutation  of  a 
saint,  or  the  kiss  of  Judas  betraying  Jesus.  And  so 
these  words  of  Solomon  have  been  accepted  by  the 
world  as  a  proverb  :  "  Faithful  are  the  wounds  of  a 
friend  ;  but  the  kisses  of  an  enemy  are  deceitful." 
Why,  again  we  ask,  why  this  varying  estimate  and 
this  varying  value  of  human  actions  ?  Again  we 
reply,  because  the  conscious  intention  gives  real 
character  to  the  action.  Thus,  we  understand, 
through  our  own  consciousness,  the  apparent  para- 
dox, but  the  real  propriety,  of  the  statement  so 
beautifully  made  by  the  poet-king  of  Israel  :  "  Let 
the  righteous  smite  me  ;  it  shall  be  a  kindness." 

But  no  such  rule  can  be  applied  to  the  move- 
ments of  matter.  It  is  utterly  impossible  even  to 
attach  to  them  any  character,  either  of  merit  or  de- 
merit. The  blow  from  a  falling  hammer  may  kill  a 
man,  and  yet,  by  universal  consent,  involve  not  the 
least  moral  character  ;  while  that  blow,  if  impelled 
by  malice  prepense,  becomes  murder,  and  the  perpe- 


THE   MODERN    THEORY  OF  FORCES,  25 

trator  is,  by  universal  consent,  condemned  as  guilty 
of  a  capital  crime. 

But  more  than  this  :  long  before  the  public  may 
have  understood  his  conduct  and  character,  the  man 
himself  has  understood  both,  as  he,  at  first  and  fully, 
was  conscious  of  his  own  intention  ;  and  long  after 
the  public  may  have  rendered  its  verdict  of  praise  or 
blame,  the  man  himself  has  known  whether  he  was 
rightly  judged. 

As  we  study  the  facts  of  matter  and  of  mind, 
further  and  further  do  we  get  from  the  correlation  of 
material  forces  with  mental  action. 

But  more  than  this  :  while  no  keenness  of  obser- 
vation and  no  mechanical  gauge  can  possibly  deter- 
mine the  character  of  an  external  process  such  as  the 
stern,  persistent,  and  painful  surgery  of  Dr.  Brown 
Sequard  in  the  critical  case  of  Mr.  Sumner,  which 
seemed  intended  to  kill,  but  was  designed  to  cure — 
the  man  may  even  misjudge  his  own  physical  acts, 
unless  he  study  his  own  consciousness  and  thus 
know  himself. 

In  St.  Vitus'  dance  how  shall  others  understand, 
how  shall  the  man  himself  understand  his  strange 
actions,  unless  he  question  his  own  consciousness, 
and  know  whether  these  actions  are  wdth  or  without 
the  consent  of  his  will  ?  whether  they  are  the  effect 
of  mental  choice  or  the  effect  of  physical  disease?   If, 


26  FAITH  AND   MODERN   THOUGHT. 

on  the  one  hand,  action  be  known  by  the  testimony 
of  consciousness  to  be  involuntary,  and  thus  adjudged 
to  have  no  moral  significance  ;  so,  on  the  other  hand, 
may  inaction,  as  in  the  case  of  paralysis,  be  known 
by  the  testimony  of  consciousness  to  be  involuntary, 
and  so  be  adjudged  to  have  no  moral  significance. 
Thus,  within  the  range  of  human  actions,  the  same 
act  may,  in  the  true  light  of  consciousness,  have 
different  character  and  value,  and  totally  different 
acts  may,  \x\  the  same  true  light,  have  the  same 
character  and  value  ;  while  opposite  action  and  in- 
action may  have  precisely  the  same  value  with- 
out any  character — as  in  St.  Vitus'  dance  and  in 
paralysis — or  have  the  same  value  with  a  different 
character,  or  have  different  values  and  different 
characters.  Not  only  may  precisely  the  same  kind 
of  action  have  an  utterly  different  character  and  es- 
timate, according  to  the  mental  intention,  but  it  may 
produce  an  entirely  different  effect,  according  to  the 
mental  intention  which  prompted  it — now  with  a 
friendly  intention  imparting  pleasure,  and  now  with 
an  unfriendly  intention  imparting  pain  ;  thus,  in  its 
result,  differing  both  in  quality  and  quantity,  accord- 
ing to  the  mental  intention — baffling  the  calculation 
of  the  most  watchful  mechanical  gauge.  So,  the 
same  word,  producing  the  same  material  vibrations, 
will,  according  to  the  feeling  it  represents,  awaken 


THE   MODERN    THEORY  OF  FORCES.  2/ 

joy  or  grief,  pride  or  shame,  attraction  or  repulsion, 
defy  and  elude  the  most  skillful  mechanical  measure- 
ment. No  fixed  mechanical  gauge,  then,  can  be 
applied  in  this  higher  field  ;  no  material  measurement 
is  possible  ;  a  fortiori,  no  quantitative  equivalent  can 
be  found. 

If,  then,  from  the  standpoint  of  experiment,  Prof. 
Barker  and  Bastian  and  Bray  and  Spencer  and  Tyn- 
dall  found  it  **  a  hopeless  attempt  to  establish  any- 
thing like  a  quantitative  estimate,"  from  a  still 
higher  standpoint,  in  consciousness  itself,  we  see  the 
attempt  is  hopeless. 

Now,  of  these  factors, — force,  matter,  mind — 
which  do  we  know  best  ?  We  know  matter  only 
through  force.  But  are  we  conscious  of  force  ?  No  ; 
we  are  conscious  of  its  impressions  on  us,  its  attrac- 
tions and  repulsions,  gravitation  and  diremption, 
soUdity  and  extension,  etc.,  which  are  the  results  of 
force,  and  of  these  we  are  conscious  only  through 
the  senses. 

Are  we  conscious  of  thinking  and  feeling  and  will- 
ing? We  are  directly  conscious  of  these  ;  but  these 
are  spiritual  acts  —  at  least,  different  phenomena 
from  solidity  and  extension.  If,  as  Mr.  Spencer  is 
compelled  to  admit,  ''  The  utmost  possibility  for  us 
is  an  interpretation  of  the  process  of  things  as  it  pre- 
sents itself  to  our  limited  consciousness  "  (see  Bas- 


28  FAITH  AND   MODERN   THOUGHT. 

tian,  p.  2),  this  is  especially  true  when  we  pass  from 
the  realm  of  things  to  the  realm  of  persons.  It  is 
not  through  the  bodily  senses,  but  through  con- 
sciousness itself,  that  we  know  the  mind  ;  and  thus 
our  knowledge  of  mind  is  at  once  more  direct,  more 
complete,  and  more  trustworthy.  This  decisive 
point  Mr.  Spencer  is  compelled  to  concede  :  "  The 
personality  of  which  each  is  conscious,  and  of  which 
the  existence  is  a  fact  beyond  all  others  the  most 
certain,  etc."  {First  Prin.  p.  66)  ;  and  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill 
{Introduction  to  Logic)  is  compelled  to  assert  :  "  What- 
ever is  known  to  us  by  consciousness,  is  known 
beyond  the  possibility  of  question."  Now,  if  con- 
sciousness is  **  the  light  of  all  our  seeing,"  both  what 
is  within  and  what  is  without,  it  is  obvious  how  much 
of  our  knowledge  it  includes.  In  this  light  of  con- 
sciousness we  may  learn,  each  for  himself,  and  better 
than  his  neighbor  can  tell  him,  what  mind  is. 

And  the  first  answer  of  consciousness  is,  that 
mind  is  distinguished  from  matter — the  self  from 
the  not-self — in  which  simple  judgment  two  impor- 
tant things  are  involved  :  the  one,  that  the  mind  or 
self  is ;  and  the  other,  that  mind  is  distinct  from 
matter. 

Again,  the  answer  of  consciousness  is,  that  mind 
is  a  spontaneous  agent,  acting  without  compulsion, 
and  even  in  spite  of  compulsion  ;  again,  that  mind  is 


THE  MODERN    THEORY  OF  FORCES.  29 

a  rational  agent,  capable  of  knowing  itself  and  of 
knowing  the  material  universe,  capable  of  recog- 
nizing and  obeying  obligation.  But  not  only  does 
the  mind  see  itself  as  person,  and  not  thing,  pos- 
sessed of  a  will  in  liberty  and  a  rationality  to  guide 
that  will,  and  a  conscience  to  respond  joyously  to 
the  harmony  of  the  will  and  the  reason,  or  sadly  to 
their  discord  ;  the  mind  not  only  sees  what  it  is,  but 
also  shows  what  it  is.  Superior  to  material  forces, 
it  brings  them  into  a  higher  unity  than  of  themselves 
they  could  ever  attain,  making  them  subserve  a 
human  organism  ;  elevates  the  life-principle  to  a 
higher  service  than  mere  instinct ;  exalts  the  senses 
to  a  nobler  office  than  that  of  mere  sensual  srratifi- 
cation  ;  em.ploys  all  these,  at  the  behests  of  its  own 
rationality,  to  serve  and  secure  a  higher  and  still 
higher  manhood.  This  is  utterly  different,  both  in 
kind  and  degree,  from  what  pertains  to  physical 
forces.  Thus,  by  the  right  of  its  own  conscious 
excellence,  it  holds  dominion,  and  for  the  purpose  of 
augmenting  that  excellence,  it  puts  all  physical 
forces  and  all  life-instincts  and  all  the  bodily  senses 
in  subjection  to  this  higher  unity. 

By  this  twofold  process  of  induction  and  deduc- 
tion, from  the  standpoint  of  scientific  experiment 
and  from  that  of  philosophic  observation,  w^e  see 
how  "  hopeless  is  the  attempt  to  estabhsh  anything 


30  FAITH  AND   MODERN   THOUGHT. 

like  a  quantitative  equivalence  ;  "  how  hopeless  the 
attempt  to  establish  a  correlation  between  the  forces 
of  matter  and  the  activities  of  mind. 

But  the  direct  argument  from  mind  is  by  no 
means  exhausted.  Moral  government  exists.  We 
recognize  its  obligation  upon  ourselves  ;  we  impose 
the  same  obligation  upon  others.  It  is  vindicated 
by  the  individual  conscience  and  by  the  public  con- 
science, and  sanctioned  by  common  law,  and  ap- 
pealed to  in  every  struggle  for  freedom,  justice,  and 
reform.  This  recognition,  this  vindication,  this 
sanction,  this  appeal,  are  all  confirmed  by  the  indi- 
vidual conscience,  making  each  a  law  unto  himself; 
leaving  each  at  liberty  within  this  moral  realm,  yet 
holding  each  responsible,  with  supreme  sanctions  of 
commendation  or  condemnation,  which  the  human 
soul  cannot  escape — a  confirmation  superior  to  all 
skeptical  reasoning  or  theoretical  contradiction  or 
scientific  adjustment.  Nothing  of  this  kind  can  be 
said  of  material  forces ;  it  cannot  but  be  said  of 
mental  activities.  There  can  be  no  correlation  be- 
tween them,  either  quantitative  or  qualitative.  On 
the  one  hand,  material  forces  never  become  respon- 
sible, however  much  they  may  be  employed  by  the 
mental  activities  ;  on  the  other  hand,  mental  activ- 
ities never  become  irresponsible,  however  much  they 
may  employ  the  material  forces.     The  distinction  is 


THE   MODERN    THEORY  OF  FORCES.  3 1 

essential  and  immutable.  Correlation  here  is  impos- 
sible. And  yet,  the  modern  theory  of  forces  con- 
tradicts this  highest  dictate  of  the  soul,  and — in 
spite  of  the  evidence  of  literature  and  law,  of  private 
and  public  recognition,  of  conscience  and  reason — 
denies  the  possibility  of  moral  government  and  of 
moraHty.  It  places  in  the  same  category  material 
forces  and  intellectual  and  voluntary  action,  denying 
all  difference  in  kind  and  quality.  "  All  actions," 
says  Bray,  p.  309,  *'  organic  or  inorganic,  mental  or 
material — all  actions  being  equally  necessary,  there 
can  be  ?io  iyitrinsic  differeyice  between  them."  Merit 
and  demerit,  praise  and  blame,  at  once  perish.  Dr. 
Meissner  proposed  to  show  not  only  that  heat  is  a 
mode  of  motion,  but  that  vegetable  and  animal  life, 
and  human  will  and  love  and  thought,  and  even 
God,  himself,  are  but  motion  ! — the  one,  no  less  than 
the  other,  subject  to  necessity  and  destitute  of 
morality  !  ! 

Its  logic  is  sound,  if  its  premises  are  valid.  Merit 
and  demerit  are  not  predicable  of  mere  force  ;  and 
voluntary  action  is,  by  this  theory,  transformed  and 
degraded  into  mere  force.  Hence,  merit  and  de- 
merit are  not  predicable  of  human  action  !  Accord- 
ing to  the  modern  theory  of  forces,  both  morality 
and  moral  government,  therefore,  are  impossible  !  ! 

We  would  not  discard  this  theory,  solely  or  pri- 


32  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

marily,  because  of  its  consequences  ;  but,  because  it 
is  unsound,  we  discard  the  theory  with  its  conse- 
quences. 

But,  not  to  dwell  longer  upon  the  argument 
from  mind,  we  pass  to  another  direct  argument, — 
the  argument  drawn  from  life. 

After  the  admission  of  Bastian,  that  ''the  inter- 
mediate links  in  the  life-process  are  not  easily  estab- 
lished ;"  and  Virchow's  statement,  that  ''chemistry 
has  not  succeeded  in  forming  a  blastema  (the  gen- 
eral formative  compound  of  tissues),  nor  physics  in 
forming  a  cell — what  does  it  matter  ;  "  and  Spencer's 
confession,  "  The  forces  which  we  distinguish  as 
uicntal  come  within  the  same  generalization  (as  the 
nervous).  Yet,  tJicre  is  no  alternative  biU  to  make  the 
assertion  ;  "  and  Prof.  Tiedeman's  declaration,  "  The 
origin  of  organic  xnatter  and  living  bodies  is  alto- 
gether beyond  the  range  of  experiment ;  "  and  Bray's 
assertion,  "  The  first  requisite  is  life,  which,  so  far  as 
we  yet  know,  proceeds  only  from  life  ;  ''  and  Hux- 
ley's admission,  in  his  inaugural  address  before  the 
British  Scientific  Association,  (1871) ;  "  Looking  back 
through  the  prodigious  vista  of  the  past,  I  find  no 
record  of  the  commencement  of  life,  and,  therefore, 
I  am  devoid  of  any  means  of  forming  a  definite  con- 
clusion as  to  the  conditions  of  its  appearance  : " 
after  such  admissions  it  is   not   necessary   to   linger 


THE  MODERN   THEORY  OF  FORCES.  33 

long  upon  the  question  of  life  as  related  to  the  mod- 
ern theory  of  forces,  however  fully  we  may  choose 
to  consider  it  for  the  sake  of  the  discussion.  Evi- 
dently, the  process  in  nature  is  to  evolve  life  from 
life  ;  vegetables  from  the  living  seeds  (each  after  its 
kind) ;  fish  from  the  living  spawn  ;  animals  from  the 
egg  or  living  germ  ;  and  man  from  the  living  germ 
or  the  &^%. 

The  earth  brings  forth,  not  something  from 
nothing,  as  it  would  if  life  —  the  greater  —  were 
evolved  from  mere  physical  forces — the  less — but 
what  it  has  received  as  a  living  conception,  the 
physical  forces  (heat,  light,  electricity,  magnetism, 
chemical  affinity)  each  and  all  aiding  to  develop,  but 
not  creating,  the  life. 

If  spontaneous  generation  ever  be  effected  by 
the  skill  of  man  through  strange  and  arbitrary  com- 
binations, yet,  spontaneous  generation  is  not  nature's 
method. 

Everywhere  through  nature's  realm,  so  far  as  w^e 
can  trace  it,  in  the  present  or  in  the  past,  life  pro- 
ceeds from  life.  The  scientific  rule  is  scrupulously 
observed  :  Causa  ceqitat  effcctmn.  The  vegetable 
takes  lifeless  mineral  ingredients,  and,  applying 
light  and  heat,  transforms  these  lifeless  ingredients 
into  living  matter ;  this  is  effected,  as  Bastian  himself 
admits,  "  under  the  influence  of  pre-existing  proto- 


34  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

plasm."  (II  :  p.  'j']^  Crystals,  evidently,  as  Bastian 
also  admits,  are  statical  aggregates ;  living  organisms 
are  dynamical.  Crystals,  in  forming,  emit  heat ; 
organisms,  in  growing,  absorb  heat.  Organic  mole- 
cules or  atoms  have  mobility;  inorganic  molecules 
have  immobility.  Inorganic  bodies  are  built  up 
from  without  by  accretion ;  organic  bodies  grow 
from  within  by  assimilation.  Organic,  living  bodies 
have  the  power  of  reproduction  or  self-multiplica- 
tion ;  inorganic,  lifeless  bodies  are  incapable  of  self- 
multiplication  or  reproduction.  In  the  life-process 
there  is  a  ceaseless  strife  between  vital  affinity  and 
chemical  affinity — the  former  proceeding  to  build  up, 
the  latter  to  destroy,  the  organism.  The  life-process 
is  the  triumph  of  the  former,  which  not  only  employs 
other  physical  forces,  but  subjects  even  chemical 
affinity  and  gravity  to  its  high  purpose.  Indeed, 
Prof.  Clark  asserts  (''  Mind  and  Nature,"  p.  7),  "  Or- 
ganized beings  exist  in  direct  opposition  to  natural 
chemical  affinity."  If  this  be  true,  we  see  the  less 
probability  that  chemical  agency,  however  skillfully 
employed,  can  create  life,  and  the  greater  propriety 
in  Huxley's  statement  :  "  Constructive  chemistry 
could  do  nothing  without  the  influence  of  pre-exist- 
ing protoplasm."     (Bray,  p.  35.) 

To  careful,  and  even  to  careless  observation,  life 
ever  appears  employing   forces,  superintending  and 


THE  MODERN   THEORY  OF  FORCES.  35 

directing  their  service,  using  them  as  constructive 
aids  to  bring  it  nourishment  and  to  build  up  for 
itself  a  fitting  organism,  so  that  every  seed  shall  have 
its  own  body,  and  every  plant  its  own  distinct  form, 
and  every  animal  its  own  characteristics,  and  every 
man  his  own  individuality  or  personality.  For  its 
use,  life  seeks  out  appropriate  forces,  separates  them 
from  the  inappropriate,  and  subjects  them  to  its 
service,  producing  a  higher  unity  by  its  own  mastery, 
and  a  greater  diversity  for  its  pleasure  and  profit. 

We  would  not,  then,  style  life  a  force — not  even 
a  vital  force — but  an  activity,  or  life-power;  while 
mind  is  not  a  force — not  even  a  spiritual  force — but 
a  spiritual  activity,  or  mental  power. 

The  distinction  is  by  no  means  illusory  or  unim- 
portant. It  reveals  the  barrier  between  matter  and 
life,  between  matter  and  mind — a  barrier  which  we 
have  no  fear  that  scientific  progress  will  ever  break 
down  or  remove,  however  much  some  scientists 
desire  to  effect  this. 

There  may  be  vital  forces — chemical,  like  the  di- 
gestive force  of  the  stomach,  which  may  be  imitated 
in  the  chemical  laboratory  ;  mechanical,  like  the  pro- 
pulsive force  of  the  heart,  following  the  most  precise 
rules  in  hydraulics  ;  muscular  force,  moving  the  limbs 
like  the  mechanical  action  of  a  lever  ;  there  are  these 
vital  forces  which,  together  with  physical  forces,  like 


36  FAITH  A  AW  MODERN'   THOUGHT. 

heat  and  light,  the  Hfe  uses  in  its  activity  and  power ; 
forces  which  are  correlated  to  each  other  but 
which  the  life  uses  instinctively  and  directs  not  as 
equals,  but  as  servants  to  accomplish  its  higher 
ends. 

Prof  Barker  labors  through  successive  pages  to 
prove,  what  we  readily  admit  and  assert,  that  all 
these  physical  operations  under  the  supervision  of 
Hfe  are  in  correlation.  While  he  admits,  inevitably, 
that  vital  force  (as  he  styles  the  life-power)  is  different, 
dominating  the  physical  forces,  asserting  its  superior 
right,  "  uniting  substances  which  in  inanimate  nature 
ever  flee  from  each  other,  separating  that  which  is 
incessantly  striving  to  unite  "  (p.  4)  ;  and,  without 
even  pretending  to  demonstrate,  he  merely  assumes 
correlation  in  such  contingent  phraseology  as : 
*'  Chemistry  doubts  not  her  ability  to  produce." 
.  .  *'  A  few  years  hence  will  doubtless  give 
us,"  etc.,  etc. 

Life  is  a  feeling  of  want  or  need  which  goes  forth 
into  spontaneous  activity  and  reproduction.  Do 
those  who  clamor  for  spontaneous  generation  (arche- 
biosis),  and  pretend  to  effect  it,  produce  such  life? 
As  a  power,  life  is  as  primitive  and  independent  in 
its  origin,  as  are  the  forces  in  their  origin.  While  it 
differs  from  them  in  kind,  it  is  also  their  superior 
in  degree  ;  the  life-instinct,  whenever  and  wherever 


THE   MODERN    THEORY  OF  FORCES.  3/ 

it  appears,  directly  going  forth  with  original  autlior- 
ity  to  take  for  its  service  and  assimilate  to  itself 
whatever  it  may  select  from  earth  and  air  and  sea 
and  sky.  In  the  simplest  processes  of  the  life-power, 
this  authority  is  manifest  in  its  on-workings,  and 
within  this  whole  range  instinct  rules.  In  the  higher 
processes  of  this  same  life-power,  within  the  range 
of  sentiency,  sense,  with  instinct,  rules  ;  and  in  the 
highest  processes  of  this  same  life-power,  within  the 
range  of  rationality,  reason,  with  sense  and  instinct, 
rules.  So  that  within  the  human  sphere,  as  not 
within  the  animal  or  the. vegetable,  even  sense  and 
instinct  are  attended  by  the  informing  presence  of 
reason. 

There  is,  then,  between  the  physical  force  and 
the  life-power,  a  distinction  that  is  fundamental, 
characterizing  the  force  as  mechanical,  the  power  as 
living  ;  making  this  the  user,  that  the  used  ;  and  by 
the  very  distinction  in  kind,  ruling  out  correlation  of 
forces  as  not  applying  in  terms,  nor  possible  in  fact. 

This  view  of  life  is  confirmed  rather  than  confuted 
even  by  the  explanation  of  Dr.  Carpenter.  As  Dr. 
Carpenter  is  conspicuously  put  forth  by  the  American 
editor  as  the  representative  of  the  modern  theory  of 
forces  in  its  application  to  life,  we  shall  be  pardoned 
for  referring  more  freely  to  his  lecture.  (See  "  Cor- 
relation of  Forces,"  etc.,  edited  by  Prof.  Youmans, 


38  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

pp.  401,  402,  41 1,  412,  414,  419,  420,  421,  425.  See, 
also,  Balfour  Stewart's  "  Conservation  of  Energy," 
p.  161.     Also,  Le  Conte,  pp.  185-6-8,  197,  201.) 

We  have  presented  the  negative  argument  drawn 
from  the  admissions  and  discordant  definitions  of 
the  advocates  of  this  theory,  and  the  positive  argu- 
ments drawn  from  the  nature  of  mind  and  of  life. 
By  this  two-fold  process  of  argumentation — direct 
and  indirect — we  have  shown  the  invalidity  of  the 
modern  theory  of  forces. 

It  is  obvious  to  remark  that  the  view  we  have 
taken  accords  with  sacred  Scripture,  as  might  be 
shown  by  repeated  references  from  Genesis  to 
Revelation. 

As  indications  of  the  scriptural  doctrine  on  this 
subject,  we  refer  to  Gen.  ii.  7  :  "  And  the  Lord  God 
formed  man  of  the  dust  of  the  ground,  and  breathed 
into  his  nostrils  the  breath  of  life  ;  and  man  became  a 
living  soul."  Job.  xxxiii,  4  :  "  The  spirit  of  God  hath 
made  me,  and  the  breath  of  the  Almighty  hath  given 
me  life  ;  "  and  the  significant  question  of  Jesus,  Matt, 
vi.  25  :  "  Is  not  the  life  more  than  meat,  and  the  body 
than  raiment  ?  "  and  his  sublime  prophecy,  John  v. 
28,  29  :  "  The  hour  is  coming  in  the  which  all  that 
are  in  the  graves  shall  hear  his  voice,  and  shall  come 
forth  ;  they  that  have  done  good  unto  the  resurrec- 
tion of  life  ;   and  they  that  have  done  evil,  unto  the 


THE  MODERN    THEORY  OF  FORCES.  39 

resurrection  of  damnation;"  the  Apostle  Paul's  ser- 
mon at  Athens,  which  not  only  bears  directly  upon 
the  origin  of  life  and  all  things,  but  seems  as  perti- 
nent to  the  vagaries  of  modern  speculation  as  to 
those  of  the  Attic  type,— Acts  xvii.  23-31  :  'Tor  as 
I  passed  by  and  beheld  your  devotions,  I  found  an 
altar  with  this  inscription,  TO  THE  UNKNOWN 
GOD.  Whom  therefore  ye  ignorantly  worship,  him 
declare  I  unto  you.  God  that  made  the  world,  and 
all  things  therein,  seeing  that  he  is  Lord  of  heaven 
and  earth,  dwelleth  not  in  temples  made  with  hands  ; 
neither  is  worshipped  with  men's  hands,  as  though 
he  needed  anything  ;  seeing  he  giveth  to  all  life,  and 

breath,  and  all  things  ; For  in  him  we  live, 

and  move,  and  have  our  being  ;  as  certain  also  of 
your  own  poets  have  said,  For  we  are  also  his  off- 
spring. Forasmuch  then  as  we  are  the  offspring  of 
God,  we  ought  not  to  think  that  the  Godhead  is 
like  unto  gold,  or  silver,  or  stone,  graven  by  art  and 
man's  device.  And  the  times  of  this  ignorance  God 
winked  at,  but  now  commandeth  all  men  everywhere 
to  repent ;  because  he  hath  appointed  a  day,  in  the 
which  he  will  judge  the  world  in  righteousness,  by 
that  man  whom  he  hath  ordained  ;  whereof  he  hath 
given  assurance  unto  all  men,  in  that  he  hath  raised 
him  from  the  dead ;"  and,  finally,  not  to  multiply 
examples,  the   Saviour's   warning   to   his    disciples, 


40  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Matt.  X.  28  :"  Fear  not  them  which  kill  the  body,  but 
are  not  able  to  kill  the  soul ;  but  rather  fear  him 
which  is  able  to  destroy  both  body  and  soul  in  hell." 

Here,  then,  we  reach  the  limit  of  the  specific 
discussion  involved  in  this  chapter ;  and  here  we 
can  logically  rest.  Yet  it  may  be  justly  expected 
that  we  refer  to  the  modern  theory  of  evolution, 
based,  as  it  is,  on  the  modern  theory  of  forces. 

We  admit  an  evolution  originated  by  a  divine 
Creator,  guided  by  a  divine  intelligence,  and  gov- 
erned by  a  divine  purpose,  an  evolution  consistent 
with  the  conservation  and  correlation  of  forces 
throughout  the  material  universe.  But  the  modern 
theory  of  evolution,  based  upon  the  modern  theory 
of  forces,  discards  a  divine  Creator,  a  guiding  intelli- 
gence, a  controlling  purpose,  and  assumes  a  force 
that  is  physical,  persistent,  ultimate,  unintelligent, 
unconscious,  unknowable,  which  evolves  itself  into 
all  things  that  are, —  matter,  life,  mind,  or,  to  be 
specific,  into  heat,  light,  electricity,  magnetism,  chem- 
ism,  consciousness,  reason,  volition.  Now,  it  fol- 
lows from  what  has  been  said,  that  evolution  based 
upon  correlation  and  conservation  of  forces,  as  appli- 
cable equally  to  life  and  mind  and  physical  forces,  is 
untenable.  If  life  and  mind  are  fundamentally 
and  essentially  distinct  from  physical  forces,  the 
modern  doctrine  of  evolution  is  impossible.     If  life 


THE  MODERN   THEORY  OF  FORCES.  4 1 

and  mind  are  not  convertible  into  heat,  light,  elec- 
tricity, magnetism,  and  chemical  affinity,  and  these 
physical  forces  convertible  into  mind  and  life,  then 
the  modern  theory  of  evolution  fails. 

This  theory  of  evolution  is  unsound,  not  only  in 
its  foundation,  but  unsound  in  itself: 

1.  It  is  assumed  by  its  leading  advocates,  hke 
Mr.  Spencer,  as  the  settled  and  only  theory,  when  it 
is  not  demonstrated  nor  proved.  Thus  it  violates 
the  very  principle  on  which  positive  science  presumes 
to  rest,  and  invalidates  its  own  process.  As  an 
historical  fact,  this  theory  of  evolution  is  not  proved  ; 
as  a  scientific  fact,  "  an  absolute  law,"  without  a 
law-giver,  it  is  not  demonstrated.  We  might  safely 
go  farther  and  say,  what  is  not  necessary  here  to 
affirm,  that  in  the  nature  of  the  case  it  never  can  be 
verified  by  induction  (historic  or  scientific),  never  can 
be  demonstrated  by  positive  science. 

2.  This  theory  assumes  that  force,  out  of  which 
all  things  are  to  evolve,  is  unknowable.  Now,  by 
what  authority  of  positive  science  does  it  make  this 
assertion?  How  does  it  know  so  much. about  this 
force  as  to  warrant  the  assumption  that  it  is  unknow- 
able ?  Granting,  for  the  sake  of  the  theory,  that  it 
may  as  yet  be  unknown,  does  it  therefore  follow 
that  it  is  unknowable  ? 

3.  It  assumes  this  force  to  be  the  ultimate,  the 


42  FAITH  AND   MODERN    THOUGHT. 

primary  or  first.  But  this  contradicts  the  preceding 
assunnption  that  it  is  unknowable.  If  it  is  unknow- 
able, how  can  it  be  known  as  primary  or  ultimate? 
And  more,  there  is  no  proof  that  this  unknowable 
force  (as  Mr.  Spencer  styles  it)  is  ultimate.  Mr. 
Spencer  admits  that  there  is  no  such  proof.  Why 
stop  with  force  as  the  ultimate  ?  Our  consciousness 
forbids  this — e.g.^  our  consciousness  declares  that  in 
personal  experience  an  exercise  of  will  is  before 
force.  More  than  this,  our  observation  forbids  it. 
When  the  person  dies  and  the  will  ceases  or  is  with- 
drawn from  the  human  frame,  personal  force  ceases. 

4.  It  assumes  that  this  unknowable  force  is 
physical — i.  e.,  force  without  intelligence,  or  wisdom, 
or  purpose ;  blind  force,  acting  by  chance  or  by 
necessity,  *'  whirling  and  whirling  evermore  until  it 
becomes  selfconscious,"  and  thinks  and  reflects. 

To  say  that  this  force  is  physical  contradicts  the 
assumption  that  it  is  unknowable.  More  than  this, 
experience  and  observation  forbid  this  fourth  assump- 
tion— e.  g.,  observation  indicates  that  all  force  in  the 
material  world  is  wisely  ordered,  and  that  all  organ- 
isms are  skillfully  adapted  :  the  eye  to  seeing, 
the  ear  to  hearing,  the  generative  organs  to 
reproduction  ;  so  that  long  before  they  are  needed, 
as  they  form  in  the  womb,  it  is  in  exact  and  complex 
accordance    with    the  laws   of   optics  and    acoustics 


THE   MODERN    THEORY   OF  FORCES.  43 

and  reproduction,  precisely  adapted  to  future  use  in 
these  directions.  And  these  are  samples  of  universal 
nature.  At  the  same  time,  our  experience  declares 
that  force  adapted  to  a  purpose  is  guided  by  intelli- 
gence— a  declaration  which  no  logic  can  confute. 
More  than  this,  we  infer  the  nature  of  a  cause  from 
the  nature  of  the  effect.  But  for  this  principle  in- 
duction itself  were  invalid,  and  positive  science 
utterly  inconclusive  and  useless.  So  here  the  effects 
bear  the  marks  of  intelligence,  of  wisdom,  of  pur- 
pose ;  therefore,  the  cause  must  be  intelligent  and 
wise,  and  not  mere  physical  force. 

5.  This  theory  of  evolution  assumes  not  only 
that  this  force  is  unknowable,  yet,  at  the  same  time, 
ultimate  and  physical,  but  also  that  it  is  unconscious. 
Again  we  reply,  this  contradicts  the  primary  assump- 
tion that  it  is  unknowable.  If  unknowable,  how  is 
it  known  to  be  unconscious?  Thus  the  contradic- 
tions involved  in  this  theory  multiply.  It  contradicts 
in  the  sixth  place,  a  fundamental  axiom  in  reason- 
ing, causa  cequat  effectum — an  effect  can  not  be 
greater  than  its  cause.  But  here  is  a  physical  force 
without  intelligence,  wisdom,  or  purpose ;  an  uncon- 
scious force  evolving  (according  to  this  theory  of 
evolution),  forces  that  are  living,  conscious,  intelli- 
gent, wise,  and  moral !  Here  is  the  greater  constantly 
evolving  from  (coming  out  of)  the  less — ^^the  higher 


44  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT, 

from  the  lower  !  "  Causa  czquat  effectum,''  say  these 
'*  more  advanced  thinkers,"  the  effect  equals  the 
cause — and  with  mathematical  precision  they  demon- 
strate, if  a  cause  (C)  produces  an  effect  (E),  then  E=C. 
So,  if  E  produces  another  effect  (S),  then  S=E=C. 
Therefore,  by  the  on-working  of  these  causal  forces, 
no  degree  or  equivalence  of  force  is  destroyed  or 
annihilated,  so  that  the  effect  shall  become  less  than 
the  cause,  whether  to  the  tenth  or  ten-thousandth 
link  in  the  chain  of  progress.  And  so  we  say  as 
earnestly  and  confidently,  causa  cequat  effecticm — the 
cause  equals  the  effect ;  therefore,  by  the  on-working 
of  these  causal  forces  from  the  first,  no  degree  or 
equivalence  of  force  is  produced  or  created,  so  that 
in  any  case  the  cause  shall  be  less  than  the  effect, 
whether  to  the  tenth  or  ten-thousandth  link  in  the 
chain  of  regress.  This  rule  evidently  works  both 
ways.  It  is  as  applicable  to  the  evolution  based 
upon  the  modern  theory  of  forces,  as  to  conservation 
and  correlation  of  forces.  Nothing  else  and  no 
more  can  be  evolved  than  what  was  at  first  involved. 
This  axiomatic  rule,  which  Liebig  so  elaborately,  yet 
so  unnecessarily,  demonstrates,  proves  too  much  for 
the  doctrine  of  evolution.  The  simple  and  homo- 
geneous, which,  in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Spencer  and 
the  evolutionists,  grows  up  into  such  heterogeneity 
and  complexity,  must,   at  the   outset,  according  to 


THE  MODERN   THEORY  OF  FORCES.  45 

the  remorseless  axiom,  be  and  contain  all  the  com- 
plexity and  heterogeneity.  Hoist  by  its  own  petard, 
this  false  evolution  disappears,  and  with  it  the 
clearly  implied,  if  not  carefully  concealed,  atheism  ; 
and  theism  appears,  indestructible  and  persistent, 
and  with  it  involution — for  God,  as  author  and 
finisher,  is  all  and  in  all — and  with  this  the  true 
evolution,  as  we  shall  presently  see,  for  He  is  before 
all  things,  and  by  Him  all  things  consist. 

7.  It  contradicts  its  own  principle, — that  no  force 
is  created  by  the  exercise  of  force.  Yet  it  would, 
by  the  mere  exercise  of  force,  lift  up  a  lower  force 
to  a  higher  plane  than  the  lower  force  could  of  itself 
attain. 

8.  This  theory  is  deceptive.  It  assumes  a  false 
name, — evolution  ;  while,  by  its  own  showing,  it  is 
not  evolution,  but  involution. 

9.  Positive  science  boasts  of  its  method  of  experi- 
ment and  observation,  and  claims  to  rely  upon  facts. 
By  what  process  of  observation  or  experiment  is  it 
discovered  that  force  is  eternally  persistent  ?  Does 
this  rest  upon  fact,  or  upon  assumption  ?  Here 
again  the  theory  contradicts  the  method.  No  pos 
sible  induction  can  demonstrate  such  a  conclusion, 
no  fact  does  or  can  verify  it.  Besides,  according  to 
the.  theory,  this  force  is  unknowable.  How,  then, 
can  it  be  declared  persistent  ?  and  especially,  how  can 


46  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

it  be  declared  eternally  persistent?  The  declared 
eternal  persistence  of  force  inevitably  involves  the 
theory  in  a  two-fold  contradiction.  Perhaps  the 
force  which  seems  so  persistent  may  have  had  a  be- 
ginning somewhere  in  the  past ;  perhaps  somewhere 
in  the  future  it  may  end.  There  is  nothing  in  pos- 
itive science  that  can  or  dare  deny  this. 

'*  Existence,"  says  Mr.  Spencer  (F.  Pr.  vol.  I.,  p. 
146),  ''existence  means  nothing  more  than  persist- 
ence." Existence,  then,  may  have  had  a  begin- 
ning—by the  self-silencing  admission  of  this  theory 
— so  it  may  have  an  end.  Besides,  if  persistence  is 
existence,  from  what,  we  ask,  does  this  persistent 
force  stand  out,  or  exist — from  itself.^  This  is  a 
supplemental  contradiction  which  ranks  as  an 
absurdity. 

These  ''  advanced  thinkers  "  cannot  know,  with- 
in the  Hmit  of  their  theory,  what  force  is  ;  by  w^hat 
possible  right,  then,  consistent  with  their  theory,  can 
they  postulate  that  force  is  the  cause  of  all  mani- 
festations within  us  and  around  us — the  ultimate, 
the  persistent  cause  ?  Positively  none.  Their  only 
answer  is  given  in  these  words  of  Mr.  Spencer  :  '*  We 
cannot  go  on  merging  derivative  into  wider  and  still 
wider  !  " 

But,  w^e  reply,  why  not  go  on  ?  By  what  right 
do  they  stop  at  this  point?     Evidently  none.     Do 


THE  MODERN    THEORY   OF  FORCES.  47 

they  know  that  they  have  found  the  ultimate  cause? 
Certainly  not.  Do  they  even  know  what  they  have 
found  ?  Do  they  know  that  force  is  persistent  and 
indestructible  ?  We  affirm  that  they  do  not  know. 
The  very  admission  of  Mr.  Spencer  is  :  "  Force  is 
an  unknown  cause,  .  .  .  and  the  persistence  of 
force  is  a  truth  which  transcends  experience."  Here, 
Mr.  Spencer,  together  with  his  school,  abandoning 
induction,  stands  no  longer  on  experience  or  demon- 
stration, but  on  assumption  postulated  as  an  ulti- 
mate !  His  own  theory  forbids  his  occupying  this 
position,  and  condemns  it  as  wholly  untenable  for 
these  theorists.  He  does  not  know  the  ground  he 
occupies.  He  does  not  know  whether  force — his 
assumed  ultimate — is  eternally  persistent  or  not. 
According  to  his  own  admission,  he  does  not  know 
whether  force  itself  may  not  be  self-originated  then 
and  there  ;  or  whether  it  be  originated  by  chance,  he 
does  not  know ;  or  whether  it  shall  abide,  he  can- 
not tell ! 

This  physical  philosophy  leads  to  interminable 
difficulties.  While  it  leaves  unsolved  the  pro- 
foundest  problems  of  existence,  it  starts  more  ques- 
tions than  it  settles.  Thus  the  mechanical  theory 
is  partial  and  unsatisfying. 

The  very  assumption  that  force — physical  force — 
is  the  basis  of  being,  ultimate  and  persistent,  while 


48  FAITH  AXD  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

it  discloses  the  unity  indicated  by  science,  discloses, 
also,  the  insufficiency  of  force  as  the  assumed  first 
cause  ;  and  presses  the  mind  to  seek  a  sufficient 
cause  of  force  itself  and  of  all  things,  till  some  of 
these  more  advanced  thinkers  are  compelled  to 
declare,  with  Bray  (p.  i68):  *' All  force  is  mental 
force,  such  '  will-power '  as  we  are  conscious  of  exer- 
cising in  our  small  individuality ;  "  and  with  Sir 
J.  F.  W.  Herschel  (p.  224):  "The  prescience  of 
mind  is  what  solves  the  difficulty  ; "  and,  with 
Wallace  (p.  224) :  "  The  inference  is,  that  force  is 
produced  in  the  only  way  we  know  force  to  be  pro- 
duced, by  the  will  of  conscious  beings." 

Thus  science,  whether  with  willing  or  unwilling 
footsteps,  is  led  by  its  pathway  of  induction  toward 
an  ultimate,  persistent,  intelligent,  and  so,  sufficient 
causation.  And  scientists  are  doing  in  the  interest 
of  science  just  what  is  needed  in  the  interest  of 
religion,  to  show  force  and  law,  unity  and  multipli- 
city, pointing  back  to  God. 

10.  This  theory  assumes  that  life  and  mind  are 
convertible  with  material  forces,  thus  destroying  the 
fundamental  <listinction  between  mind  and  matter 
and  impeaching  consciousness,  which  declares  mind 
distinct  from  matter — the  one  knowing,  the  other 
incapable  of  knowing;  the  one  moral,  the  other  in- 
capable of  morality  ;  while  mind  is  an  activity  which 


THE  MODERN    THEORY  OF  FORCES.  49 

uses  matter,  subjecting  the  material  to  the  service 
of  the  mental. 

11.  It  assumes  a  correlation  quantitative  between 
material  forces  and  life  and  mind,  yet  admits  (see 
]\Ir.  Spencer  and  others)  that  this  has  not  been 
proved  and  cannot  be — that  the  task  is  hopeless. 

12.  It  assumes  that,  because  God  cannot  be 
detected  by  experiment  or  discovered  by  scientific 
methods,  therefore,  he  is  not  ;  bowing  him  out  of 
the  universe  because  he  is  not  indispensable  to  the 
hypothesis  of  positive  science,  or  ruling  him  out  of 
existence  because  he  does  not  appear  within  the 
range  of  the  telescope. 

To  this  arbitrary  rejection  of  God,  it  is  sufficient 
to  reply,  that  this  modern  theory  of  forces  and  of 
evolution  is,  by  its  own  confession,  self-silenced. 

It  does  not  know,  a  fortiori  it  cannot  deny.  It 
has  not,  forsooth,  proved  that  there  is  a  God — 
certainly  it  has  not  proved  that  there  is  no  God. 
But  more  than  this,  by  this  virtual  and  unequivo- 
cal rejection  of  God,  this  theory  virtually  and 
unequivocally  commits  itself  to  atheism  and  chance. 
There  can  be  no  middle  ground.  It  is  either  theism 
or  atheism — God  or  chance,  the  author  of  the 
universe.  Necessity  is  only  another  name  for 
chance,  blind  as  well  as  capricious  I 

Here,  in  addition  to  all  the  contradictions  already 


50  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

specified,  we  find  a  defect  sufficient  of  itself  to  con- 
demn the  theory  as  invalid. 

Ill  this  emergency,  to  save  the  name  and  the 
fame  of  modern  evolution,  a  certain  class  of 
advanced  thinkers  earnestly  call  upon  evolutionists 
everywhere  to  adopt  archebiosis.  It  would  be  re- 
markably convenient,  were  it  possible,  thus  to  save 
evolution  from  breaking  down,  as  it  otherwise  does, 
by  the  absurdity  of  evolving  the  greater  from  the 
less,  and  so  evolving  something  from  nothing.  But 
archebiosis  is  only  another  horn  of  the  dilemma  alike 
fatal  to  evolution.  The  process  of  archebiosis  is  a 
process  of  chance.  It  is  possible,  not  through  order 
but  disorder,  the  like  producing  the  unlike,  the  life- 
less the  living,  the  inorganic  the  organic  ;  and  arche- 
biosis abandons  evolution  to  the  reckless  sport  of 
chance. 

We  said  that  either  process  is  fatal  to  evolution. 
If  heterogenesis  be  accepted,  the  process  is  confess- 
edly capricious.  It  is  either  a  living  or  a  lifeless 
process,  as  it  may  chance,  working  toward  the 
assumed  result ;  and  the  result  is  inevitably  capri- 
cious, for  the  effect  may  be  precisely  similar  to  the 
cause, — life  from  life;  or  precisely  dissimilar — life 
from  lifelessness.  From  the  same  process  the  result 
is  living  or  lifeless,  as  it  may  chance.  If  there  is  any 
law  recognizable,  it  is  lawless  caprice,  which  no  sci- 


THE   MODERN   THEORY  OF  FORCES.  5 1 

ence  can  formulate,  or  even  allow.  If  heterogenesis 
be  rejected,  evolution,  as  proposed  by  this  modern 
theory  of  forces,  is  still  by  chance  ;  for  intelligence 
and  design  are  deliberately  ruled  out  from  the  begin- 
ning, and  the  result  is  an  effect  greater  than  the  cause, 
viz.  :  life  and  intelligence  evolved  from  a  cause  which 
possesses  neither — evolved  from  physical  forces,  a 
result  possible  only  by  chance.  The  absurdity  is 
equal,  at  least,  to  that  involved  in  heterogenesis,  since 
the  effect  is  not  only  different  in  kind  from  its  cause, 
but  different  in  degree — greater  than  the  cause,  so 
that  for  evolution,  whichever  way  it  fly,  is  chance  ; 
and,  in  itself,  'tis  chance. 

Evolution,  be  it  remembered,  evolution  based 
upon  the  modern  theory  oi  forces,  assumes  the  task 
of  evolving  all  things,  even  life  and  mind,  from  phys- 
ical forces  ;  and  by  either  process,of  heterogenesis  or 
homogenesis,  is  involved  in  the  fatal  dilemma  of 
chance,  and  the  result  is  an  inevitable  absurdity. 
Chance  can  be  excluded  only  by  the  presence  of  an 
intelligent  and  almighty  power,  with  a  wise  and  free 
purpose  originating  and  ordering  all  forces.  There 
is  an  evolution  consistent  with  such  a  purpose,  and 
subject  to  such  a  power,  by  whom  *'  we  understand 
the  worlds  were  framed  ;  so  that  things  which  are 
seen  were  not  made  of  things  which  do  appear " 
(Heb.  xi :  3) ;  so  that  forces  which  mold  and  move 


52  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

the  universe  are  the  expression  of  his  will,  existing 
henceforth — i.  e.,  standing  out  from  God — as  efficient 
realities  in  space  and  time,  subtler  than  the  fiery 
mist  or  the  star-dust,  subtler  than  the  attenuated 
nebula  of  the  modern  evolutionist,  yet  no  less  real, 
and  more  ancient,  with  causal  energy  unsurpassed 
by  that  assumed  in  the  modern  theory  of  forces. 

These  divinely  created  forces,  by  their  intervvork- 
ing  and  counterworking  and  onworking,  as  secondary 
but  efficient  causes  ''  make  the  things  which  do 
appear"  {i.e.,  the  material  phenomena),  and  mold 
and  move  the  atoms  and  the  worlds  ;  at  the  wise 
behest  of  their  divine  Author  they  constitute  these 
Vv'orlds  into  a  universe  of  order,  and,  at  the  same 
behest,  continue  the  universal  order. 

Hence,  the  forces  are  persistent  or  indestructible 
beyond  any  possibility  of  finite  use  or  change.  Only 
he  who,  at  his  own  behest,  put  them  forth  into  space 
and  time,  as  local  and  temporal  efficiencies,  can 
reverse  or  recall  them. 

He7ice,  the  forces  arc  correlated  to  each  other  in 
their  very  constitution,  and  are  convertible  by  finite 
use  or  change,  as  we  see  continually  in  the  material 
modifications  and  in  human  appliances. 

Hence,  forces  maybe  multiplied  and  varied  at  the 
divine  behest,  to  build  up  and  adorn  and  perfect  the 
material  universe,  and  fit  it  better  to  become    the 


THE   MODERN   THEORY  OF  FORCES.  53 

abode  of  living  things,  as  clearly  appears  to  have 
been  done.  Upon  the  primal  forces  of  cohesion  and 
repulsion  and  revolution,  other  forces  being  divinely 
begotten  or  superinduced,  the  world-process  ad- 
vanced until  light  and  heat  and  electricity  and  mag- 
netism and  chemical  affinity  all  mingled  in  harmoni- 
ous efficiency  ;  and  the  primeval  chaos  was  gradually 
transformed  to  a  universe  of  order  and  pervaded  with 
light  and  beauty. 

Hence,  the  forces  have  evolved  not  something 
greater  than  they  involved  at  first,  but  what  was  at 
first  involved — ^just  this  in  kind  and  degree ;  evolved 
not  as  it  may  chance,  but  as  it  should  be  in  the 
view  of  eternal  wisdom  ;  evolved  not  by  "  the  fortui- 
tous concurrence  of  mystic  atoms  "  inert,  but  by  the 
orderly  on-working  of  efficient  forces,  controlled  ever- 
more by  the  divine  power  and  guided  by  a  divine 
purpose. 

Thus,  in  the  true  view,  evolution  has  a  divine 
origin  and  a  divine  purpose  ;  and  the  universe  is  com- 
prehensible and  the  order  of  the  universe,  rational. 
In  the  false  view,  evolution  has  neither  origin  nor 
purpose  ;  the  universe,  as  a  ceaseless  series  of  the 
conditioned,  is  incomprehensible,  and  the  order  of 
the  universe  is  mechanical  and  irrational.  The 
former  view  culminates  in  knowledge,  comprehensive 
and    satisfying  :    ''  For  the  invisible   things  of  him 


54  FAITH  AND   MODERN    THOUGHT. 

from  the  creation  of  the  world  are  clearly  seen, 
being  understood  by  the  things  that  are  made,  even 
his  eternal  power  and  Godhead  "  (Rom.  i :  20).  The 
^latter  view  ends  in  nescience,  perplexing  and  dis- 
heartening. Within  its  distant  but  darkened  range 
science,  material  science,  pursues  its  weary  way  in 
the  tread-mill  of  experiment  amid  material  forces  ; 
seeking  for  life  which  can  never  be  phenomenal,  but 
ever  and  forever  evades  our  physical  senses ;  seeking 
at  nerve-centers  to  detect  and  dissect  mind  itself, 
which  ever  and  forever  eludes  the  search,  replying 
evermore  to  the  deluded  seeker,  that  while  it  acts 
in  time  it  is  not  confined  to  space  ;  seeking  in  every 
nook  and  corner  of  the  material  universe  for  the 
great  First  Cause,  if  haply  it  may  feel  after  him  and 
find  him,  but  with  the  eye  of  intuitive  reason  closed, 
failing  to  see  him,  though  he  be  not  far  from  every 
one  of  us  ;  terminating  its  unsuccessful  search  in 
utter  nescience  and  despair.  Nothing  but  perfect 
demonstration  can  ever  establish  such  a  result  or 
authorize  such  a  conclusion.  And  in  the  very  na- 
ture of  the  case,  demonstration  of  this  negative  con- 
clusion is  impossible.  *'  All  that  induction  can  do, 
as  scientific,  is  to  observe  phenomena  and  sequences 
in  nature,  and  put  them  into  convenient  generaliza- 
tions." 

This    modern    theory    of  evolution    is    not  only 


THE   MODERN    THEORY  OF  FORCES.  55 

unsatisfactory  and  invalid  ;  it  is  wholly  uncalled  for, 
and,  therefore,  even  the  presumption  is  against  it. 
We  are  not,  needlessly,  to  multiply  hypotheses. 
The  old  dictum  of  Occam  remains  valid  :  Entia  non 
miiltiplicanda  sunt  praeter  neccssitatem. 

Let  Occam's  razor  be  applied  to  this  needless 
hypothesis  of  evolution.  This  presumption  is 
strengthened  by  the  presence  and  prevalence  of  an 
older  theory,  and  a  better — an  evolution  at  once 
comprehensive  and  satisfactory,  comprehending  all 
the  facts  of  material  science  and  satisfying  all  the 
spiritual  demands  of  the  soul. 

The  real  issue,  then,  is  between  the  false  and  the 
true  theory  of  evolution — between  atheism  and 
theism — chance  and  God.  The  true  view  is  not 
only  sublime,  but  is  full  of  sympathy  and  support 
and  guidance — almighty  support  and  guidance  for 
the  material  universe — almighty  guidance  and  sup- 
port and  sympathy  for  man.  Whatever  changes 
may  occur  in  material  nature — and  what  finite  mind 
can  forecast  the  possibility? — whatever  changes  ma}^ 
occur,  yet,  by  the  wise  behest  of  Almighty  God, 
order — divine  and  benign  order — shall  evermore  be 
preserved  ;  and  man  may  evermore  trust  in  God  and 
not  be  afraid  ;  and,  in  the  light  of  His  divine  pres- 
ence and  the   strength  of  His  divine  aid,  go  on  to 


56  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

improve  and  enjoy  the  life  which  now  is  and  the  life 
which  is  to  come. 

The  false  view,  though  but  a  step  removed  from 
the  sublime,  is — it  must  be  confessed — utterly  de- 
void of  sympathy,  of  support,  of  guidance  and 
rational  government.  By  it  we  are  plunged  into 
the  frightful  abyss  of  nescience.  If  force  be  im- 
personal, what  are  its  powers  and  possibilities  — 
whether  it  be  mechanical  necessity,  or  capricious 
chance,  or  blind  fate  ;  whether  it  be  malicious  or 
merciful,  as  a  friend,  a  fury,  a  fiend,  or  a  phantasm — is 
unknown.  This  were  a  conclusion  horrible  enough, 
were  we  permitted  by  this  modern  theory  of  evo- 
lution to  hope  in  a  God  behind  the  unknown  force, 
and  superior  to  it,  who  might  rescue  us  from  the 
frightful  abyss.  But  to  be  denied  even  this  hope, 
and  to  be  left  to  sink  at  last  in  the  fathomless  vortex 
of  atheism,  at  the  mercy  of  a  blind  but  tremendous 
and  pitiless  force,  forever  unknown  and  unknowable 
— this  is  the  depth  of  woe,  the  climax  of  horror. 

And  to  this  we  are  driven  by  the  modern  theory 
of  evolution,  based  upon  the  modern  theory  of 
forces. 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  5/ 


CHAPTER   II. 

Faith  and  Positivism. 

SHALL  faith  be  ruled  out  ?  This  is  not  exclu- 
sively a  question  between  philosophy  and  the- 
ology, but  it  is  also  a  question  of  philosophy  with 
philosophy.  It  has  of  late  been  fashionable  in  cer- 
tain quarters  to  satirize  Christian  faith  as  folly,  to 
admit  nothing  but  "  positive  knowledge,"  to  sneer  at 
belief  as  irrational. 

One  class  of  these  pretentious  foes  to  faith,  who 
occupy  the  realm  of  sense,  assume  the  modest 
appellation  of  philosophers,  yet  magisterially  limit 
all  knowledge  to  this  realm.  What  appears  to  sense 
they  know.  The  phenomenal  is  the  real — the  only 
real.  Just  what  it  is,  they  are  not  able  to  say  ;  but 
that  it  is,  they. know.  The  senses  are  the  media  of 
communication,  and  the  senses  are  the  source  of 
knowledge — the  source  of  all  knowledge. 

Another  class,  in  the  same  field  of  the  sense,  de- 
spising the  appearance  of  modesty,  reject  the  name 
philosopher ;  affirm  the  paradox  that  "  there  are 
more  false  facts  than  false  theories  "  (Lewes'  Biograph- 


58  FAITH  AND   MODERN    THOUGHT. 

ical  History  of  Philosophy,  etc.) ;  and  resolutely 
press  their  theory  to  its  legitimate  conclusion,  *'  that 
a  valid  philosophy  is  impossible,"  "  that  science  is 
radically  opposed  to  and  excludes  all  philosophy  and 
theology."  As  said  the  sophists,  so  say  they,  that 
nothing  is  truly  known  ;  and  the  logical  result  is 
utter  skepticism.  ''The  ancient  researches,"  says 
Lewes,  "  ended  in  skepticism,  common-sense,  and 
skepticism  again.  The  modern  researches  ended  in 
idealism,  skepticism,  common-sense,  and  skepticism." 

The  question,  then,  whether  faith  is  entitled  to 
any  place  and  prerogative,  concerns  not  theology 
alone,  but  philosophy  as  well  ;  even  science  itself  is 
not  unconcerned. 

The  entire  range  of  this  discussion  includes  two 
fields :  one,  the  philosophic  and  finite ;  the  other, 
the  religious  and  infinite  ;  the  former  regarding 
matter,  mind,  and  morals ;  the  latter  regarding 
God,  immortality,  and  religion,  especially  the  Chris- 
tian religion.  After  a  brief  survey  of  the  ground,  and 
a  due  limitation  of  terms,  we  shall  follow  two  lines 
of  argument,  the  indirect  and  the  direct;  by  the  first 
to  vindicate  a  place  for  faith  by  the  admissions  (pos- 
itive or  implied,)  of  objectors  themselves  ;  by  the 
second,  to  establish  a  place  for  faith  on  positive  and 
reliable  grounds.  The  higher  domain  of  faith,  the  re- 
ligious and  infinite,  will  then  challenge  our  inspection. 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  59 

The  objectors  to  faith  may  be  ranged  in  four 
classes  :  The  first  class  object  to  faith  because  it  can 
not  be  verified  by  sense;  the  second,  because  it 
can  not  be  verified  by  the  understanding.  The  third 
class  object,  that  faith  transcends  reason.  The 
fourth  class  object,  that  nothing  can  be  believed, 
that  doubt  is  universal. 

We  reply  to  the  fourth  objection,  that  it  ends  in 
sheer  negation,  not  only  of  material  substance  and 
phenomena,  but  of  mind  and  thought  itself,  even 
the  very  thought  which  gave  it  birth.  The  objection 
is  suicidal  ;  it  does  not  allow  us  to  believe  that  we 
doubt.  To  the  third  objection  we  reply,  that  al- 
though faith  may  transcend,  it  does  not  contradict 
reason.  But  this  objection  and  reply  belong  espec- 
ially to  the  second  branch  of  the  subject. 

The  first  and  the  second  classes  object,  that  faith 
can  not  be  verified  by  the  sense,  nor  by  the  under- 
standing. Yet  both  believe  in  principles  which  can 
not  be  verified  by  the  sense,  nor  by  the  understanding 
(as  we  shall  show  in  the  proper  place)  ;  and  these 
very  principles  underlie  the  processes,  both  of  the 
sense  and  of  the  understanding,  and  even  the  possi- 
bility of  these  processes.  "  Natural  phenomena  are 
ever  fundamentally  inexplicable  by  physical  science 
alone."  * 

*Mivart's  "  Genesis  of  Species,"  p.  287. 


6o  FAITH  AND   MODERN    THOUGHT. 

This  belief,  then,  of  these  objectors,  which  is 
positive,  vindicates  a  place  for  faith,  even  for  reli- 
gious faith,  as  will  appear  in  the  progress  of- the 
discussion.  We  say  this  belief  of  the  first  and  the 
second  classes  of  objectors  relies  upon  reason  for  its 
existence,  and  for  the  principles  which  it  recognizes. 
Reason  verifies  for  the  sense  and  for  the  understand- 
ing, in  regard  to  these  necessary  principles  or  facts. 
So  may  it  in  regard  to  things  spiritual  and  infinite. 
If  it  be  said  :  Belief  does  not  depend  upon  reason, 
but  is  ultimate  and  postulatory  in  reference  to  the 
sense  and  the  understanding,  we  reply,  this  is  only  a 
stronger  vindication  of  a  place  for  faith  ;  for  so  it 
may  be  said,  ad  Jwmineni,  in  reference  to  religious 
faith,  it  is  ultimate  and  postulatory. 

Faith,  as  a  term  extensive,  is  belief  founded  upon 
evidence,  belief  in  every  direction,  toward  the  sense, 
the  understanding,  the  conscience,  the  reason,  and 
revelation,  toward  the  finite,  or  the  infinite,  belief 
whether  philosophic  or  religious.  Faith  as  a  term 
intensive  or  specific,  is  Christian  faith,  including  not 
mere  belief,  but  all  else  that  may  be  involved  in  faith. 
As  the  former,  in  its  lowest  and  simplest  definition, 
then,  faith  is  belief  founded  upon  evidence  ;  in  the 
highest  and  complete  definition,  it  is  saving  trust  in 
the  Redeemer.  As  an  essential  in  this  definition  of 
terms,  we  have   inseparably  joined  with   belief,  the 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  6 1 

phrase,  founded  upon  evidence,  whether  the  belief  be 
lowest,  in  reference  to  mere  matter,  or  highest  in  ref- 
erence to  spiritual  things,  even  Christian  faith.  This 
definition  at  once  and  finally  excludes  from  the  dis- 
cussion whatever  does  not  rest  upon  evidence,  be  it 
credulity,  superstition,  or  fancy.  Faith  evermore  waits 
upon  authority.  It  must  have  evidence  of  some  sort : 
sense,  or  reasoning,  or  human  testimony,  or  con- 
science, or  reason,  or  revelation.  Faith  is  not  first, 
but  knowledge,  of  some  sort  and  degree  is  first.  We 
can  not  believe  concerning  that  of  which  we  have  no 
possible  apprehension,  of  which  we  know  absolutely 
nothine.  We  believe  in  the  existence  of  an  external 
world,  or,  at  least,  of  external  phenomena  ;  but  this 
belief  is  based  upon  the  testimony  of  the  senses. 
Thus  founded,  our  belief  may  be  so  complete  as  to  end 
in  certainty.  Distrusting  the  testimony  of  the  senses 
may  lead  to  the  denial  of  an  external  world.  So  in 
regard  to  the  understanding  and  its  judgments,  to 
the  reason  and  its  intuitions,  to  the  conscience  and 
its  witness,  to  revelation  and  its  teachings.  In  each 
direction  faith  relies  upon  appropriate  evidence. 
There  can  be  no  primitive  beliefs  even,  in  the  sense 
that  they  precede  all  evidence,  all  authority,  all 
knowledge ;  or,  in  the  sense  that,  if  not  preceding 
they  are  independent  of  these.  Such  faith  would  be 
irrational  and  blind.     If  we  may  entertain  such  faith 


62  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

then  we  may  believe  what  we  please,  with  or  with- 
out evidence. 

Again,  in  reference  to  different  truths,  faith  (be- 
lief) rests  upon  different  authority  :  the  authority  or 
evidence  of  sense  in  reference  to  phenomena  external 
or  internal ;  the  evidence  of  the  understanding  in 
reference  to  logical  reasoning,  inductive  or  deductive; 
the  authority  of  reason  for  necessar}^  and  universal 
truths  ;  the  authority  of  conscience  with  reason  for 
spiritual  truths  within  the  compass  of  finite  discov- 
ery ;  and  the  authority  of  revelation  for  spiritual 
truths  which  lie  beyond.  So,  different  truths  reach 
our  belief  or  faith  through  different  avenues.  The 
truths  differ,  the  avenues  differ  (sense,  understanding, 
reason,  conscience,  revelation),  the  faiths  differ,  and 
the  results  differ.  Yet  in  all,  reason  with  its  light  as 
belonging  to  a  rational  soul  is  more  or  less  present, 
is  never  wholly  absent.  Reason,  as  locus  principi- 
oruvt,  belongs  to  the  soul,  not  as  pre-existent  accord- 
ing to  Plato,  but  by  the  constitution  of  the  soul, 
personal,  rational.  As  thus  constituted  it  can  not 
be  like  a  piece  of  blank  paper  passively  awaiting  the 
inscriptions  of  experience.  Coming  into  being  as  a 
soul  in  the  image  of  God  (or  if  it  be  objected  as  too 
early  in  the  discussion  to  make  this  reference),  com- 
ing into  being  as  a  soul,  it  has  reason,  conscience, 
and  a  self-determining  will,  as  well  as  perception. 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  63 

By  the  constitution  of  the  soul,  no  faculty  (be  it 
sense  or  understanding)  acts  wholly  alone.  No  faculty 
is  ever  purely  akoyov,  says  Aristotle  (De  Anima,  Lib. 
ill.  9,  2).  Reason  gives  to  sense  more  than  mere 
phenomena.  Reason  gives  to  the  understanding 
more  than  mere  qualities.  Without  reason,  as  every 
one  must  admit,  we  should  have  only  an  inferior  in- 
terest in  the  things  of  sense  ;  even  an  inferior  interest 
in  the  processes  of  the  understanding.  Now,  with 
intense  interest  we  are  brought  face  to  face  with  the 
great  questions:  What?  How?  and  Why?  with  all 
that  they  imply.  Even  the  child  is  not  satisfied  with 
knowing  what  is,  but,  by  the  soul's  own  impulse,  asks 
the  cause  and  the  purpose  ;  and  the  thoughtful  mind 
eagerly  inquires  the  real  meaning  of  the  universe. 
Reason  and  conscience,  attracted  evermore  toward 
a  higher  unity,  long  to  rest  in  the  all-encompassing, 
supreme  design.  Hence  not  merely  physical  and 
intellectual,  but  rational  and  spiritual  issues  move 
the  world.  Hence  questions  concerning  faith  can 
not  diminish,  but  must  ever  increase  in  interest. 
Then,  as  with  all  other  exercises  of  the  soul,  reason 
is  present,  so  reason  (this  is  our  point)  should  go 
with  faith  even  in  its  highest  exercise.  '*  By  the  eye 
of  reason  through  the  telescope  of  faith,  i.  e.  Reve- 
lation, we  may  see  what  without  this  telescope  we 
could  never  have  known  to  exist.     But  he  who  blinds 


64  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

the  eye  of  reason  and  pretends  to  see  by  an  eye  of 
faith  is  not  guided  by  the  h'ght,  but  sees  Hke  a  man 
in  his  sleep  "  (Jeremy  Taylor).  "  For  though  reason 
is  not  the  positive  and  affirmative  measure  of  our 
faith,  and  our  faith  ought  to  be  larger  than  our 
(speculative)  reason,  yet  in  all  our  creed  there  can 
be  nothing  against  reason."  Pascal  sententiously 
remarks,  that  ''  faith  is  reasonable  though  not 
reached  by  a  chain  of  reasoning."  Bedell  (Internal 
Evidences  of  Christianity,  Philadelphia  Lectures,) 
says:  ''Christianity requires  a  faith  which  is  rational, 
i.  e.,  which  is  conformed  to  the  laws  of  our  thinking 
nature  ;  and  she  submits  all  the  grounds  of  this  faith 
to  the  judgment  of  enlightened  human  reason."  The 
Apostle  enjoins  (i  Peter,  iii.  15):  *' Be  ready  always 
to  give  an  answer  to  every  man  that  asketh  you  a 
reason  of  the  hope  that  is  in  you."  A  recent  evan- 
gelical writer,  in  refuting  rationalism  (Dr.  Fisher, 
Boston  Lectures),  asserts,  that  "  no  amount  oi  evi- 
dence can  justify  belief  in  propositions  that  are  either 
self-contradictory  or  in  conflict  with  known  truth," 
thus  guarding  faith  that  it  be  not  irrational,  while  he 
maintains  that  *'  the  human  soul  has  a  native  recog- 
nition, however  obscure  it  may  have  become  through 
sin,  of  the  verities  of  natural  religion — God,  freedom, 
accountableness,  immortality."  Says  Halyburton 
(Inquiry,  p.  356) :    "  Faith  must  be  founded  or  'tis 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  65 

irrational,  brutish;"  (p.  357)  ''Sufficient  evidence 
must  always  determine  our  assent  ;  to  resist  it  is 
irrational." 

We  have  multiplied  statements  on  this  point, 
not  because  the  reader  may  require  it,  nor  because 
the  position  seems  doubtful,  but  because  we  would 
guard  against  the  common  but  false  charge  of  men 
like  Hume  and  Gibbon  of  the  last  century,  that 
Christian  faith  is  maintained  in  the  absence  or  in  the 
face  of  unanswerable  arguments  ;  and  of  men  like 
Abbott  and  Herbert  Spencer  at  the  present  day, 
that  faith  is  utterly  blind  and  credulous,  spurning 
rational  evidence,  going  against  reason  as  readily  as 
with  it  ;  and  for  another  reason,  that  some  men  like 
Jacobi  the  German,  and  Proclus  the  Greek,  have 
held  that  "  faith  is  the  foundation  of  our  knowledge," 
that  "  in  belief  we  have  the  revelation  of  all  reality 
— all  original  cognition,"  as  Algazzali  the  Arabian, 
says :  "  Radix  cognitionis  fides."  Sir  William 
Hamilton  ransacks  the  records  of  philosophic 
thought  to  find  authority  and  precedent  to  fortify 
his  conclusion  "  that  in  the  last  resort  we  must, 
perforce,  philosophically  admit  that  belief  is  the 
primary  condition  of  reason,  and  not  reason  the  ulti- 
mate ground  of  belief;  that  we  are  compelled  to 
surrender  the  proud  intellige  ut  ere  das  of  Abelard,  to 
content  ourselves  with  the  humble  crede  ut  intelligas 


66  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

of  Anselm,  by  misconstruction,  we  think,  appro- 
priating to  his  purpose  the  practical  motto  of  the 
logical  Anselm,  and  violently  pressing  even  Augus- 
tine into  the  same  strange  service.  While,  on  the 
one  hand,  we  should  not  exaggerate  reason  to  deny 
all  need  of  revelation,  as  do  the  rationalists,  neither, 
on  the  other  hand,  should  we  disparage  reason  that 
we  may  exalt  faith.  Happily  has  Dr.  McCosh  said 
(Intuitions  of  the  Mind)  :  It  is  good  neither  for  faith 
nor  reason  to  be  alone. 

The  schoolmen,  indeed,  like  Anselm,  styled  phi- 
losophy the  ancilla,  handmaid,  of  religion,  yet  not  a 
foe  but  a  friend  of  faith,  regarding  faith  with  *'  its 
root  deep  in  our  moral  and  spiritual  nature,  as  in 
the  highest  sense  reasonable."  In  this  they  but 
reflected  the  view  of  their  acknowledged  leader,  the 
great  Augustine,  who,  least  of  all  men,  shrank  from 
the  Apostolic  injunction,  "  Be  ready  always  to  give 
an  answer  to  every  man  that  asketh  you  a  reason  of 
the  hope  that  is  in  you." 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  accumulating  errors  might 
spring  up  as  the  natural  outgrowth  from  the  funda- 
mental error  of  divorcing  reason  and  faith,  as  does 
Kant  in  his  dual  hypothesis  of  the  speculative  reason 
and  the  practical,  making  the  speculative  (or  pure) 
reason  reject  what  the  practical  reason  (or  faith) 
accepts,  leaving  faith  to  roam  the  field  of  morals  and 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  6/ 

religion  not  only  alone,  but  blind  and  unreasoning. 
Combining  this  error  of  Kant  with  another  grave 
error  of  the  sophists,  that  "  nothing  is  truly  known," 
Herbert  Spencer  (First  Principles,  p.  88)  unfairly  no 
less  than  unhesitatingly  remands  religion  to  "  the 
sphere  of  unknown  realities,"  makes  faith  only  **  an 
indefinite  consciousness  which  can  not  be  formula- 
ted," and  pronounces  *'  the  ultimate  religious  truth 
of  the  highest  possible  certainty  "  to  be  this,  that 
"  the  Power  which  the  universe  manifests  to  us  is 
utterly  inscrutable,"  the  religious  altar  is  *'  to  the 
unknown  and  unknowable  God,"  and  faith  in  her 
devotions  is  blind  and  irrational. 

If,  in  the  spirit  of  the  Rationalist  and  the  Soph- 
ist, the  statement  is  made  that  a  proposition  may 
be  false  to  the  reasoning  faculty  yet  true  to  faith, 
we  reply:  though  false  to  reasoning,  it  is  true  to 
reason,  if  true  to  faith.  Against  all  such  disparage- 
ments of  faith,  the  view  we  have  already  presented 
is  a  complete  vindication.  To  recur  to  our  defini- 
tion :  Faith,  in  every  direction,  is  belief  founded 
upon  evidence — at  the  lowest  degree  as  belief  in 
matters  of  sense,  and  in  the  highest  degree  as  belief 
in  the  things  of  the  spirit,  even  saving  trust  in  the 
Redeemer. 

From   this  limitation   of  terms  we  turn  to  our 
first  line  of  argument,— to  vindicate  a  place  for  faith 


68  FAITH  AND   MODERN   THOUGHT. 

by  the  direct  or  implied  admission  of  objectors, 
mindful,  within  this  field  of  the  philosophic  and 
finite,  of  the  maxim  that  "  false  metaphysics  can  be 
effectually  counteracted  by  true  metaphysics  alone." 

One  class  of  objectors  occupy  the  field  of  sense, 
and  "  positively  "  limit  all  knowledge  to  this  field. 
What  appears  to  sense  they  know.  The  phenom- 
enal is  the  real,  the  only  real.  True,  the  senses  are 
not  always  uniform  in  their  reports  ;  they  may  be 
deceived  ;  they  may  be  impaired ;  they  differ  in 
different  persons.  The  phenomena  are  fleeting,  con- 
fused, contradictory.  Philosophy,  with  no  guarantee 
or  guide  but  sense,  it  would  seem,  might  easily  hear 
the  rebuke  of  its  arrogance  coming  from  every  quar- 
ter of  its  monopolized  domain,  and  learn  a  lesson  of 
humility.  But  whether  or  not  it  listen  to  this  .rebuke 
and  learn  this  lesson,  it  is  at  least  compelled  to  trust 
in  the  senses  for  what  it  claims  to  know,  and 
thus  all  along  practically  to  admit  and  employ  the 
very  principle  which  theoretically  it  excludes  and 
scorns. 

For  example,  Mr.  Huxley,  speaking,  (it  is  to  be 
presumed)  according  to  the  rules  of  **  positive  phi- 
losophy," of  the  molecular  particles  of  water  and  of 
their  natural  disposition  or  inherent  power  to  change 
into  steam  or  into  ice,  says  :  ^'  We  call  these  prop- 
erties of  water,  and   do  not  hesitate   to  believe  that 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  69 

they  result  from  the  properties  of  the  component 
elements  of  water."  This  philosophic  statement,  as 
well  as  the  announcement  of  his  unhesitating  belief, 
he  makes  without  the  witness  of  any  observed  fact 
or  any  attempted  proof. 

But  Mr.  Huxley,  walking  by  scientific  faith,  ad- 
vances to  a  more  commanding  position.  He  believes 
that  originally  "  living  protoplasm  was  evolved  from 
non-living  matter,"  by  natural  conditions,  and  that 
these  conditions  may  hereafter  be  artificially  pro- 
duced so  that  matter  will  assume  the  properties  we 
call  '*  vital." 

"  This  opinion,"  he  is  careful  to  say,  ''  is  an  act 
of  philosophic  faith."  Supported  in  another  step 
by  philosophic  faith,  (although  he  is  not  careful  to 
specify  at  every  step.)  Mr.  Huxley  advances  to  the 
belief  that  the  human  soul  is  produced  by  molecular 
matter  properly  disposed.  It  does  not  appear  that 
his  guide  conducts  him  much  farther  in  this  direc- 
tion. Indeed  it  would  not  seem  necessary,  since  at 
this  point  scientific  faith  reveals  to  him  the  identity 
of  matter  and  mind,  or  the  indifference  of  both,  for 
Mr.  H.  is  left  at  liberty  to  accept  or  deny  either,  or 
deny  or  accept  both.  Brought  to  this  position  of 
security  and  freedom.  Prof.  Huxley  takes  time  to 
look  about  him  and  prove  his  devotion  to  philosophic 
faith   by  a   demonstration  of  his   iconoclastic    zeal. 


70  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

"  The  theology  of  the  present  age,"  he  declares, 
''begins  to  see  the  necessity  of  breaking  in  pieces 
the  idols  built  up  of  books  and  cobwebs,  and  of 
cherishing  the  noblest  and  most  human  of  man's 
emotions,  by  worship  for  the  most  part  of  the  silent 
sort  at  the  altar  of  the  Unknown  and  Unknowable." 
Where  and  how,  we  would  ask,  has  Mr.  Huxley 
ascertained  that  there  is  an  Unknown  and  Unknow- 
able ?  and  how,  especially,  that  he  has  an  altar?  and 
how,  that  worship  is  agreeable  to  him  or  appropriate 
to  mortals  ?  and  how,  that  the  human  emotions, 
which  lead  to  such  worship,  are  the  noblest  belong- 
ing to  man  ?  How  is  it  that  this  class  of  writers 
know  that  the  object  of  this  worship  is  unknowable  ? 
Is  this  **  positive  knowledge  ?  " 

But  Prof.  Huxley  is  urged  to  this  by  the  pressure 
of  science,  based  upon  or  embodied  in  *'  the  fixed 
order  and  unchanging  causation  of  nature."  But 
how  has  he  found  that  there  is  a  fixed  order  and  un- 
changing causation  ?  Has  his  observation  compre- 
hended and  penetrated  all  nature?  Has  the  obser- 
vation of  all  the  explorers  in  the  field  of  positive 
science  accomplished  this  ?  And  thus  has  there 
been  discovered  a  "  fixed  order  and  unchanging  cau- 
sation of  nature?"  Or  is  this,  again,  a  matter  of 
philosophic    faith  ?     As   ''  organic    chemistry,  mole- 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  7 1 

cular    physics    and     physiology    are     yet    in    their 
infancy,"  ^  it  would  seem  to  be  the  latter. 

Here,  in  passing,  we  should  not  neglect  to  notice 
the  fact  that  if  it  were  possible  that  nature  be  thor- 
oughly and  perfectly  observed,  not  by  one  individual, 
(for  this  is  not  supposable)  but  by  successive  scien- 
tific explorers,  still  the  conclusions  in  regard  to  the 
fixed  order  of  nature  and  unchanging  causation 
would  depend  upon  their  reports,  and  in  the  final 
analysis  be  a  faith  based  upon  testimony. 

But  we  can  not  dismiss  this  objection  so  lightly, 
for  it  is  at  just  this  point  that  much  of  the  opposition 
to  Christian  faith  concentrates. 

Mr.  Huxley  claims  that  "  stress  of  science  em- 
bodied in  the  fixed  order  and  unchanging  causation  '* 
of  nature  constrains  him  to  his  peculiar  attitude  to- 
ward the  theology  of  the  present  age.  Now  we 
do  not  question  his  loyalty  to  science.  We  are  quite 
willing  that  he  shall  stand  forth  as  its  redoubtable 
champion.  We  have  no  doubt  that  the  science 
which  he  so  zealously  defends  is  embodied  in  nature, 
indeed  this  gives  it  its  very  "  form  and  feature,"  that 
it  is  thus  embodied  exclusively,  as  though  there  were 
nothing  but  nature — nothing  above  or  beyond. 
That   one   loyal  to  such  a  master  should  feel  pressed 

*  For  this  and  the  preceding  qu9tations  from  Mr,  Huxley,  see  his 
"  Lay  Sermons,  Addresses  and  Reviews." 


72  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

by  a  great  stress,  we  do  not  wonder,  even  if  in  the 
line  of  his  asserted  "  unchanging  causation  "  of  na- 
ture, he  should  feel  the  stress  of  fatality.  But  in 
regard  to  this  "  fixed  order  and  unchanging  causa- 
tion of  nature,"  which  so  impresses  Mr.  H.,  is  it  an 
order  fixed  and  unchanging?  Mr.  H.  is  the  champion 
of  a  science  which  professes  to  be  a  science  of  fact. 

Is  he  not  over-confident  just  here,  as  well  as  over- 
zealous?  Has  his  science  demonstrated  that  the 
order  of  nature  is  fixed  and  unchanging?  We  need 
not  stop  to  cite  phenomena  which  indicate  the  con- 
trary, which  constrain  those  who  regard  only  ante- 
cedence and  sequence  to  exclaim  with  the  old  Ionics: 
"  All  things  perpetually  flow,"  and  to  sympathize 
with  the  common  feeling  of  uncertainty,  and  the 
common  expectation  of  changefulness — rather  than 
changelessness.  Countless  illustrations  are  at  hand; 
but  Mr.  Huxley  admits  the  difficulty  of  predicting 
the  future  in  even  the  simplest  possible  case,  aban- 
dons **  positive  science,"  and  reluctantly  but  legiti- 
mately raises  the  question  :  ''  How  can  we  know 
that  the  next  stone  which  we  throw  into  the  air 
will  descend?"  ''The  answer  is  that  we  do  not 
know,  but    believe  "  that  the  stone  will  fall. 

Hume  declared  that,  in  the  last  analysis,  in  varia- 
bleness of  antecedence  and  sequence  is  all  that  expe- 
rience tells  us  of  causation.     Mr.  Lewes,  the  biogra- 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  73 

pher  of  philosophy,  accepts  this  statement  as  right, 
and  affirms  that  ''  all  our  ideas  are  derived  from 
experience,"  and  that  "  philosophy  must  end  in 
skepticism."  Yet  even  Mr.  Lewes,  one  of  the  most 
positive  of  the  positivists,  says  :  "  If  we  believe  that 
similar  effects  will  follow  whenever  the  same  causes 
are  in  operation,  if  we  believe  that  fire  will  burn,  we 
are  simply  believing  in  our  experience — that  is  irresist- 
ible. Custom  has  primarily  nothing  to  do  with  the 
belief;  if  we  had  only  one  experience  of  fire,  we 
should  believe  that  it  would  burn." 

Some  friendly  apologist  of  Huxley  may  term  his 
the  incautious  language  of  a  bold  experimental- 
ist. But  however  this  apology  may  be  regarded  by 
the  fearless  Professor,  it  is  inapplicable  to  the  cau- 
tious Lewes,  and  especially  inapplicable  to  the  copi- 
ous but  careful  author  of  Mill's  Logic.  This  precise 
dialectician  is  never,  even  in  the  moments  of  most 
earnest  advocacy,  betrayed  into  verbal  rashness. 
Yet  in  his  treatise  on  that  most  precise  of  precise 
sciences,  Logic,  we  find  statements  (not  isolated)  of 
which  the  following  may  be  taken  as  a  specimen  : 
"  To  certain  facts,  certain  other  facts  always  do  and 
as  we  believe  always  will  succeed  "  (B.  IIL  Ch.  V., 
Sec.  2).  And  again  Mr.  Mill  observes  :  *'  We  believe 
that  fire  will  burn  to-morrow  because  it  burned  to- 
day and  yesterday,  but  we  believe  precisely   on   the 


74  FAITH  A  AW  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

same  ground  that  it  burned  before  we  were  born," 
etc.  Here  is  belief  admitted — belief  in  a  principle 
which  certainly  has  never  been  demonstrated  by  the 
"positive"  philosophy,  and  never  can  be — belief  in 
this  principle  as  fundamental  and  essential  to  every 
inductive  process  ;  and  also  a  belief  in  human  testi- 
mony for  establishing  the  uniformity  of  a  mere  phe- 
nomenon, so  far  as  the  memory  of  man  reacheth,  and 
elevating  the  precedent  into  a  fundamental,  change- 
less law,  when  he  says :  "■  The  proposition  that  '  the 
cause  of  nature  is  uniform  *  is  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple, or  general  axiom  of  induction."  We  do  not 
stop  now  to  question  the  validity  of  this  axiom  of 
positive  philosophy ;  we  merely  call  attention  to  the 
ready  faith  of  the  positive  philosophers.  We  do  not 
dispute  the  axiom  itself  of  positive  science.  We 
might  admit  it  upon  the  authority  of  reason,  or  of 
reasoning,  inductive  or  deductive.  But  what  right 
has  the  "  Positive  Science  "  to  this  axiom  as  a  fun^ 
damental  principle  ?  Has  experience  shown  it  ? 
Such  a  complete  axiom  of  positive  science  demands 
a  complete  experience.  The  frank  admission  of 
Prof.  Huxley  is  more  consistent  with  logical  truth 
and  fairness  than  the  careful  assumption  of  Mr.  Mill : 
"  We  do  not  know,  but  believe  /'  and  the  fullness  of 
logical  truth  and  fairness  in  this  direction  would  be 
reached   by  an  admission  from  the  whole    positive 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  75 

school  that,  according  to  their  system,  such  behef  is 
bhnd  and  unauthorized. 

Limited  as  these  philosophers  are  by  self-confine- 
ment to  the  sphere  of  sense,  what  advantage  do  they 
possess  above  the  animal  in  respect  to  knowledge  ? 
If  sense  is  all ;  if  sequences  make  up  the  sum  of 
knowledge  ;  if  the  phenomenal  is  the  only  real,  why 
may  not  the  brute  animal,  with  keener  instinct  and 
stronger  senses,  surpass  the  human  animal  in  the 
possibility  of  knowing,  and  at  length  monopolize  the 
realm  of  positive  knowledge  ?  The  positive  philoso- 
pher, at  least,  can  not  know,  that  this  may  not  yet 
occur.  Upon  his  own  broadest  claim  he  only  knows 
what  is — not  at  all  what  may  be,  much  less  (if  there 
be  a  less  than  the  least)  does  he  kno-w  what  must  be. 
Doubtless  he  feels  himself  to  be  secure  against  the 
brute  monopoly  of  knov/ledge,  and  believes  himself 
to  be  master  of  the  situation — believes. 

But  passing  by  this  repeated  fundamental 
admission  of  the  principle  of  belief,  how,  we  ask, 
does  the  human  animal  differ  from  the  brute  animal 
in  regard  to  knowledge  ?  First,  we  pause  for  a  mo- 
ment in  the  very  field  of  the  sense,  common  to  both. 
Both  conjoin  phenomena  in  time,  both  construct 
phenomena  in  space.  May  we  not,  in  such  processes 
of  the  sense,  at  length  completely  fill  all  space  and 
exhaust  all  duration,  till  there  be  no  more  time  for 


^()  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

conjoining  or  space  for  constructing?  Evidently 
neither  the  brute  nor  the  man,  furnished  only  v/ith 
sense  according  to  this  theory,  is  authorized  to  deny 
that  this  may  at  length  occur.  Sense  knows  only 
what  is,  phenomenally.  It  can  not  say  that  space  and 
time  are  infinite.  This  has  never  appeared  to  finite 
sense — never  can  appear  to  it.  Indeed,  sense  can 
not  say  that  there  is  any  space  beyond  what  appears 
to  it  already  occupied  by  space-constructions.  Now 
the  brute  cares  not,  believes  not,  beyond  this  (is  not 
authorized  or  capacitated  to  by  his  senses)  ;  thinks 
not  of  space  or  time  beyond  what  his  experience  has. 
in  some  way,  traversed.  The  man,  alike  in  sense, 
is  different  in  thought,  different  in  behef.  He  be- 
lieves there  will  be  time  after  the  present  ;  that  there 
is  space  beyond  what  his  eye,  or  any  eye,  has  tra- 
versed ;  that  though  construction  be  added  to  con- 
struction in  space,  yet  there  will  be  room  and  still 
room  for  more  ;  and,  unlike  the  brute,  he  pushes 
out  in  successive  projections  into  the  all-surrounding 
space,  and  long  after  locomotion  flags  and  the  eye  is 
weary,  he  puts  ideal  constructions  into  the  beyond, 
unoccupied  and  illimitable.  Whence  this  difference  ? 
Whence  this  idea  of  time  and  space  to  the  man,  and 
not  to  the  brute  ?  Have  we  found  the  ultimate 
ground  on  which  human  belief  in  space  and  time 
reposes? — reposes  rationally  not  blindly,  securely  not 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  yj 

contingently — a  ground  underlying  all  the  actual 
operations  of  human  sense,  all  the  possible  operations 
of  human  sense  ?  Shall  faith — we  appeal  to  the 
positive  philosopher — shall  faith  be  ruled  out  ? 

Sense  perceives  the  collocation  and  succession  of 
phenomena.  This  is  its  strength  ;  this,  too,  is  its 
weakness.  Unaided  by  any  higher  faculty  of  the 
soul,  this  would  be  all  it  could  accomplish  ;  is  all 
legitimately  and  logically,  according  to  the  theory  of 
Brown  and  Hume — a  theory  so  commonly  pervading 
and  moulding  the  modern  positive  philosophy,  yet 
so  often  unacknowledged.  But  not  only  the  general 
faith,  the  philosophic  faith,  also,  passes  beyond  this. 
Logically,  according  to  the  sense-philosophy,  this, 
its  own  faith,  is  blind  ;  but  really  it  is  far-seeing  in 
the  light  of  reason.  Logically,  according  to  the 
sense-philosophy,  it  is  false  ;  really,  it  is  true,  con- 
firmed by  the  authority  of  reason,  which,  by  imme- 
diate beholding,  affirms  for  the  sense  in  all  its 
possible  experience  this  primitive  intuition  :  the 
reality  of  space  and  time,  illimitable  each  and  both. 

By  the  admissions  of  these  philosophers,  who  are 
so  often  arrayed  against  Christian  faith,  we  vindicate 
a  place  for  faith.  In  tracing  this  philosophy,  so  often 
arrayed  against  Christian  faith,  we  find  a  belief 
cherished,  though  by  the  system  unsupported  ;  and 
we  find  a  support  for  it  in  the  highest  human  reason. 


78  FAITH  AND   MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Thus  it  is  that  reason  in  man  helps  out  sense,  for  so 
is  the  human  soul  constituted  that  not  even  sense 
nor  the  sense-philosophy  is  left  without  the  regula- 
tion of  the  reason.  Significant  in  regard  to  the  sense, 
as   weU   as  true,    was   the   statement   of  Aristotle : 

*'  ovx  wf  aKoyov  not  to   aad^TjTixov&eLr]  av  riq  padlcjg.    * 

But,  perhaps  few  thinkers,  philosophic  or  non- 
philosophic,  limit  themselves,  even  theoretically,  to 
the  range  of  the  senses,  regarding  the  phenomenal 
as  the  only  real  and  sequences  as  making  up  the 
sum  of  knowledge.  Most  persons  recognize  another 
realm  of  knowledge,  the  realm  of  the  understanding, 
another  process  besides  that  of  merely  collocating 
phenomena,  the  process  of  connecting  the  phenom- 
enal with  the  substantial,  regarding  sequences  not 
only  as  following  antecedents  but  as  related  to  ante- 
cedents— qualities  not  as  independent  and  alone,  but 
as  depending  upon  something  which  possesses  these 
qualities  and  presents  these  appearances.  They 
speak  of  attributes  and  substances,  and  believe  in  a 
real  connection.  They  speak  of  causes  and  effects, 
and  believe  in  efficient  causation. 

Now  we  commend  this  as  highly  rational,  and 
therefore  we  are  not  a  little  surprised  by  the  manner 
in  which  some  of  this  class  treat  the  question  which 
underHes  this  discussion,  satirizing  faith  as  irrational, 

*  Arisfotle,  De  Anima,  Lib.  III.,  9. 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  79 

and  magisterially  deciding  that  it  be  ruled  out.  We 
remind  this  whole  class  of  objectors  (be  they  few  or 
many)  that  they  have  already  adopted  the  principle 
of  faith  into  their  system  and  applied  it  in  their 
practice  ;  that  they  have  asserted  their  behef  in  the 
Unseen,  even  in  substance  as  underlying  qualities 
and  attributes — in  substance,  which  according  to 
their  philosophy,  is  never  seen  or  heard  or  felt — in 
substance  which  never  appears,  but  always  eludes 
the  keenest  sense  or  the  most  curious  search.  The 
understanding,  "judging  according  to  the  sense,''  as 
it  must,  with  no  other  guide  (and  these  objectors 
recognize,  and  by  their  philosophy,  can  claim  no 
other  guide)  makes  a  strange  leap  to  a  conclusion.  By 
what  authority,  w^e  demand,  does  it  connect  quality 
with  substance?  Though  its  appropriate  function  be 
to  make  such  connections  if  the  correlates  exist, 
where  has  it  found  the  correlates  ?  Not  from  itself. 
It  connects,  only  as  the  two — qualities  and  sub- 
stance— are  given.  Not  from  the  senses.  They 
report  only  phenomena.  Yet,  these  philosophers, 
who  especially  plume  themselves  upon  rigid  logic 
and  discard  faith  in  the  unseen,  believe  in  substance 
and  allow  the  understanding  to  connect  the  attribute 
wath  the  unseen  underlying  something,  the  phenom- 
enal with  the  real.  They  speak  freely  of  cause  and 
effect  and  believe  in  efficient  causation.     Even  Mr. 


8o  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Mill  says  (Logic,  B.  III.  c.  xxi.  sees.  4  and  5) :  "  The 
law  of  causation  must  be  received  .  .  .  as  a  law 
.  .  .  of  that  portion  of  the  universe  which  is  with- 
in the  range  of  our  means  of  sure  observation  with  a 
reasonable  degree  of  extension  to  adjacent  cases," 
and  (B.  III.  c.  xiv.  sec.  7) :  "  To  endeavor  in  con- 
formity with  known  laws  to  conjecture  what  colloca- 
tions now  gone  by,  may  have  given  birth  to  individual 
facts  still  in  existence,  is  the  strictly  legitimate 
operation  of  inferring  from  an  observed  effect  in  time 
past  of  a  cause  similar  to  that  by  which  we  know  it 
to  be  produced  in  all  cases  in  which  we  have  had 
actual  experience  of  its  origin."  (The  italicising  is 
ours.)  Mr.  Lewes,  to  be  still  more  explicit,  says : 
*'  If  we  had  only  one  experience  of  fire,  we  should 
believe  it  would  burn.  To  say  that  we  can  not 
know  this  cause,  (that  is,  of  any  phenomena)  can  not 
perceive  the  relation,  is  no  more  a  ground  for  the 
denial  of  the  causal  nexus  than  it  is  for  a  denial  of  an 
external  world."  And  certainly  the  causal  nexus 
connecting  the  antecedent  and  the  consequent,  com- 
pletes the  idea  of  efficient  causation. 

Mr.  Darwin,  on  the  Origin  of  Species,  (summary 
of  chap.  V.)  says :  "  Our  ignorance  of  the  laws  of 
variation  is  profound  ;  "  and  in  the  conclusion  of  his 
chapter  on  variation  he  affirms  that,  "  whatever  the 
cause  of  each  slight  difference  in  the  offspring  from 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  8 1 

their  parents,  a  cause  for  each  must  exist!'  etc.  Prof. 
Huxley,  in  reviewing  Darwin's  theory,  declares  that 
''the  co-existence  of  a  tendency  to  minor  variation 
with  the  tendency  to  general  similarity,  whatever  be 
its  cause,  is  of  vast  importance  in  its  bearing  on  the 
(question  of  the  Origin  of  Species,"  (Lay  Sermons, 
Address  and  Reviews,  p.  264),  and  again  (p.  265),  in 
reference  to  the  Ancon  Sheep  and  the  Gratio  Kelle- 
ian  family,  he  says  :  '*  Doubtless  there  were  determin- 
ing causes  for  these  as  for  all  other  phenomena  ;  (p. 
266,)  "  Varieties  obey  the  fundamental  law  of 
reproduction  that  like  tends  to  produce  like,"  etc.  ; 
(p.  282,)  "A  phenomenon  is  explained  when  it  is 
shown  to  be  a  case  of  some  general  law  of  Nature ;  " 
and,  to  conclude  these  citations,  (p.  283)  :  ''  Harmoni- 
ous order  governing  (governs)  eternally  continuous 
progress." 

Whence,  we  ask,  have  they  derived  the  principle 
of  efficient  causation  in  the  material  world  ?  (for  we 
have  not  yet  spoken  of  a  spiritual  or  non-material 
world.  Indeed  most  of  those  who  condemn  faith  as 
irrational,  deny  the  spiritual  and  affirm  only  the  ma- 
terial.) Not  from  the  senses.  They  report  only 
phenomena  in  space,  sequences  in  time.  Not  from 
the  understanding.  It  judges  only  by  sense.  The 
causative  force  does  not  appear.  The  most  that 
sense  can  say  is,  that  one  event  follows  another — 
4* 


82  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

that  appearances  succeed  each  other.  Yet,  as  in 
regard  to  substance,  so  in  regard  to  causaHty,  these 
satirists  of  faith  beHeve  in  efficient  causation.  This 
process,  logically  illicit,  is  their  all-pervading  practice 
in  thought  and  action.  We  commend  to  these 
logicians  their  own  standard  rules  in  "  The  Art  of 
Reasoning  ;  "  and  suggest  a  critical  self-examination 
before  they  rule  out  faith. 

By  the  admissions  then  of  philosophic  objectors 
in  the  realm  of  sense  and  of  the  understanding,  we 
vindicate  a  place  for  faith  ;  and  certainly  in  the 
presence  of  public  opinion,  faith  as  a  principle  stands 
uncondemncd.  On  the  other  hand,  the  principle  is 
approved  by  the  common  reliance  upon  human  tes- 
timony by  which  questions  of  history  are  settled, 
questions  of  science  accepted,  cases  of  life  and  death 
decided,  individual  reputations,  dearer  than  life, 
made  and  lost. 

In  this  connection  we  should  not  fail  to  notice 
the  theory  of  Herbert  Spencer,  which,  while  it  allots 
to  religion  the  sphere  of  the  unknown  and  unknowa- 
ble, and  claims  for  science  the  province  of  known 
appearances,  admits  more  than  enough  to  vindicate 
a  place  for  faith.  Indeed  he  avows  that  "  belief 
is  our  sole  warrant  for  every  truth  of  immediate 
consciousness."  "^     Even  "  In  the  proposition  '  I  am,' 

*  First  Principles,  p.  28. 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  83 

no  proof  can  be  found  for  it  except  the  invariable 
existence  of  tlie  belief  in  it."*  We  would  ask  is 
not  this  belief  first  and  forever  founded  upon  the 
consciousness  of  existence?  And  is  not  that  very 
consciousness  the  proof,  unceasing  and  unquestion- 
able proof,  of  the  fact  of  our  existence  ?  Each  for 
himself  accepts  the  truth  not  by  blind  credulity, 
not  by  stubborn  determination  whether  reasonable 
or  unreasonable ;  but  because  it  is  real,  seen  to  be 
such  by  the  reason,  and  therefore  accepted  without 
question.  The  reports  of  sense  are  accepted  not 
merely  because  thus  reported,  for  the  senses  may 
be  disordered,  and  so  the  reports  be  viewed  with 
distrust  until  corrected  and  adjusted  by  a  higher 
authority — reason.  But  if  reason  itself  be  disordered 
there  is  no  appeal  for  the  soul — all  is  confusion. 
Even  the  senses,  then,  are  trusted  and  convey  to  us  a 
knowledge,  not  because  external  phenomena  are  the 
most  reliable,  not  because  knowledge  of  the  external 
world  is  the  only  or  the  real  knowledge,  not  because 
of  "  the  invariable  existence  of  belief"  in  the  senses, 
but  because  reason  sees  that  this  is  rational  and 
secure.  All  things,  indeed,  end  in  mystery  (as  the 
schoolmen  say)  no  less  for  sight  than  for  faith  ;  i.  e., 
something  is  final  — seen  to  be  rational  by  the  reason 
and  therefore  accepted,  and  not  arbitrarily  assumed 

*  First  Principles,  p.  27. 


84  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

by  the  weary  or  willful  seeker  for  the  sake  of  a  finality 
and  rest. 

We  seek  an  ultimate  datum  or  postulate,  as 
Herbert  Spencer  *  well  asserts.  But  where  shall  it 
be  found  ?  In  mere  belief,  as  he  affirms — mere  be- 
lief however  dark  and  uncertain  ?  Or,  shall  it  be  in 
the  light  and  security  of  the  reason  intuitively  be- 
holding the  ultimate  datum  and  pronouncing  the 
postulate  rational? 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  Herbert  Spencer,  holding 
that  knowledge  is  only  relative  and  that  nothing  is 
truly  known,  would  be  driven  to  mere  belief  as  the 
ultimate  postulate  and  in  the  final  resort  strive  to 
confirm  this  postulate  not  by  reason,  but  by  a 
broader  and  still  broader  generalization,  until,  if 
possible,  he  could  ascertain  the  belief  as  invariably 
existing.  Yet,  it  is  evident  that  this  task  is  really 
impossible,  for  human  observation  must  be  incom- 
petent to  establish  a  generalization  as  universal — a 
behef  as  invariably  existing.  And  so,  Mr.  Spencer, 
rejecting  reason  as  intuitive  and  reliable — rejecting 
reason  and  failing,  as  he  must  fail,  to  make  a  gen- 
eralization universal,  loses  his  "  warrant,"  his '' sole 
warrant"  for  every  truth  of  immediate  consciousness, 
as  well  as  for  every   primary  generalization   of  the 

*  First  Principles,  p.  14. 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  85 

truths  of  immediate  consciousness,  and  is  logically 
adrift  without  an  ultimate  datum  or  postulate. 

Thus  the  positive  system,  which  in  its  credulity 
founds  upon  mere  belief,  and  not  upon  reason,  and 
while  it  objects  to  faith  more  than  vindicates  a  place 
for  faith,  by  its  own  definition  annihilates  the  very 
postulate  upon  which  it  founds,  and  sinks  into  inev- 
itable skepticism  ! 

Even  belief,  then,  must  be  founded  upon  some- 
thing which  is  ultimate,  something  which  reason 
intuitively  sees  and  pronounces  to  be  ultimate  ;  a 
postulate,  not  because  believed,  but  believed,  be- 
cause reliably  pronounced  a  postulate.  This  postu- 
late is  either  furnished  by  the  human  reason  in  its 
own  light,  or  seen  in  the  light  of  a  divine  revelation 
which  the  human  reason  recognizes  as  superior  but 
not  contradictory  to  itself;  so  in  regard  to  mathe- 
matics ;  so  in  regard  to  aesthetics  ;  so  everywhere. 

The  revolution  of  the  earth  is  true,  not  because 
of  the  invariable  existence  of  such  a  belief,  for  it  has 
never  been  invariably  believed,  but  because  it  has 
been  seen  by  the  human  reason  to  be  true.  Not 
because  it  has  been  invariably  believed,  is  it  true 
that  the  blood  circulates,  but  because,  since  the  time 
of  Harvey,  it  has  been  seen  to  be  true.  So  in  refer- 
ence to  Christ  as  a  Redeemer,  and  Christianity  as  a 
faith. 


86  FAITH  AND   MODERN    THOUGHT. 

Does  not  Mr.  Spencer  make  belief — mere  belief — 
the  basis  of  the  Positive  Philosophy?  Can  the  party 
of  positivists  logically  repudiate  the  platform  ? 

This  *'  positive  "  conclusion  shows  how  readily 
objectors  adopt,  as  a  philosophical  necessity,  the 
principle  which  they  impugn  when  held  in  the  inter- 
ests of  religion  ;  with  what  facility  religious  skepticism 
can  pass  to  the  extreme  of  credulity  in  the  domain 
of  philosophy.  Such  men,  we  suggest,  should  be 
slow  to  stigmatize  Christian  faith  as  folly,  and 
Christians  as  credulous. 

In  closing  our  indirect  argument,  we  commend  to 
the  author  of  "■  The  Biographical  History  of  Philoso- 
phy," and  to  all  who  maintain  that  "  all  our  ideas 
are  derived  from  experience,"  the  remark  of  Euler 
after  having  demonstrated  certain  properties  of 
arches  :  "  All  experience  is  in  contradiction  to  this ; 
but  this  is  no  reason  for  doubting  its  truth." 

The  positive  school,  who  reject  faith  in  reason 
and  revelation,  while  they  adopt  it  stubbornly  and 
blindly  in  regard  to  sense  and  understanding,  judg- 
ing according  to  sense,  clamor  for  laiv.  What  is 
this  vaunted  shibboleth  of  a  system  wdiich  assumes 
that  "  all  our  ideas  are  derived  from  sensation  ? " 
Not  a  principle  binding  together  by  inherent  force 
and  authority,  but  a  mere  generalization  from  suc- 
cessions, not  even  a  connection  or  relation.     To-day, 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  8/ 

it  may  be ;  to-morrow,  it  may  change,  by  a  new 
observation.  The  law  is,  by  the  very  system,  made 
dependent  on  the  generahzation,  not  the  generahza- 
tion  dependent  upon  the  law  ;  the  principle  depend- 
ent upon  the  process,  not  the  process  dependent 
(as  it  should  be)  upon  the  principle.  Such  a  law,  we 
submit,  is  null  and  void — its  binding  force  is  equal 
to  that  of  a  rope  of  sand. 

We  ourselves  believe  in  law  no  less  heartily  than 
do  the  most  positive  of  the  positivists.  We  not 
only  believe,  without  misgiving,  in  the  lower  law 
which  pervades  all  nature,  and  which  the  scientist 
is  noisily  and  haughtily  pursuing,  while  the  philos- 
opher is  silently  and  reverently  tracing  ;  but  also  a 
higher  law,  (and  a  law-giver)  which  comprehends 
and  controls  all  things.  Indeed,  in  the  very  exist- 
ence of  law,  even  in  the  lower  law,  for  which  the 
revilers  of  faith  clamor,  we  may,  as  we  proceed,  find 
a  vindication  for  faith  ;  and  in  the  lower  and  the 
higher  circuits  of  law,  may  there  not  be  found  to 
reside  a  resistless  authority  for  faith  ?  Faith  is  a 
phenomenon  by  no  means  rare.  Does  it  not  exist 
by  law  as  really  as  does  any  phenomenon  in  material 
nature  ?  It  would  be  well  for  the  objector  to  pon- 
der this  question  before  hastening  to  decide  that 
faith  be  ruled  out.  Employed  in  its  true  sense,  we 
like  this  term  law,  just  now  so  pretentiously  monop- 


88  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

olized  by  those  who  "  positively "  emasculate  the 
vital  force  of  the  term.  It  involves  much  of  the 
case  at  issue.  Involving  more  than  the  materialist, 
more  than  the  fact-philosopher  admits  or  logically 
can  allow,  it  proves  too  much  for  him, — that  faith  as 
a  fact  will  not,  can  not  be  ruled  out.  It  may  even 
appear  that  whoever  undertakes  this,  makes  more 
than  a  futile,  makes  a  suicidal  attempt. 

Law,  if  it  exist  at  all,  exists  not  as  a  general- 
ization, but  independently  of  the  generalization  and 
before  it,  as  an  informing,  controlling,  connecting 
principle — detected  perhaps  by  the  generalizing  pro- 
cess, but  not  as  the  generalization  which  the  observer 
makes,  but  as  the  basis  of  it,  without  which  even  the 
generalizing  process  would  not  be  scientific  but  ar- 
bitrary. It  is  only  thus  that  each  particular  science 
can  legitimately  seek  (as  it  does  seek)  *'  a  principle 
of  unity,"  which  will  '*  account  for  the  phenomena 
in  its  own  realm,"  which  is  not  a  mere  verbal  fiction, 
as  it  must  be  in  the  *'  positive  philosophy,"  but  a 
real  force  and  law,  as  it  is  in  nature.  So,  universal 
science,  or  philosophy  in  its  highest  range,  may  legit- 
imately seek  for  a  higher  law,  a  principle  of  absolute 
unity.  Whether  by  human  searching  it  be  found  or 
not,  what  man  of  science  practically  doubts  its  exist- 
ence ?  What  true  philosopher,  what  real  Christian, 
doubts  its  existence  ?     (And  law  implies  a  law-giver. 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  89 

and  has  "  its  seat  in  the  bosom  of  God."  But  this 
point  must  be  postponed  to  its  proper  place.)  We 
can  well  sum  up  our  thought  upon  law  by  the 
incidental  reference  of  Dr.  Tayler  Lewis  upon  a  very 
different  theme :  "■  The  forces  and  laws  of  nature  are 
not  properties  of  matter  ;  that  would  be  sheer  mate- 
rialism. They  are  not  the  offspring  of  matter,  born 
of  it,  but  the  seminal  powers  themselves  mysteriously 
working  in  matter,  controlling  matter,  making  the 
earth  and  the  waters  bring  forth  the  living  forms. 
They  were  sown  when  '  the  Spirit  brooded  upon  the 
waters,'  in  that  first  mysterious  night  of  Creation." 

The  existence  of  natural  laws  underlies  science 
and  gives  it  possibility.  Observation,  which  leads 
to  science,  proceeds  upon  this  very  principle,  the 
existence  of  natural  law.  As  we  believe  in  the  one 
as  a  grand  reality,  so  we  believe  in  the  other  as  a 
grand  possibility.  We  have  no  quarrel  with  science. 
On  the  contrary,  we  welcome  its  advance.  We  hail 
it  as  it  has  ever  proved  itself  to  be,  when  matured 
by  reflection,  the  friend  of  faith,  the  ally  of  religion. 
Science  as  dependent  upon  human  observation  has 
its  appropriate  range,  and  within  that  range  may  be 
a  desirable  guide.  It  can  give  us  classified  knowl- 
edge. It  can  elaborate  a  system  of  general  princi- 
ples, but  not  a  system  of  universal  and  necessary 
principles.     As  observation  proceeds,  science   must 


90  FAITH  AND   MODERN   THOUGHT. 

readjust  itself.  Complete  scientific  knowledge  is 
possible  only  with  complete  experience  ;  and  where 
shall  such  experience  be  attained  ?  Scientific  con- 
clusions, lodged  as  they  are  in  human  opinion,  must 
be  held  subject  to  possible  modifications,  by  possibly 
new  observations,  the  hypothetical  *'  may  "  forever 
hesitating  to  rise  into  the  positive  "must."  How 
can  science  positively  deny  a  God  when  by  its  very 
nature  it  proposes  to  traverse  only  the  finite  ?  How 
can  it  positively  deny  spiritual  realities  on  which 
religious  faith  fastens,  when  it  contemplates  only 
the  phenomenal?  How  can  it  positively  deny  a 
first  cause,  when  it  is  wholly  uncertain  whether  it 
has  traced  the  complete  length  of  nature's  line  ? 
How,  if  it  positively  deny  a  First  Cause  in  the  line 
of  nature,  can  it  deny  an  originator  of  nature  and  of 
natural  causes,  even  a  Creator?  How  can  it  posi- 
tively deny  a  final  cause  or  final  causes,  when  its 
observation  has  not  yet  reached  the  end,  as  it  has 
not  yet  reached  the  beginning  of  nature  ?  How  can 
it  be  positive  even  within  its  own  narrow  range, 
when  its  observations  are  as  yet  only  partial,  its 
classifications  contradictory,  and  its  theories  hypo- 
thetical and  conflicting  ?  How,  in  fine,  can  its  arro- 
gance reach  so  far  as  to  demand  that  faith  be  ruled 
out,  when  its  own  ultimate  basis  is  belief? 

Within  this  field  of  the  philosophic  and  finite  we 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  9 1 

have  traced  the  admissions  of  objectors,  vindicating 
a  place  for  faith,  until  by  logical  necessity  they  end 
in  making  faith — belief — the  "  ultimate  datum  or 
postulate,"  the  "sole  warrant  for  every  truth  of  con- 
sciousness, and  generalization,  and  demonstration,"  * 
a  warrant  not  even  claiming  the  authority  of  reason  ! 
a  belief  that  is  blind  !  Such  admissions  should,  to 
say  the  least,  silence  objection  against  faith. 

This  indirect  argument,  arguinentiivL  ad  Jiominem, 
which  we  have  employed  only  as  a  defense,  can 
easily  be  seen  to  furnish  a  direct  support,  since  it 
shows  that  the  ability  for  faith  and  the  tendency  to 
faith  are  native  to  the  human  soul. 

But  we  do  not  depend  upon  the  admissions  of 
objectors.  We  turn  from  the  indirect  to  the  direct 
argument  to  establish  within  the  field  of  the  philo- 
sophic and  finite,  a  place  for  faith  upon  positive  and 
reliable  grounds.  This  argument  we  base  {a)  upon 
facts  of  Intelligence  ;  {U)  upon  facts  of  Conscience  ; 
(<;)  upon  facts  of  Volition. 

{a)  The  philosophy  which  would  confine  itself  to 
fact  and  discard  faith  has  not  exhausted  all  possible 
facts  when  it  has  traversed  the  entire  material  world 
and  penetrated  all  the  mysteries  of  physical  nature. 
If  nature  be  known,  it  is  known  as  what  ?  Accord- 
ing to  the  first  objector,  only  as  material  phenomena 

*  Herbert  Spencer's  "  First  Principles,"  p.  28. 


92  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

collocated  in  space,  conjoined  in  time  ;  according  to 
the  second  objector,  only  as  material  being  and  phe- 
nomena related,  or  as  effect  and  cause  connected. 
But  now  suppose,  "  Man  is  descended,"  according 
to  Darwin,  *'  from  a  hairy  quadruped,  furnished  with 
a  tail  and  pointed  ears,  probably  arboreal  in  its 
habits,  and  an  inhabitant  of  the  Old  World,"  yet  we 
have  men  to  deal  with,  human  nature  to  observe 
and  study  scientifically.  This  study,  to  say  the  least, 
is  as  important  and  exalted  as  the  study  of  material 
or  brute  nature. 

In  the  utmost  range  of  physical  sense,  thought  is 
not  included,  although  it  is  the  most  common  of  all 
facts,  ever  present  and  ever-changing.  Affections, 
passions,  are  not  included,  although  they  are 
cherished  by  all,  and  are  unquestioned  facts.  Moral 
acts,  choosing,  willing,  are  not  included,  for,  although 
exercised  by  every  person,  and  constantly  exercised, 
they  elude  the  observation  of  the  five  senses. 

Here,  then,  is  a  world  of  facts  so  different  from 
those  of  the  material  world,  that  the  very  senses 
which  give  us  a  knowledge  of  the  latter,  utterly  fail 
to  give  us  the  least  notice  of  the  former.  What 
world  is  this  ? — certainly  not  the  material.  The 
order  of  facts  by  which  it  is  known  is  metaphysical. 
How  shall  these  facts  be  perceived  ?  How  shall  we 
hold    communion   with  this   world  of  thought  and 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  93 

feeling  and  volition  ?  It  matters  not  what  this 
world  be  called.  Call  it  inind,  or  spirit,  or  soul ;  it 
is  at  least  not  material,  not  physical.  This  world  is 
not  without,  but  within  us.  Any  person  to  know  it, 
must  know  himself;  that  is,  be  self-conscious.  Any 
person  to  study  it,  must  attend  to  his  self-conscious- 
ness. We,  then,  have  found  this  second  world,  so 
entirely  different  and  distinct  from  the  material 
world  ;  and  found  the  means  of  observing  its  facts. 
This  second  class  of  facts  is  especially  worthy  of  our 
observation  as  related  to  our  very  being,  and  most 
accessible  as  lying  within  the  soul's  self-comprehen- 
sion. The  boastful  philosophy  of  fact  is  positively 
and  logically  bound  to  self-attention  and  self-study. 

It  may  be  claimed  by  some  persistent  objector 
that  even  this  new  world  we  occupy  in  common 
with  the  brute,  for  the  brute  thinks  and  feels  and 
wills.  We  do  not  stay  to  discuss  this  incidental 
question  whether  in  mind  the  man  is  superior  to  the 
brute.  If  the  philosophic  objector  insists  that  men- 
tally the  brute  is  his  equal,  we  shall  not  insist  to  the 
contrary  ;  and,  if  he  prove  his  assertion  even  to  a 
demonstration,  we  only  reply  that  in  all  fairness  it 
entitles  the  brute  to  the  same  intellectual  credit  and 
advantage  with  the  philosopher. 

In  this  world  of  thought  what  are  some  of  the 
distinctive   facts  which  we  are   to  observe  ?     First, 


94  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

not  only  that  there  is  thought,  but  the  consciousness 
of  something  thinking — the  self-assertion  of  a  mind 
or  soul,  and  not  only  a  soul  and  thought,  but  thought 
about  an  external  event  as  different  from  the  think- 
ing, or  about  an  external  object  as  different  from  the 
thinker;  and  further  still,  about  an  external  object 
as  the  real  substance,  non-appearing,  but  underlying 
certain  qualities  which  do  appear,  and  about  an 
event  as  produced  by  some  cause.  While,  then, 
there  is  the  fact  of  self-recognition — the  fact  of  con- 
scious self-activity — the  fact  of  sharp  and  decisive 
discrimination  between  self  and  not-self — between  the 
internal  and  the  external  phenomena,  there  is  also  the 
assertion,  as  a  fact,  that  the  soul  is  the  cause  of  the  in- 
ternal phenomena  and  not  of  the  external,  and  thus 
there  is  a  distinction  not  only  between  the  two  kinds 
of  phenomena,  but  also  between  the  two  kinds  of 
causality,  as  distinct  as  the  two  kinds  of  phenomena. 
And  further,  there  is  the  assertion  not  only  that  the 
event  has  a  cause  and  the  quality  a  substance,  but  that 
every  quality,  every  attribute,  is  thus  related,  and  that 
every  event  has  a  cause.  This  the  soul  unhesitatingly 
believes.  How,  we  demand,  are  we  to  account  for 
this  not  general  but  universal,  not  adventitious  but 
necessary  conclusion  ?  However  we  have  felt  im- 
pelled to  ask  a  similar  question  before,  in  view  of  the 
principles  of  space  and  time  as  conditional  to  all  the 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  95 

processes  of  sense,  and  of  the  principles  of  substance 
and  causality  as  conditional  for  all  processes  of  the 
understanding,  we  can  not  longer  postpone  the  ques- 
tion. Whence  do  we  derive  not  only  these  con- 
ditionals for  the  sense  and  the  understanding,  but 
these  ideas  of  the  universal  and  the  necessary  ?  No 
perceptions  of  sense  can  discover  these.  No  gener- 
alizations of  the  understanding  can  reach,  much  less 
furnish  them.  To  deny  their  possibility  is  fallacious, 
for  already  we  have  them.  They  are  in  the  mind. 
They  are  in  the  world.  Whence  are  they  ?  They 
are  fundamental  affirmations  of  the  mind  itself  It 
is  itself  the  place  of  these  principles.  Call  it,  if  you 
please,  the  high  intuitions  of  the  soul.  Call  it 
reason,  as  higher  than  the  senses  or  than  the  discur- 
sive logical  understanding.  These  principles  exist, 
are  employed,  and  are  thus  furnished.  If  these  be 
furnished  by  the  reason,  then  it  would  be,  to  say  the 
least,  irrational  to  ignore  or  disbelieve  them.  If 
furnished  by  the  soul  in  the  exercise  of  its  higher 
power  of  whatever  nature,  it  is  equally  irrational  to 
disbelieve  or  ignore  them.  They  are  intellectual  prin- 
ciples or  starting  points  for  all  our  positive  knowledge, 
empirical  or  philosophic,  intuitive  or  adventitious. 

In  thus  tracing  the  line  of  mental  facts  we  have 
reached  a  point  which  separates  between  man  and 
brute.     In  the  former  we  find  this  place  of  principles. 


96  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

which  is  wanting  in  the  latter.  Whatever  of  sense 
or  understanding  the  brute  may  possess,  he  does  not 
possess  human  reason,  the  place  of  principles — first 
principles — belonging  to  the  very  furniture  of  the 
human  soul,  necessary  and  universal,  like  the  notion 
of  all-pervading  space  and  of  all-enduring  time,  of 
substance  related  to  attribute  and  attribute  to  sub- 
stance, universally  by  and  necessarily  related  ;  of  effect 
related  to  cause,  and  cause  to  effect,  universally  and 
necessarily  related. 

Here,  then,  in  the  possession  of  reason,  and  not 
merely  of  reasoning  as  judgment  according  to  the 
sense,  is  the  human  mind  immeasurably  exalted 
above  the  brute.  Sublime  as  are  the  terms  in  which 
the  great  English  dramatist  characterizes  the  human 
reason,  they  are  more  than  deserved. 

Here,  also,  are  principles  universal  and  necessary, 
furnished  by  reason,  which  the  individual  and  the 
general  faith  accepts.  Here  are  facts  of  intelligence 
which,  within  this  department  of  the  philosophic 
and  finite,  furnish  positive  and  reliable  grounds  for 
faith.  We  might  specify  other  facts  of  intelligence  : 
aesthetic  principles,  which  are  the  source  and  the 
security  of  fine  art ;  mathematical  and  philosphical 
principles,  which  guide  and  govern  science  in  its 
varied  directions  ;  but  we  turn  to  consider  another 
class  of  facts, — 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  97 

{b)  Facts  of  Conscience.  We  have  a  sense  of 
right  and  wrong,  of  obHgation,  of  responsibiHty. 
We  feel  complacency  or  displacency  as  we  recognize 
this  standard  in  our  actions,  yield  to  this  obligation 
and  meet  this  responsibility,  and  we  apply  substan- 
tially the  same  principles  to  our  own  expectations 
and  estimates  of  others.  The  terms  merit  and  de- 
merit are  applied  everywhere,  and  everywhere  to 
human  agents,  and  not  only  are  innocence  and  guilt 
ascribed,  but  reward  and  retribution  are  universally 
expected.  Not  only  do  we  feel  assured  that  these 
are  applicable  to  man,  but  as  surely  that  they  are 
not  applicable  to  animals.  By  the  necessity  of  the 
case,  the  boldest  objector  admits  the  theory  of  morals 
in  respect  to  man,  and  by  the  same  necessity  he 
does  not,  can  not,  predicate  morality  of  a  thing  or 
an  animal.  As  well  speak  of  '*  a  pound  of  virtue  or 
a  peck  of  truth."  We  cross  a  permanent  line  of  sep- 
aration before  morality  begins.  Without  reason  and 
conscience  there  can  be  no  free-will.  Without 
reason,  and  conscience,  and  free-will  there,  can  be  no 
responsible  action.  The  beast  has  cognition,  and 
feeling,  and  choice,  or  selection  ;  but  it  has  not  rea- 
son and  conscience,  and  in  consequence,  no  free-will, 
and  therefore  no  morality.  Hence  it  is  evermore 
thing,  and  not  person.  This  the  objector  must  admit, 
but  the  admission  is  vital  in  its  relation  to  faith  in 


9o  FAITH  AND  MODERN  THOUGHT. 

man  and  to  the  faith  of  man.  The  animal  may  ex- 
ercise prudence  at  the  dictate  of  the  understanding, 
and  as  a  result  of  experience.  But  morality  appears 
only  in  the  presence  of  reason  and  conscience. 
"■  Conscience,"  as  has  been  well  said  by  Pres.  Mc- 
Cosh,  *'  Conscience  discerns  moral  quality  only  in 
voluntary  acts,  and  pronounces  its  decisions  upon  such 
acts  alone."  "  The  soul  itself  asserts  for  man  the 
duty  to  resist  and  subjugate  all  the  clamorous  appe- 
tites of  sense  and  hold  them  in  perpetual  servitude 
to  its  own  ethical  end."  (Pres.  Hickok.)  Experience 
everywhere  confirms  the  soul's  prejudgment,  that  if 
**  we  bow  our  personality  to  the  ends  of  animal  grati- 
fication, and  in  our  depravity  make  the  ethical  to 
serve  the  sensual,  degradation  and  debasement  shall 
inevitably  follow  and  remorse  torment  us  as  a  gnaw- 
ing worm."  (Hickok.)  The  human  soul  in  the 
possession  of  reason  and  conscience,  and  a  will  at 
liberty  to  obey  or  disobey,  stands  forth  a  moral  be- 
ing, a  person  and  not  a  thing.  Across  this  line  of 
separation  the  brute  never  passes.  Within  this 
higher  moral  realm,  dull  matter  is  never  for  a  moment 
thought  to  enter.  Everywhere  in  this  realm  of  fact 
conscience  appears,  and  here  alone — conscience  ac- 
cusing or  else  excusing ;  witnessing  evermore  to  the 
principles  of  right,  obligation  and  duty.  These 
ethical  facts  pervading  the  human  soul  and  peculiar 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  99 

to  it,  SO  far  as  our  observation  has  yet  reached — 
these  facts  demand  the  consideration  of  even  the 
most  positive  philosopher,  with  a  claim  at  least  as 
exalted  as  the  facts  of  dull  matter. 

Whence  the  principles  which  underlie  these  moral 
facts?  Not  from  material  nature,  though  watched 
by  every  sense.  Not  from  generalizations,  however 
broad  or  skillful.  The  law  is  not  from  without,  but 
from  within — "  the  law  written  in  the  heart."  It  is 
the  soul  itself  with  the  highest  reason  asserting  this 
claim  in  its  own  right ;  and  the  witness  of  conscience 
is,  evermore,  that  although  the  spirit  of  a  man  may 
sustain  his  infirmity,  a  wounded  spirit  none  can  bear. 
Here,  in  the  light  of  reason,  and  with  the  witness  of 
conscience  this  law  appears,  binding  together  the 
moral  facts  to  which  we  have  referred,  and  itself  a 
fact  pervading  every  human  consciousness — a  law 
higher  in  its  authority  and  in  the  estimate  of  the 
human  soul  than  any  other  law  within  the  realm  of 
sense  or  the  sphere  of  the  understanding,  and  there- 
fore every  possible  end  within  those  limits  must  be 
subordinate  to  this  ethical  end.  In  the  soul's  just 
estimate,  moral  character  is  of  highest  worth.  To 
deny  this,  would  be  to  deny  one's  own  reason  ;  to 
disbelieve,  would  be  to  impugn  the  testimony  of 
one's  conscience.  In  the  presence  of  this  inalienable 
right,  the  human  soul  becomes  conscious  of  its  in- 


lOO  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

herent  personality  ;  and  responsible  choice  becomes 
possible.  The  will  may  go  forth  by  the  authority  of 
reason  and  the  witness  of  conscience  to  choose  the 
good,  to  act  worthy  of  itself,  when  reason  and  un- 
derstanding and  sense  are  in  accord,  and  if  they  are 
in  conflict,  still  to  act  worthy  of  itself  by  choosing 
the  good  and  refusing  the  evil.  The  common  faith 
asserts  itself  in  the  supreme  authority  of  the  right, 
and  in  the  superior  worth  of  virtue  or  obedience  to 
this  authority.  In  this  statement  the  principle  or 
basis  of  the  right  is  not  specified,  nor  is  it  affirmed 
that  the  determination  of  this  principle  is  always  the 
same  ;  but  this  being  determined,  as  it  always  is  for 
the  soul  in  some  way,  the  statement  remains  true 
that  the  common  faith  has  always  regarded  the  right 
as  of  supreme  authority,  and  virtue  or  obedience  to 
this  authority  as  of  superior  worth. 

And  here  we  may  say  in  reply  to  any  philosophic 
skepticism,  that  if,  in  the  processes  of  perception, 
we  may  proceed  on  the  belief  or  assumption  of 
space  and  time  for  conjoining  all  phenomena,  if  in 
the  processes  of  the  understanding  we  may  proceed 
on  the  assumption  or  belief  in  substance  as  the 
ground  of  connecting  phenomena,  why  in  the  higher 
process  of  morals  is  it  irrational  or  unscientific  to 
proceed  on  the  belief  or  assumption  of  the  principle 
of  right  with    its   accompanying   consequences    of 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  lOI 

obligation  and  responsibility?  We  do  not  say,  how- 
ever, in  either  case — whatever  the  skeptical  objector 
may  assert — that  we  proceed  upon  assumption,  but 
rather  upon  the  most  valid  ground,  the  principles  of 
human  reason.  Indeed,  we  have  carefully  observed 
the  legitimate  rule  of  induction  :  that,  "  in  the  uni- 
verse objectively  considered  there  is  an  intelligent 
and  wise  adaptation  of  powers  and  laws  to  natural 
ends,  and  that  the  same  is  true  of  the  relation  of 
the  universe  to  the  knowing  mind."  (Pres.  Porter.) 

At  this  point  of  our  advance,  with  the  unques- 
tionable facts  which  we  have  attained,  we  pause  to 
ascertain  the  mutual  attitude  of  faith  and  reason- 
intellectual  or  historical  faith,  for  we  have  not  'yet 
reached  the  field  of  Christian  faith.  Is  it  an  attitude 
of  repugnance  ?  On  the  contrary  we  confidently 
declare  a  harmony  between  faith  and  reason. 

Has  it  not  been  the  common  faith  of  the  learned 
and  the  illiterate,  that  there  is  in  nature  substance 
as  well  as  quality  ?  That  the  phenomenal  is  related 
to  the  real,  and  must  be  so  related  ?  That  causes 
produce  effects,  and  that  every  effect  must  have  a 
cause  ?  That  there  is  space  beyond  the  reach  of 
the  longest  human  vision,  even  immensity?  That 
there  is  a  past  beyond  all  finite  experience,  and  a 
future  no  less  extended,  even  infinite  duration? 
That  there  are  phenomena  unlike  material  phenom- 


102  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

ena?  That  there  is  an  internal  world  different  from 
and  distinct  from  the  external  world  ?  That  this 
world  of  thought  and  feeling  and  volition  is  as  real 
as  the  world  of  extension  and  figure  and  weight? 
That  the  human  soul,  the  knower,  is  as  real  as  mat- 
ter, the  thing  known  ?  That  the  will  can  choose 
between  good  and  evil,  since  there  is  a  rule  of  right 
to  which  the  human  conscience  doth  witness  ?  That 
not  the  thing  is  responsible,  not  the  animal,  but  the 
person  thus  morally  endowed  ? 

Instead  of  discord,  thus  far,  between  faith  and  rea- 
son, we  find  that  faith  has  relied  upon  the  authority 
of  reason  for  these  fundamental  beliefs,  and  thus  faith 
has  been  throughout  consistently  rational — saved, 
on  the  one  hand,  from  credulity,  or  believing  with- 
out facts,  and  on  the  other  hand,  from  superstition, 
or  magnifying  facts  without  reason.  Thus  in  this 
highest  sphere  which  we  have  yet  reached — although 
there  remains  a  higher  still  for  us  to  consider — faith 
is  shown  to  be  not  only  consistent  with  reason,  but 
as  it  has  been  beautifully  defined  to  be  :  **  The  fealty 
of  the  finite  will  and  understanding  to  the  reason." 
(Webster's  definition  quoted  from  Coleridge.) 

{c)  Facts  of  Volition.  Here  we  reach  another 
question  of  Faith,  closely  allied  to  what  shall  follow 
— in  a  certain  sense  fundamental  to  it — the  question 
of  human  depravity.     The  human  will   at   variance 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  IO3 

with  reason  and  conscience  constitutes  depravity. 
In  regard  to  this  it  is  undeniable  that  a  behef  in 
human  depravity  has  been  the  common  faith  of 
mankind.  Whether  this  is  authorized,  is  rational, 
may  be  positively  determined.  The  facts  are  quite 
within  the  reach  of  our  present  advance,  although 
we  are  yet  wholly  within  the  sphere  of  the  human 
and  the  moral.  This  doctrine  has  not  been  origi- 
nated by  any  religion,  certainly  not  by  the  Christian 
religion.  Yet  it  is  common  to  all  religions.  By  the 
terms  of  the  statement,  (depravity  is  the  will  at 
variance  with  reason  and  conscience)  as  well  as  in 
the  nature  of  the  case,  it  is  evident  that  depravity  is 
a  fact  originating  from  within  the  human  soul,  and 
not  an  effect  wrought  by  an  external  force  like  ne- 
cessitated causation  in  the  material  world.  Neither 
can  it  ever  become  a  necessitated  cause  producing 
unavoidable  effects  like  those  in  the  material  world. 
It  is  not  imposed  upon  the  soul,  to  be  inevitably 
suffered  as  misfortune,  for  it  is  the  will  itself  in  its 
own  act  at  variance  with  reason  and  conscience. 
"  Sin  is  a  quality  of  voluntary  acts.  It  always  re- 
sides in  some  mental  affection  or  act  in  which  there 
is  the  exercise  of  free-will.  The  guilt  of  the  sin  thus 
always  lies  with  him  who  commits  it."  *  And  again 
on  the  other  hand,  ''  Moral  good  lies  in  the  region 
*  Dr.  McCosh's  Intuitions  of  the  Mind. 


104  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

of  the  will.  By  this  I  mean  that  every  truly  virtuous 
act  must  be  a  voluntary  one."  ^  *'  Sin  is  a  malady 
which  has  infected  mankind,  differing  from  any  other 
disease  only  in  this,  that  it  emanates  from  the  will 
and  involves  guilt."  f 

Depravity  is  not  introduced  into  the  soul  surrep- 
titiously, exonerating  the  soul  from  responsibility, 
and  transferring  the  guilt  to  another.  It  is  the  will 
itself  in  its  own  act,  at  variance  with  reason  and  con- 
science. If  depravity  exists,  it  is  subject  to  the 
inspection  of  self-consciousness.  The  question  is  one 
of  fact.  The  consciousness  of  the  race  can  testify 
directly  and  conclusively.  Each  person  feels  it  for 
himself;  and  almost  every  one  confesses  it  of  him- 
self, or  asserts  it  of  his  neighbor.  If  any  deny  this, 
they  are  at  most  only  a  persistent  i^\\%  hardly  enough 
to  furnish  the  desirable  exception  requisite  to  prove 
a  rule.  The  best  men  daily  and  penitently  make 
humiliating  confession  ;  and  bad  men  more  than 
admit  the  fact  by  their  denial.  The  purest 
man  sadly  finds  how  difficult  the  task  to  master 
appetite  and  desire  and  passion  and  self-love  ;  to 
control  the  senses  ;  to  govern  the  thoughts  ;  to  regu 
late  all  the  words ;  to  guide  the  whole  conduct  in 
every  relation  ;  to  bring  all  into  strict  and  willing 
conformity  with  the  rule  of  his  own  reason  and  con- 

*  Dr.  McCosh's  Intuitions  of  the  Mind. 
f  Dr.  Fisher's  Boston  Lecture. 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM,  10$ 

science.  This  is  the  testimony  of  self-consciousness 
in  the  case  of  the  individual.  ''  But  when  he  hath 
parents  and  children,  friends  and  enemies,  buyers 
and  sellers,  lawyers  and  clients,  a  family  and  a  neigh- 
borhood— then  it  is  that  every  man  dashes  against 
another,  and  one  relation  requires  what  another 
denies  ;  and  when  one  speaks  another  will  contra- 
dict him  ;  and  that  which  is  well  spoken  is  sometimes 
innocently  mistaken  ;  and  that  upon  a  good  cause 
produces  an  evil  effect ;  and  by  these  and  ten  thou- 
sand other  concurrent  causes  man  is  made  more  than 
most  miserable."  These  statements  of  Jeremy 
Taylor  commend  themselves  to  human  experience 
and  observation.  His  illustration  of  this  moral  truth 
is  so  apt,  that  we  shall  be  pardoned  for  transcribing 
it :  ''  This  being  the  case  of  all  the  world,  what  is 
every  man's  evil  becomes  all  men's  greater  evil ;  and 
though  alone  it  is  very  bad,  yet  when  they  come  to- 
gether it  is  made  much  worse.  Like  ships  in  a 
storm,  every  one  alone  hath  enough  to  do  to  outride 
it  ;  but  when  they  meet,  besides  the  evils  of  the 
storm,  they  find  the  intolerable  calamity  of  their 
mutual  concussions  ;  and  every  ship  that  is  ready  to 
be  oppressed  with  the  tempest,  is  a  worse  tempest  to 
every  vessel  against  which  it  is  violently  dashed. 
So  it  is  in  mankind."  So  this  testimony  of  the  indi- 
vidual self-consciousness  becomes  but  a  sample   and 


I06  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

a  part  of  the  accumulated  testimony  of  the  general 
consciousness  of  mankind.  This  appears  in  universal 
language  and  literature,  in  law  and  religion,  in  the 
demand  for  government  and  the  difficulty  of  govern- 
ing well,  in  the  rule  and  the  misrule  which  make  up 
the  political  history  of  the  world.  These  words, 
this  literature,  these  laws,  these  religions,  etc.,  exist 
in  the  world  as  facts  which  none  are  at  liberty  to 
ignore,  and,  least  of  all,  the  positivist  or  fact-phi- 
losopher. These  facts  are  the  outgrowth  and  the 
witness  of  the  human  consciousness  ;  and  prove,  as 
no  fact  can  be  more  strongly  proved,  human  deprav- 
ity, the  will  at  variance  with  reason  and  conscience, 
choosing  not  everywhere  and  always  the  highest 
good — not  always  and  everywhere  unswervingly  pur- 
suing the  right. 

Depravity  is  a  fact,  ''  which  all  deep-thinking 
men,  heathen  or  Christian,  have  united  in  deploring, 
a  fact  which  Seneca  declares  almost  in  the  language 
of  Paul," — a  fact  recognized  and  emphasized  not  only 
in  the  Bible,  but  in  the  Promethean  fable  of  Asia 
Minor,  in  the  Brahminical  writings  of  India,  in  the 
significant  symbol  of  Cupid  and  Psyche  ;  pervading 
indeed  all  the  myths  of  the  Greeks  and  the  Romans, 
and  constituting  the  chief  element  in  the  mythology 
of  the  East  and  of  the  West. 

The   most  positive  of  the  fact-philosophers  can 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  10/ 

not  impugn  or  condemn  our  method  of  determining 
this  question,  severely  inductive  as  it  is;  asking  as 
we  have  done,  not  what  may  be,  but  what  is — not 
even  what  is  the  law,  but  what  are  the  facts  ;  receiv- 
ing testimony  not  alone  from  the  senses,  which  might 
be  deceived,  but  taking  the  testimony  of  the  individ- 
ual consciousness  and  the  conclusive  testimony  of 
the  common  consciousness  of  the  race.  Pantheistic 
and  materialistic  atheists,  ancient  and  modern,  have 
suppressed  this  confession  only  by  denying  the  dis- 
tinction between  right  and  wrong — a  distinction 
which  we  have  already  found  pronounced  by  reason, 
and  witnessed  by  conscience,  and  accepted  by  the 
common  faith  of  mankind  as  inherent  and  essential. 
By  such  denial  they  have  disqualified  themselves  in 
the  presence  of  reason  and  conscience  as  witnesses 
upon  the  question  just  now  at  issue, — the  question 
of  depravity. 

The  belief  of  mankind,  then,  in  human  depravity 
is  confirmed  by  fact:  and,  by  the  decision  of  reason 
should  not  be  ruled  out — can  not  be.  Sin  is  in  the 
world,  and  guilt,  with  their  attendant  evils.  To 
what  extent  sin  has  impaired  any  of  our  faculties, 
even  the  noblest,  and  thus  necessitated  divine  help 
in  our  weakness,  and  divine  light  in  our  darkness,  we 
need  not  here  attempt  to  determine.  Sin  is  in  the 
world.     The  great  question  confronting  us  here  is, 


I08  FAITH  AND   MODERN    THOUGHT, 

How  shall  sin  be  treated?  With  punishment,  or 
atonement  ?  Shall  there  be  redemption,  or  judg- 
ment ?  If  atonement  be  allowed,  how  and  on  what 
conditions  shall  it  be  made,  and  how  shall  it  become 
available  for  sinners  ?  This  question,  which  concerns 
us  most,  this  greatest  question  which  can  possibly 
meet  a  world  of  sinners,  human  reason  can  not  answer. 
This  must  rest  not  with  the  sinner,  but  with  the 
moral  governor.  This  necessity  impels  our  inquiry 
to  another  and  higher  field, — the  infinite,  the  religious. 
Thitherward  faith,  rising  above  the  philosophic  and 
the  finite,  looks  intently,  anxious  for  light  and  help. 
The  revelation  may,  must  transcend  human  reason, 
not  to  contradict,  but  to  save.  As  Lessing,  who  will 
not  be  suspected  of  partial  witness  here,  has  said : 
"  'Tis  a  proof  of  the  truth  of  Revelation,  if  reason 
finds  in  it  truths  which  exceed  reason.  Whoever 
despoils  his  religion  of  such  truths  has  as  good 
as  none  ;  for  what  is  a  revelation  which  reveals 
nothing?  " 

By  indirect  argument,  then,  and  by  direct  argu- 
ment, within  the  field  of  the  finite  and  philosophic, 
we  not  only  vindicate  a  place  for  faith,  but  establish 
it  upon  positive  and  reliable  grounds ;  and  thus 
exclude  skepticism  as  irrational  and  philosophically 
impossible. 

As  incidental  to  the  main  discussion,  it  is  obvious 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  IO9 

to  remark  that  the  view  presented  utterly  precludes 
mere  Materialism  on  the  one  hand,  and  mere  Ideal- 
ism on  the  other.  If  this  view  be  correct,  there  is 
both  a  material  universe  of  ever-changing  phenomena, 
produced  by  ever-acting  causes,  related  to  ever- 
during  substances  ;  and  a  (mental)  spiritual  universe, 
no  less  real,  no  less  active,  no  less  multifarious  in 
phenomena. 

It  is  also  obvious  to  remark  that,  according  to 
this  view,  the  final  centre,  around  which  the  universe 
of  matter  and  the  universe  of  mind  revolve,  can  not 
be  pantheistic  ;  for  mind  everywhere  and  always 
recognizes  its  individual  personality,  freedom,  and 
responsibility — its  own  self-hood,  separating  it  not 
only  from  all  surrounding  material  objects,  but  also 
from  all  other  minds.  This  very  assertion  of  self- 
hood denies,  with  all  the  emphasis  of  endless  and 
countless  iteration,  the  possibility  of  pantheism. 
The  centre,  self-supporting,  all-supporting  centre,  is 
beyond  the  finite  and  philosophic.  There  is  not 
a  pantheistic  whole,  and  the  centre  can  not  be 
pantheistic. 


no  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT, 


CHAPTER  III. 
Faith  and  Positivism. 
The  Field  of  the  Religioiis  and  Infinite. 

T^ROM  the  field  of  the  philosophic  and  finite,* 
-*-  it  is  easy  to  pass  to  that  of  the  religious  and  in- 
finite. Indeed,  true  philosophy  not  only  points  out 
the  direction,  it  conducts  us  far  along  the  way.  In 
this  connection  positivists  will  readily  recall  the  say- 
ing of  Bacon,  distinguishing  between  shallowness  and 
depth  in  philosophy  ;  and  rationalists  will  not  forget 
the  declaration  of  Coleridge,  that  **  philosophy  leads 
us  ultimately  to  religion."  It  is  unnecessary  to 
recount  the  long  list  of  eminent  names  to  show  that 
the  great  leaders  in  philosophic  thought  have  been 
profoundly  religious.  Not  only  has  philosophic 
prose  been  religious,  but  philosophic  poetry  has 
taught  us  to  ''  look  through  nature  up  to  nature's 
God." 

While    common    poesy    has    fondly   and    freely 
roamed  the  field  of  devotion,  poetic  genius,  like  that 

*  See  Chap.  ii. 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  Ill 

of  Milton  and  Dante  and  David,  has  attained  its 
loftiest  flight  in  sacred  song.  While  philosophy 
points  us  beyond  the  present  and  the  visible,  it  is 
especially  true  that  religion  points  to  the  invisible 
and  the  eternal.  Even  Comte,  at  the  bottom  of 
the  scale,  striving  to  be  persistent  in  positiveness, 
sought  to  deify  the  phenomenal,  but  was  carried 
beyond  himself  to  acknowledge  a  Religion  of  Hu- 
manity and  adore  the  Grand  ^tre,  while  woman  was 
chosen  only  as  the  symbol  of  the  real  divinity  he 
would  revere.  Herbert  Spencer  bids  us  worship, 
not  the  sensible  and  the  finite,  but  the  mysterious 
and  the  infinite.  Religion  has  been  no  more  preva- 
lent than  irrepressible  in  its  impulse  to  trust  and 
worship  something  other  and  higher  than  itself,  and 
to  look  to  something  superior  to  the  present — the 
climax,  both  in  power  and  permanence,  of  what 
faith,  in  its  varied  surroundings  and  its  various 
stages  of  development,  could  reach.  This  appears 
in  every  form  of  religion.  With  the  cultured  and 
the  uncultured,  having  the  same  object  in  view — 
resting  satisfied  only  with  an  object  for  its  worship 
and  dependence  higher  than  the  finite  and  the  de- 
pendent— one  that  could  defend,  protect  and  bless 
the  worshiper. 

Not   only,  then,  is  it  a  fact  that  religious  faith 
does  point   and    impel   us   toward   the   infinite,  the 


112  FAITH  AND   MODERN    THOUGHT. 

supreme,  but  it  requires  only  a  moment's  reflection 
to  see  that  in  the  nature  of  the  case  it  must  do  thus. 
Nothing  less  than  the  Supreme  can  defend,  protect 
and  bless  the  trusting  soul.  Anything  less  must, 
by  the  very  terms  of  the  supposition,  be  untrust- 
worthy. We  are  led  by  both  lines  of  thought, — 
the  physical  and  the  metaphysical,  the  scientific  and 
the  religious — to  the  urgent  question  of  the  day,  the 
paramount  question  for  all  time:  Is  there  such  an 
object  ?     Is  faith  in  God  valid  ? 

In  reply  we  pursue,  in  this  field,  as  in  the  field 
of  the  philosophic  and  finite,  two  lines  of  argument  : 
the  indirect  and  the  direct — by  the  first,  to  vindicate 
a  place  for  faith,  by  the  admission  of  objectors — by 
the  second,  to  establish  a  place  for  faith  upon  posi- 
tive and  reliable  grounds. 

We  indicate,  by  a  few  examples,  the  line  of 
indirect  argument,  which  is  capable  of  indefinite 
extension. 

At  the  outset  we  meet  this  universal  admission 
of  objectors, — the  acknowledged  inability  to  prove 
that  there  is  no  God.  By  this  one  fatal  admission, 
all  atheistic  arguments  remain  self-condemned  as 
inadequate  and  inconclusive. 

Again,  all  skeptical  theories  admit  that  some- 
thing is.  (We  do  not  even  reckon  as  a  theory  the 
suicidal  assertion  that  nothing  is,  for  then  the  doubter 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  II3 

is  not,  and  can  not  even  doubt.)  All  these  theories 
admit  that  something  is  ;  and  by  the  labored  at- 
tempts to  account  for  its  existence,  they  imply  the 
obligation  to  answer  the  great  questions  which  press 
upon  us  evermore:  Whence?  and  How?  and  Why? 
Now,  within  the  limit  of  this  admission,  what  are 
we  to  account  for? 

Even  Mr.  Spencer,  positivist  as  he  is,  accepts 
the  testimony  of  consciousness,  and  admits  that  we 
know  ourselves  at  least  as  well  as  we  know  the 
material  world  which  lies  around  us.  "  The  person- 
ality of  which  each  is  conscious,  and  of  which  the 
existence  is  to  each  a  fact  beyond  all  others  the 
most  certain,"  etc.,  etc.^  The  admission  is  by  no 
means  gracious,  for  "Positive  Science,"  so  far  forth 
as  it  is  a  science,  has  its  real  basis  not  in  external 
nature,  but  in  the  mental  constitution  of  man. 

But  Mr.  Spencer  admits  still  further,!  that  "  it  is 
rigorously  impossible  to  conceive  that  our  knowledge 
is  a  knowledge  of  appearances  only,  without  at  the 
same  time  conceiving  a  reality  of  which  they  are  the 
appearances  ;  for  appearance  without  reality  is  un- 
thinkable." And  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  (Introduction  to 
Logic,)  admits  :  "  Whatever  is  known  to  us  by  con- 
sciousness is  known  beyond  the  possibiHty  of 
question." 

*  First  Principles,  p.  66.  f  Ibid.  p.  88. 


114  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT, 

Now,  we  are  conscious  of  thought,  and  of  our- 
selves as  thinking.  It  is  obvious  to  remark  that,  on 
the  one  hand,  material  nature  can  be  known  only  as 
there  is  a  mind  to  know  it,  in  a  word,  only  as  there 
is  a  knower;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  while  we 
can  know  it,  yet  material  nature  can  not  know 
us.  There  is  this  ineradicable  distinction  between 
mind  and  matter. 

But,  farther,  will  any  positivist  admit  that  there 
are  any  other  beings  like  himself,  other  minds 
capable  of  knowing  and  being  known  ?  The  admis- 
sion outruns  the  inquiry,  and  becomes  a  positive 
assertion  as  strong  as  the  knowledge  of  his  own 
existence.  But  that  other  minds  exist,  he  can  not 
know  by  self-consciousness,  as  he  knows  himself,  nor 
by  perception,  as  he  knows  matter ;  yet,  he  may 
know  by  many  infallible  proofs — proofs  of  intelli- 
gence, of  emotion,  of  volition,  proofs  of  reason  and 
of  conscience;  and  the  knowledge  is,  henceforth, 
valid  and  rational.  Since  by  this  general  admission, 
whatever  is,  needs  accounting  for — by  this  special 
admission  the  knower  and  the  known,  mind  and 
matter,  both  must  be  accounted  for,  and,  according 
to  the  farther  admission  that  we  may  know,  as  ex- 
isting, other  minds  than  our  own — know  not  by  self- 
consciousness  nor  by  perception  ;  but  by  a  process 
valid  and  rational,  even    by    undeniable    proofs    of 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  11$ 

mentality — the  limit  and  the  significance  of  the  task, 
both,  are  multiplied.  This  admission,  which  is  inev- 
itable, opens  at  once  a  logical  and  valid  way  of 
approach  to  the  knowledge  of  God,  the  Infinite 
Mind.  This  may  not  be  the  only  way,  it  may  not 
be  the  best  way,  but  it  is  at  least  as  valid  as  the  way 
by  which  we  reach  the  knowledge  of  other  minds. 
Indeed,  the  knowledge  gained  by  this  way  of 
approach  to  the  Infinite  may,  by  its  repetition  and 
accumulation,  become  much  more  abundant. 

But,  here,  we  shall  be  met  by  a  school  of  nescients 
with  the  objection  that  God  is  infinite,  and  there- 
fore, we  can  not  know  him,  that  God  is  not  bounded 
by  finite  relations,  while  our  knowledge   is  relative. 

In  this  very  objection  there  as  involved  an  impor- 
•tant  admission,— the  admission  that  God  is,  and  that 
He  is  infinite.  But  farther,  it  is  not  only  admitted 
but  asserted  that  He  is  infinite ;  hence,  especially, 
comes  the  theory  of  nescience  in  respect  to  God. 
But  in  all  logical  fairness,  does  not  the  admission  or 
assertion  prove  too  much  for  the  objector?  How 
can  he  assert  that  God  is  infinite  unless  he  knows 
that  God  is  not  finite  ?  By  the  very  terms  of  the 
admission  does  he  not  claim  to  know  the  Infinite,  as 
sustaining  to  everything  else  the  relation  of  the 
unlimited  to  the  limited  ?     This   is  sufficient  for  our 


Il6  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

But  we  pause  here  long  enough  to  ask  these 
knowing  nescients  if,  according  to  their  admission, 
God  is,  does  he  not  sustain  the  relation  of  Creator, 
(not  as  dependent,  but  as  originating,)  of  Upholder 
(not  as  dependent,  but  as  sustaining)  and  Governor  of 
all  things,  self-acting,  self-sustaining,  self-regulating? 

Sir  William  Hamilton  asserted  all  this  promptly ; 
and  Mr.  Spencer  admits  that,  **  to  say,  we  can  not 
know  the  absolute  is,  by  impHcation,  to  affirm  that 
there  is  an  absolute,"  and,  if  absolute,  then  Author 
and  Finisher. 

If  it  still  be  insisted  by  the  school  of  nescients, 
that  we  do  not  know  God  adequately  or  completely, 
and  therefore  we  do  not  know  him  ;  we  reply,  that 
although  we  do  not  know  him  entirely,  we  may 
"know  in  part,"  and,  so  far  forth,  know  him  really. 
Though  we  do  not  know  him  adequately,  yet  we 
"  know  in  part,"  and,  so  far  forth,  know  Him.  The 
most  persistent  theist  would  claim  no  more  than  this. 
The  school  of  nescients  admit  and  assert  that  we 
know  finite  minds  and  finite  matter.  But,  we  ask,  do 
we  know  matter  and  mind  completely  ?  Not  even  su- 
perior men,  like  Hamilton  and  Spencer,  would  make 
this  claim.  They  and  their  disciples  would  readily 
admit  a  want  of  complete  knowledge, — a  knowl- 
edge only  in  part.  This  admission,  again,  proves 
too  much  for  their  objection  to   a  knowledge  of  the 


THE  MODERN    THEORY  OF  FORCES.  11/ 

infinite — for,  is  not  their  knowledge  of  finite  mind 
and  matter,  though  incomplete  and  *'  in  part,"  yet 
real  knowledge  so  far  forth  ?  This  school  of  object- 
ors, by  their  very  claim  of  nescience,  have  denied 
themselves  all  possibility  of  reply  ;  and,  from  this 
point  henceforth,  so  far  as  pertains  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  infinite,  must  remain  in  self-adjudged  silence. 
But  we  notice  another  grave  and  general  admis- 
sion. This  is  implied  in  the  labored,  repeated,  and 
unsatisfactory  attempts  to  account  for  what  is,  and 
for  what  appears,  issuing  in  theories  which  ignore  or 
deny  God's  existence — theories  which  have  been 
proposed  and  withdrawn  by  the  originators — theories 
which  have  been  offered  to  the  public  and  rejected 
— theories  at  first  carefully  elaborated  and  then 
modified,  subsequently  changed  and  changed  after- 
ward, and  then  changed  again  and  again,  and  at 
length  appearing  as  modern  theories  with  modern 
form,  but  with  antique  lineaments  betraying  their 
real  ancestry,  as  if  skeptical  selection  or  atheistic 
preference  had  played  the  scientific  trick  of  Rever- 
sion, and,  at  one  fearful  leap,  had  bounded  back, 
sheer  across  the  interval  of  civilization  to  the  period 
preceding  even  Comte's  lowest  grade  of  human 
thought  (styled)  ''  the  theological."  Were  all  these 
theories  authoritatively  challenged  to  give  their  name, 
the  answer  would  be :  We  are  legion.     These  theo- 


Il8  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

rics,  fanciful  and  varied  as  they  have  been  from 
Democritus  to  Darwin,  we  need  not  trace  ;  theories 
too  narrow  to  account  for  Hfe  and  inteUigence,  and 
more  especially  too  narrow  to  account  for  reason, 
free-will,  and  conscience,  which  demand  an  adequate 
cause,  and  reiterate  this  demand,  in  the  dignity  and 
light  of  their  own  authority.  It  is  easy  to  see,  that 
because  of  inability  to  meet  this  very  demand, 
skeptical  theorizing  has  veered  toward  materialism. 

But  we  pass  to  the  direct  argument,  the  positive 
answer  to  the  question  :  Is  faith  in  God  valid  ?  The 
idea  of  God  is  in  the  world.  However  well  or  ill 
.conceived,  however  strongly  or  feebly  held,  philo- 
sophically developed  it  implies  supreme  Being, 
supreme  in  all  excellences  which  reason,  the  lowest 
and  the  highest  reason,  can  discern  :  Supreme  exist- 
ence or  self-existence,  su'preme  action  or  self-action, 
supreme  government  or  self-government,  that  is,  a 
personality  Supreme.  The  idea  of  God  has  univer- 
sally prevailed.  It  has  persistently  endured  amid 
all  the  shock  of  contradiction  and  question,  amid  all 
the  change  of  philosophies  and  policies  and  politics, 
showing  its  deep  and  ineradicable  acceptance  in  the 
hearts  of  men.  To  question  it  now,  or  attempt  to 
invalidate,  is  logically  to  assume  the  omis probandi. 
It  is  absurd  to  say  that  the  idea  is  irrational,  for 
it  has  been  accepted  by  the  profoundest  thinkers. 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM,  II9 

To  say  that  it  is  difficult  to  reach  is  no  less  absurd, 
for  the  lowest  civilization  as  well  as  the  highest,  has 
heartily  and  pertinaciously  held  it.  To  say  that  it  is 
the  outgrowth  of  civilization  is  as  absurd,  for  the 
earliest  history  and  language  have  it,  and  have  it  in 
its  purest  and  loftiest  form  ;  for  instance,  the  history 
and  language  of  the  Hebrews.  No  expression  of  it 
in  modern  or  mediaeval  times  has  excelled  or  equaled 
its  early  majestic  statement.  This  appears  every- 
where in  the  Old  Testament,  to  which  we  refer  not 
now  as  inspired,  but  simply  as  historic  records  uni- 
versally admitted  to  be  of  the  highest  antiquity.  To 
say  that  the  ontological  argument  or  any  of  the  the- 
istic  arguments  is  irrelevant,  or  inadequate  to  estab- 
lish the  conclusion,  does  not  avail,  for  the  conclusion 
has  been  reached  by  common  consent  since  these 
arguments  have  been  criticised,  and  long  before  they 
had  critic  or  champion,  perhaps  before  they  were 
formally  stated,  possibly  before  they  were  even 
thought  of. 

The  idea  originated  and  has  been  perpetuated  in 
the  public  and  the  philosophic  mind,  in  some  way 
that  seemed  at  first,  and  has  ever  seemed  relevant 
and  valid.  It  were  well,  at  the  outset,  to  detect 
this  way  and  follow  it  in  the  line  of  our  direct  argu- 
mentation, noting  at  the  same  time  the  accessory 
proofs  that  lie  along  the  way. 


I20  FAITH  AND  MODERN  THOUGHT. 

This  is  not  the  way  of  the  senses  merely,  for 
never  until  man  appeared  on  the  earth  was  the  idea 
of  God  entertained  ;  and  since  that  time  it  has  been 
entertained  by  man  alone.  However  superior  the 
senses  of  beasts,  or  however  sure  the  brutal  instinct, 
the  brutes  regard  not,  seek  not,  know  not  God. 

It  is  not  the  way  of  the  understanding,  judging 
according  to  sense,  for  the  understanding,  as  the 
word  implies  and  as  its  office  necessitates,  refers  the 
phenomena  of  the  sense  to  the  substance  in  which 
such  phenomena  originate,  and  the  substance  to 
the  phenomena. 

But  a  higher  human  faculty,  the  reason,  looking 
above  and  beyond  sense — looking  above  and  beyond 
the  understanding,  may,  does,  see  a  profounder  rea- 
son as  fundamental  for  its  own  finite  self,  and  a 
fortiori,  fundamental  for  the  sense  and  the  under- 
standing, a  being  unconditioned,  as  origin  for  its  own 
conditioned  being. 

This  far-reaching  conclusion  of  the  highest  faculty 
of  the  human  soul  is  regulative  for  itself,  and,  again 
a  fortiori,  can  not  be  denied  or  questioned  by  the 
inferior  faculties  of  the  soul,  the  perceptive  and 
the  elaborative — that  is,  the  sense  and  the  under- 
standing. 

Even  if  God  should  reveal  himself  to  the  human 
senses,    either   visibly   or    audibly,    the    sense    must 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  121 

appeal  to  reason  to  decide,  whether  it  be  the 
reveahng  of  God  or  of  something  else — whether  for 
example,  it  was  an  earthly  dove  from  the  dove-cotes 
of  Jericho  flying  down  to  the  Jordan,  or  the  Holy 
Spirit  descending  like  a  dove  from  heaven  and  rest- 
ing upon  the  Son  of  man — whether  it  was  an  earthly 
sound  striking  upon  the  ear  of  Adam,  or  the  voice  of 
God  walking  (coming)  through  the  garden  in  the 
cool  of  the  day  to  commune  with  the  first-born  of 
the  sons  of  men. 

So,  a  fortiori,  any  premises  furnished  by  Sense 
for  the  Understanding  to  place  in  syllogistic  array 
for  a  demonstration  of  the  Divine  existence,  would 
demand  the  criticism  and  supervision  of  the  higher 
faculty,  the  Reason,  to  ascertain  whether  the  prem- 
ises were  vahd  for  the  Sense,  and  whether  the 
logical  process  of  the  Understanding  were  licit,  before 
the  soul  would  rely  upon  the  conclusion  as  trust- 
worthy. This  may  be  found  in  our  higher  spiritual 
nature,  in  which  man  essentially  differs  from  the 
brute.  It  is  opened  to  us  by  the  affirmations  of  the 
Reason — of  the  reason  as  more  or  less  developed — 
of  the  Reason  without  which  man  would  not,  could 
not,  rise  to  the  idea  of  God.  That  this  view  harmo- 
nizes with  divine  Revelation  will  more  fully  appear 
in  the  proper  place.  It  is,  however,  important  to 
remark  here,  in  passing,  that  the  Scriptures  refer  to 
II 


122  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

this  greatest  of  all  truths, — the  Divine  Existence — 
not  in  the  method  of  proof,  but  of  illustration. 
Taking  for  granted  this  fundamental  truth,  the 
Scriptures  appeal  for  its  recognition  to  the  human 
soul  as  already  informed  of  it,  so  that,  at  all  times 
and  to  all  men,  this  appeal  may  be  justly  made. 
Gen.  i.  i  ;  John  i.  i.  et passim. 

This  view  best  explains,  and  is  at  the  same  time 
confirmed  by,  the  fact  that  religious  faith  pervades 
humanity.  While  this  remarkable  fact  demands  ex- 
planation, it  has,  also,  the  force  of  a  two-fold  argu- 
ment. The  fact  is  indisputable,  its  antiquity  is 
settled,  its  universality  is  admitted,  its  tenacity  has 
overcome  all  open  violence  or  concealed  treachery 
that  would  subvert  or  destroy  it.  It  has  ever  har- 
monized with  the  loftiest  aspirations  of  mankind, 
contributed  to  their  best  welfare,  resisted  and  suc- 
cessfully held  in  check  their  baser  passions  and  evil 
tendencies. 

The  view  just  hinted  at  as  the  philosophic  and 
scriptural  one,  explains  this ;  reveals  at  once  the 
source  and  the  strength  of  religious  faith  ;  shows 
that  it  originates  in  man's  higher,  spiritual  nature, 
and  relies  upon  the  unalterable  affirmations  of  the 
reason,  the  far-seeing  faculty,  and  the  regulative 
authority  of  the  human  soul. 

As  a  fact  ineradicable  from  human  nature,  it  has 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  1 23 

the  force  of  a  convincing  argument  ;  and,  again,  as 
a  fact  ineradicable  from  human  history,  it  has  the 
argumentative  force  of  immemorial  possession.  Log- 
ic and  law  always  admit  the  force  of  this  argument, 
and,  if,  according  to  the  view  of  common  law,  a  few 
years  confer  the  right  of  possession,  how  shall  the 
force  of  argument  be  multiplied  immeasurably,  when 
the  possession  doth  extend  as  far  as  the  history  of 
man  runneth  ? 

But  this  view  requires  careful  limitation.  It  is 
sometimes  asserted,  as  by  Rothe,  Schleiermacher  and 
others,  that  we  have  an  immediate  consciousness  of 
God.  This  statement  is  apt  to  mislead,  on  the  one 
hand,  by  confounding  the  reason's  affirmation  of  God 
with  the  consciousness  of  external  phenomena  by  a 
sense-perception,  or  of  internal  phenomena  by  self- 
consciousness  ;  but,  never  thus  can  we  have  a  knowl- 
edge and  consciousness  of  the  Divine  Being,  nor,  on 
the  other  hand,  by  confounding  the  knowledge  and 
consciousness  of  God  wich  the  consciousness  of  sub- 
stantial things  and  of  logical  forms  and  conclusions 
furnished  by  the  understanding  in  its  discursive  pro- 
cess of  connecting  phenomenal  properties  with  sub- 
stantial realities,  or  logical  premises  with  real  truths. 
These  appear  in  the  light  of  consciousness,  as  the 
valid  results  of  the  discursive  faculty,  the  under- 
standing.    But    by    no    merely    discursive    process, 


124  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

through  logical  premises  or  phenomenal  properties 
can  we  see  God. 

Intuitive  beholding  by  sense  and  the  consequent 
consciousness  refer  exclusively  to  finite  phenomena. 
But  God  is  infinite  and  is  not  phenomenal.  Logical 
beholding  by  the  understanding  and  the  consequent 
consciousness  refer  to  the  substantial  realities  to 
which  phenomenal  properties  are  related.  But  God 
is  not  revealed  to  our  consciousness  as  the  under- 
lying substance  of  phenomenal  properties  :  a  fortiori, 
we  have  not  thus  a  consciousness  of  God. 

It  is  only  the  highest  faculty  of  the  soul,  the 
Reason,  which  can  *'  reach  the  height  of  this  great 
argument."  To  this,  our  spiritual  vision  alone,  doth 
God  reveal  himself.  As  the  Father  of  our  spirits, 
the  infinite  Spirit  appears  to  us,  not  comprehensible 
by  us — known  only  in  part,  yet  known  so  far  forth 
as  he  doth  reveal  himself — known  more  and  more 
clearly  as  the  eye  of  reason  is  undimmed  and  single, 
till  the  body  is  filled  with  light. 

Suppose  reason  wanting  ;  by  consequence,  the 
knowledge  of  God  is  wanting.  There  can  be  neither 
the  rational  vision  nor  the  consciousness.  So  it  is 
with  the  stock  and  the  stone,  so  it  is  with  the 
animal.  It  is  not  necessary  to  the  purpose  of  our 
argument,  as  we  employ  it,  to  determine  how  the 
reveahng   of  God    to    the    reason    is    accomplished, 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  12$ 

whether  immediately  or  mediately,  or  both.  The 
revealing  of  God  to  the  reason,  this  is  our 
point,  the  revealing  of  God  is  affirmed  by  the 
reason,  and  by  this  highest  authority  of  the  human 
soul  we  have  the  consequent  consciousness  of  God, 
not  that  he  appears,  phenomenally,  nor  logically 
that  he  must  be ;  but,  rationally  that  he  is  as  he 
doth  reveal  himself.  This  affirmation  of  reason 
perhaps  involves,  though  it  rises  higher  and  stronger 
than,  animal  instinct  which  never  reaches  God — 
perhaps  involves,  though  it  rises  higher  and  stronger 
than,  generalizations  of  causal  power,  which,  however 
extended,  never  reach  him  "  who  is  before  all 
things  and  by  whom  all  things  consist."  This  af- 
firmation of  the  reason  does  involve,  though  it 
rises  higher  than,  the  feeling  of  dependence  and 
the  impulse  to  worship,  which  witness  to  some 
outv/ard  object  corresponding  to  the  inward  impulse 
in  analogy  with  all  the  instincts  of  our  nature, 
but  which  only  feel  after  God  if  haply  they  may 
find  him  ;  higher  and  stronger  than  "  the  poet's  in- 
terpretation of  nature"*  which  may  'Mook  through 
nature  up  to  nature's  God,"  or  may  idealize  the 
universe  as  only  ''  haunted  forever "  f  by  a  subtle 
but  atheistic  imagining.  All  these  may  be  involved 
as  subordinate  ;  but  the  rational  beholding  of  God, 

*  f  See  British  Quarterly  Review. — July  '71 


126  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

*'  of  whom  are  all  things,"  is  man's  spiritual  vision, 
the  highest  prerogative  of  his  nature,  elevating  him 
above  all  that  surrounds  him,  animate  or  inanimate, 
and  exalting  him  to  fellowship  with  heavenly  minds, 
to  the  knowledge  and  communion  of  God.  So 
the  soul  may  be  said  to  believe  in  God  for  the 
strongest  of  all  reasons,  because  it  can  not  do  other- 
wise. But  this  statement,  also,  is  apt  to  mislead, 
for  the  necessity  is  not  blind  and  fatalistic,  but 
rational  and  luminous.  It  is  not  a  necessity  which  is 
fatalistic,  for  it  may  be  resisted  like  all  rational 
necessity.  If  the  bodily  eye  may  be  closed  or 
turned  away  from  the  sun,  so  may  the  soul  wilfully 
turn  away  from  God  and  wander  into  outer  darkness 
the  more  perilous  because  the  more  profound. 
The  free  will  may  rebel  and  resist  even  to  its  own 
ruin.  Those  who  do  not  like  to  retain  God  in 
their  knowledge,  he  may  give  over  to  a  reprobate 
mind  that  they  should  believe  a  lie.^ 

The  ease  with  which  all  the  arguments  fall  into 
their  proper  place,  in  accordance  with  this  view, 
indicates  that  we  have  the  clue  to  the  labyrinth. 
This  arrangement,  while  it  does  not  attach  equal 
value  to  the  several  arguments,  does  not,  on  the 
other  hand,  exclude  any  valid  proofs  in  the  line  of 
direct  argumentation.     We  cannot  agree  with  those 

*Rom.  i.  25.-2.  Thess.  ii.  11. 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  12/ 

who  reject  the  argument  from  Design  as  worthless  ; 
nor,  yet,  with  those  who  rely  upon  it,  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  all  other  proofs.  Logical  arguments  in  their 
entire  range,  whether  inductive  or  deductive,  whether 
from  premises  furnished  by.  moral,  mental,  or  mate- 
rial facts,  have  their  value  in  reference  to  the 
great  conclusion,  and  a  special  adaptation  to  differ- 
ent minds.  The  proof  furnished  by  the  affirmations 
of  the  reason  does,  to  some  extent,  reach  every 
mind.  But  some  minds  are  more  or  less  disqualified 
to  receive  it,  by  internal  or  external  circumstances, 
by  surrounding  darkness,  by  native  grossness  and 
earthliness,  by  absence  or  fault  of  education,  by 
habit  or  by  prejudice  ;  sometimes,  by  careless  or  by 
careful  disregard,  blunting  the  rational  instincts  or 
perverting  the  moral  choice  until  the  fool  doth  say 
in  his  heart:  There  is  no  God.  To  the  mind  unbi- 
assed and  open  to  its  influence,  this  proof  is  at  once 
the  most  clear  and  convincing.  As  such  it  must 
appear  to  superior  and  holy  intelligences  who  behold 
the  beauty  of  the  Lord  as  they  inquire  in  his  heav- 
enly temple.  As  such  it  must  appear  to  the  higher, 
purer  intellects  of  earth,  who  in  spirit,  like  Enoch, 
walk  with  God  and  commune  with  him  in  the  temple 
of  his  material  universe. 

While,  for  ourselves,  our  estimate  of  the  value  of 
the  different  arguments  varies,  we  remember  that  to 


128  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

many,  perhaps  to  most  minds,  the  lower  proofs  are 
the  best  adapted  and  the  most  convincing. 

As  all  human  minds,  whatever  height  of  knowl- 
edge they  attain,  pass  through  the  stage  of  weak- 
ness, so  all  minds  have  followed,  to  some  extent, 
the  same  pathway,  and  somewhere  in  their  course 
have  mastered,  or  at  least  met  with,  the  same  early, 
simple  means  of  knowing — the  same  early,  simple 
proofs  which  have  served  to  communicate,  or  to  call 
up  to  consciousness  the  idea  and  the  knowledge  of 
God.  The  slightest  phenomenon  has  started  the 
soul  upon  the  induction  which  ultimately  leads  to 
God.  That  phenomenal  effect,  by  a  necessity  of 
experience,  as  well  as  by  a  necessity  of  thought,  has 
a  cause  which  has  a  higher,  and  this  onward  to  the 
highest.  For,  the  soul  by  its  own  necessity  of 
thinking,  affirms  not  only  that  every  phenomenal 
effect  must  have  a  cause,  but  that  there  must  be  a 
primal,  a  highest  cause.  A  rational  necessity,  no 
less  imperative  than  that  which  bears  the  soul  along 
the  pathway  of  causality,  impels  to  the  highest  unity 
as  ultimate.  This  is  clear  to  the  Reason,  however 
it  may  be  to  the  Sense  or  the  Understanding. 

This  is  clear  to  the  reason,  else  there  is  nothing- 
stable,  all  things  flow,  and  sense  by  its  very  confu- 
sion becomes  nonsense.  Hence  the  effort  of  positive 
scientists  to  find  a  clue  which  will  lead  to  unity,  and 


FAITH  AMD  POSITIVISM.  1 29 

thus  make  science  possible  and  permanent  :  seeking 
for  protoplasm,  as  a  first  form  of  life  ;  or  evolution 
according  to  "  First  Principles "  (physical  units 
evolving  by  an  inner  law)  ;  or  generative  gemmules 
as  first  developing  by  "  Natural  or  Sexual  Selec- 
tion,"or  by  both  ;  or  force  as  the  rudimental  origin- 
ator, unfolding  into  a  universe  by  conservation  and 
correlation  ;  or  motion  as  the  primal  source  of  all 
phenomena. 

But  it  is  vain  to  multiply  expedients  in  the  field 
of  the  sense.  There  must  be  a  first.  This  is  clear 
to  the  reason,  else  the  understanding  must  ever  plod 
along  its  weary,  and  still  more  weary  way  of  endless 
regression,  and  the  soul  with  hope  forever  deferred, 
sink  at  length  in  utter  exhaustion.  But  no  mind, 
either  the  simplest  or  the  sagest,  can  persistently 
believe  this.  Hence  the  logical  systems  which  have 
clamored  for  demonstration,  and  labored  to  prove  a 
first.  For  the  sense  and  the  understanding,  reason, 
higher  than  either,  affirms  not  only  that  every  effect 
must  have  a  cause,  but  that  there  must  be  a  first,  a 
cause  which  is  not  an  effect.  Thus  reason  settles 
the  vexed  question  for  the  human  soul,  and  announ- 
ces its  decision  to  satisfy  the  sense,  and  unbind  the 
burden  from  the  understanding  and  bid  it  rest  in 
the  great  First  Cause. 

If  the  sense-philosopher  ignore  reason,  or  rebel, 
6* 


130  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

or  appeal  to  the  lower  faculty,  and  clamor  for  phys- 
ical sight,  he  shall  remain  forever  unsatisfied,  for  the 
source  of  all  phenomena  no  physical  sense  shall  ever 
perceive. 

If  the  speculative  logician  ignore  reason,  or  rebel, 
or  appeal  to  the  lower  faculty  of  the  understanding, 
and  clamor  for  demonstration  of  the  first  cause,  he 
may  plod  on  with  increasing  weariness  to  his  dying 
day,  for  no  human  logic  can  demonstrate  a  first 
cause.  Without  the  aid  of  reason,  its  premises  are 
insufficient.  Its  major  premise  evermore  is  only 
that  every  effect  has  a  cause.  No  acuteness  of  logic 
can  thence  infer  a  first  cause  without  being  guilty  of 
an  illicit  process.  But,  reason  recognized  and 
obeyed  furnishes  the  premises  which  may  bear  logic 
safely  forward  to  the  desired  conclusion :  {a)  that 
every  effect  must  have  a  cause,  {U)  that  there  must  be 
a  first  cause,  a  cause  which  is  not  an  effect. 

And  since  by  the  very  constitution  of  the  human 
soul,  neither  the  sense  nor  the  understanding  is 
abandoned  by  the  reason,  is  ever  wholly  hlo/ov^  so  the 
obedient  soul  may  be  guided  by  the  reason  even 
along  the  phenomenal,  or  by  the  way  of  the  logical, 
to  the  first  cause,  the  source  of  all  phenomena ;  and 
the  sense-philosopher  and  the  speculative  logician 
may,  by  this  help  for  the  soul,  be  led  to  rest  in  the 
Supreme  Cause.     But   this  rest,  though  speculative, 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  I31 

would  scarcely  be  spiritual ;  though  sure,  it  would 
not  be  quite  satisfactory  ;  and  reason  offers  some- 
thing higher  than  this.  Sense  has  observed  higher 
phenomena  than  the  material;  for  example,  the 
internal  Sense — self-consciousness  —  has  observed 
thought  and  feeling  and  volition,  and  demands  a 
source  for  these.  The  understanding  has  traced 
design  in  the  mental,  moral,  and  material  world. 
Nature,  it  has  discovered,  is  formed  into  an  harmo- 
nious universe,  where  invariable  as  well  as  universal 
order  exists.  Man,  also,  it  has  observed,  is  fitted  to 
such  a  universe.  The  universe,  so  diverse  in  phe- 
nomena, seems  one  to  the  observant  soul;  and  this 
universe  of  endless  and  endlessly  varying  phenomena, 
seems  the  same  to  the  myriad  minds  which  observe 
it  :  the  logical  understanding  declares  it  one  and 
real,  and  demands  the  adequate  cause  of  the  order 
and  adaptation  and  wisdom  that  pervade  the  mental, 
moral,  and  material  universe.  Strictest  induction 
demands  this — will  be  satisfied  with  nothing  less. 
The  first  cause,  already  discovered  as  the  source  of 
phenomena  and  the  origin  of  causes,  appears  in  the 
light  of  Reason  as  intelligent  and  moral,  as  wise  and 
free  and  holy  ;  and  we  attain  to  the  personality  we 
seek.  Reason  affirms  for  faith  a  Divine  Personality, 
with  no  less  directness  and  authority  than  it  affirms 
for  Sense  and  for  the  Understanding  a  great  First 


132  FAITH  AND   MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Cause.  Henceforth,  for  faith  there  exists,  by  the 
highest  finite  authority,  a  personal  Jehovah.  The 
human  soul  may  evermore  trust  and  worship  *'  The 
king  immortal,  eternal,  invisible,  the  only  wise 
God  ;  "  may  worship  with  stronger  vision  and  deeper 
joyousness  as  the  light  of  Reason  is  clarified  and 
strengthened. 

Henceforth,  in  this  light  it  sees,  with  growing 
vision,  the  finite,  however  extended  in  space  or  time, 
comprehended  by  the  infinite,  who  is  the  Author, 
Upholder,  Governor,  Finisher,  who  doeth  all  things 
according  to  the  good  pleasure  of  his  will ;  who,  in 
the  possession  of  supreme  wisdom,  and  in  the  exer- 
cise of  supreme  freedom,  doth  order  all  things  at  the 
behest  and  in  the  interest  of  supreme  holiness. 
Henceforth,  faith  in  God,  (for  I  do  not  yet  speak  of 
faith  in  Christ  the  Saviour,)  henceforth,  faith  in  God 
is  strong  and  secure  while  it  follows  the  guidance  of 
reason  and  occupies  this  high  vantage  ground,  be- 
coming weak  and  vulnerable  only  when  it  deserts  its 
true  guide  and  treads  the  lower  ground  of  the 
understanding,  or  the  still  lower  grounds  of  sense. 

Does  the  Universe  stretch  beyond  the  reach  of 
the  mightiest  telescope?  Whatever  be  its  utmost 
verge,  reason  no  less  clearly  sees  that  it  is  God's 
universe  ;  and  faith  rejoices  evermore.  Does  the 
microscope    reveal    minute    and    still    more  minute 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  1 33 

infusoria,  multiplied  indefinitely  till  they  swarm 
innumerable  in  the  dust  of  summer,  or  in  autumn's 
haze  ?  Still  these  are  but  the  small  dust  in  the  bal- 
ance of  him  who  weigheth  the  mountains  in  scales 
and  the  hills  in  a  balance,  who  taketh  up  the  isles 
as  a  very  little  thing  ;  and  faith  exclaims  :  ''  If  I  take 
the  wings  of  the  morning,  and  dwell  in  the  utter- 
most parts  of  the  sea  ;  even  there  shall  thy  hand 
lead  me,  and  thy  right  hand  shall  hold  me." 

Do  earth's  ages  run  backward  by  geologic 
progression  into  the  dim  distance  of  the  past,  till 
man  and  moving  things  disappear,  and  the  light 
vanishes,  and  darkness  settles  down  upon  the 
formless  deep?  Reason  no  less  clearly  discerns 
God  the  Creator,  having  the  powers  of  the  world 
to  come,  glorious  in  holiness,  fearful  in  praises, 
doing  wonders ;  and  faith  exclaims :  ''  Lord,  thou 
hast  been  our  dwelling  place  in  all  generations. 
Before  the  mountains  were  brought  forth,  or  ever 
thou  hadst  formed  the  earth  and  the  world,  even 
from  everlasting  to  everlasting  thou  art  God."  Do 
special  creations  mark  the  progress  of  the  Universe  ? 
They  are  the  acts  of  God.  Do  ''  physical  units  " 
appear,  and,  ''  with  remarkable  powers  of  producing 
and  reproducing  organisms,"  slowly  or  swiftly 
evolve  a  universe  ?  They  are  the  creations  of  God 
who   hath  ordained  and   doth   direct  the   order  of 


134  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

their  evolution.  Do  *'  protoplastic  cells  "  appear, 
filled  with  life  and  pervaded  by  motion  ?  The 
mighty  maker,  God,  hath  formed  these  *'  proto- 
plastic cells,"  and  imparted  this  breath  of  life, 
and  intermingled  life  and  motion.  And  now,  if 
the  process  of  development  is  modified  by  *'  Nat- 
ural "  or  ''  Sexual  Selections,"  or  by  both,  it  is 
in  accordance  with  the  divine  provision.  Were  even 
"  Spontaneous  Generation "  possible,  it  could  not 
take  place  without  the  pre-requisite  conditions 
which  the  Creator  supplied.  In  a  word,  whatever 
may  be  the  latent  or  visible  powers  in  the  universe, 
they  have  their  source  in  the  infinite  power  of  the 
Creator,  and  are  evermore  subject  to  the  divine 
control ;  and  faith,  walking  serenely  in  the  light 
of  reason,  doth  rejoice  in  God.  Thus  we  secure 
at  once  the  retention  and  validity  of  the  proofs ; 
the  logical  argument  or  the  argument  from  design 
and  order,  in  the  realm  of  matter  and  of  mind — 
the  moral  argument,  or  the  argument  from  con- 
science— the  volitional  argument,  or  the  argument 
from  free-will — the  rational  argument,  or  the  argu- 
ment from  the  affirmation  of  reason  ;  and,  as  will 
hereafter  appear,  the  scriptural  argument,  or  argu- 
ment from  revelation. 

We  secure  all   this,   not  at   the  disparagement, 
but    by  the    help   and    authority  of  reason.     It    is 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  135 

competent  for  any  man,  at  his  discretion,  to  employ- 
either  or  all  of  these,  not  with  equal  force  and 
conclusiveness,  but  as  he  may  choose,  and  as  he 
best  can  handle  them. 

It  were  easy  to  elaborate  and  fully  illustrate 
each  proof;  but  this  may  not  be,  and  need  not. 
Having  shown  the  valid  ground  for  each,  and  thus 
rescued  some,  at  least,  from  neglect  and  abuse, 
it  remains  for  us  only  to  state  each  succinctly, 
and  arrange  all  in  order  to  bear  successfully  upon 
the  conclusion. 

Now,  the  argument  from  design  takes  Its  proper 
place,  and  has  valid  force.  God  seen  by  the  reason 
and  authoritatively  affirmed  to  be  as  author  and 
finisher,  a  first  is  found,  and  there  is  room  for 
the  revealing  of  design  ;  and  now,  every  depart- 
ment of  nature  brings  voluntary  contributions  to 
this  accessory  argument.  Every  science  reveals 
fresh  evidence ;  every  power  of  the  mind  gives 
intelligent  witness  of  high  design.  Mind  and 
body  uniting,  give  their  combined,  personal  testi- 
mony. The  eye,  the  ear,  the  touch — every  sense 
furnishes  accumulating  proofs,  in  its  own  wonderful 
structure,  in  the  perfect  adaptation  to  sight  and 
sound  and  resistance,  and  all  the  countless  forms 
and  phenomena,  in  things  great  and  small,  near 
and    remote,    in    the    material    universe    endlessly 


136  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

varying,  until  the  senses  can  not  master  the  multi- 
pHcity,  and  the  strongest  human  mind  can  not 
number  them ;  yet  so  admirably  adapted  that  they 
make  up  individual  things  complete,  and  worlds 
and  systems,  and  a  universe  ;  so  admirably  adapted 
throughout,  as  to  constitute  in  itself  one  universe  ; 
so  admirably  adapted  to  the  human  senses,  and 
to  the  countless  observant  minds,  as  to  constitute 
for  each  and  for  all,  one  universe.  Such  a  mutual 
adaptation  of  the  mind  and  the  senses  and  phe- 
nomenal nature,  bespeaks  design  which,  as  every 
wise  man  will  admit,  immeasurably  transcends 
all  earthly  wisdom.  Volumes  might  furnish  some 
adequate  room  for  satisfactory  illustration,  but  our 
limits  forbid  anything  beyond  a  brief  outline  of 
the  argument. 

Volumes  of  illustration  have  been  written  since 
the  successful  example  of  Paley  ;  yet  these  are  only 
the  index  to  illustrations  already  exhaustless  but 
ever  increasing  as  science  and  experience  are  inter- 
preting the  universe.  However  complete,  at  once, 
the  rational  argument  may  be — the  logical  argument 
(the  argument  from  design)  is — shall  forever  be, 
cumulative. 

In  firm  connection  with  the  affirmations  of  the 
Reason,  and  the  universal  and  immemorial  fact  of 
religious  faith,  and  the  countless  evidences  of  wise 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  1 37 

design  in  the  universe  far  surpassing  all  earthly 
wisdom,  there  is  the  unanswerable  argument  from 
the  order  pervading  the  universe.  This  order  is  not 
only  everywhere  manifest,  so  that  innumerable  proofs 
of  the  argument  press  upon  us  ;  but  this  universal 
order  is  admitted  by  even  the  most  determined 
atheist,  who,  with  the  desperation  of  an  assailant, 
would  seize  this  weapon  of  religious  faith  and  turn 
it  against  theism.  Order,  universal  order,  he  not  only 
admits  as  existing,  but  he  asserts  it  to  be  invariable 
and  hence  the  basis  of  all  induction  and  science. 
Law  governs,  law  immutable,  and  thus  order  is 
secured,  and  thus  it  will  forever  pervade  the  universe, 
law  so  controlling  that  it  can  not  be  controlled,  so 
enduring  that  it  is  eternal,  so  that  it  neither  needs 
nor  admits  a  God. 

But,  as  we  have  already  shown.  Reason  from  a 
higher  position  commands  this  accessory  argument, 
and  covers  it  so  completely  that  it  can  not  be  thus 
stormed  and  captured  by  the  atheist,  even  if  it  had 
no  strength  for  self-defence.  The  common  consent 
of  humanity  and  the  argument  from  divine  design, 
already  established,  also  cover  it  and  are  ready  and 
competent  to  defend  it,  if  such  defence  were  needed. 
But  it  is  more  than  equal  to  self-defence.  The 
assumption  of  the  atheist  is  powerless  against  it. 
The  atheist  himself  must  admit  the  weakness  of  his 


138  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

assumption,  and  after  a  little  reflection  withdraw 
from  this  point  of  attack.  This  order  points  to  God 
as  its  author ;  the  atheist  points  to  chance  or  fate — 
he  can  point  to  nothing  eke.  But  who  is  chance,  or 
who  is  fate  to  command  the  subjection  and  allegiance 
of  order — of  universal  and  invariable  order  ?  Chance 
is  a  capricious  fiction  without  any  power  or  wisdom 
or  wish  to  produce  order.  Chance  is  nothing  ;  and 
fate  is  blind — blind  by  a  trick  of  words,  but  really  a 
bhnd  fiction,  nothing  more,  without  any  power  or 
wisdom  or  wish  to  produce  order.  Fate  is  nothing. 
Induction,  which,  for  its  validity  and  success,  de- 
pends upon  order  in  the  universe,  would  spurn  the 
claim  of  chance  or  fate.  Induction  and  science  repel 
the  assumption  of  the  atheist,  and  unite  their  testi- 
mony to  intelligent  design  and  the  common  consent 
of  mankind  to  confirm  the  affirmation  of  Reason, 
that  God  is  over  all,  blessed  forever  ;  that  he  is  the 
same  yesterday,  to-day,  and  forever,  and  therefore 
that  order  is,  and  is  all-pervading. 

And  now,  in  our  Hne  of  direct  proof,  another 
accessory  argument  takes  its  proper  and  valid  place 
— the  argument  from  freedom,  freedom  of  the  will. 
That  freedom  of  the  will  exists  is  proved  by  individ- 
ual consciousness,  and  attested  by  the  common  con- 
sent of  mankind  as  expressed  in  the  language, 
literature,  laws,  and  history  of  the  world.     This  can 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  '        1 39 

be  accounted  for,  only  on  the  ground  that  a  supreme 
free-will  presides  over  the  universe. 

Liberty,  the  freedom  of  the  will,  is  impossible 
and  absurd  in  a  universe  subject  to  fate.  In  the 
nature  of  the  case,  by  the  very  terms  of  the  state- 
ment, necessity  must  everywhere  prevail  in  that 
which  is  chief  and,  a  fortiori,  in  that  which  is  subor- 
dinate. The  sovereign  is  necessity,  and  the  subject 
must  be  necessitated.  Freedom,  then,  would  be 
utterly  and  forever  excluded  from  a  universe  subject 
to  fate  ;  and  no  less  decisively  would  it  be  excluded 
by  chance.  Chance  is  only  a  name  for  the  total 
absence  of  wisdom  supreme  and  free,  presiding  over 
the  universe.  Chance  is,  in  fact,  fate  only  by  another 
name.  In  a  world  where  all  things  are  subject  to 
irrational  caprice  or  necessity,  freedom — freedom  of 
will — is  utterly  impossible  and  absurd.  Yet,  such 
freedom  exists.  If  anything  is  known,  this  is  known 
— known  everywhere  and  by  every  one,  and  by  every 
one  possessed  and  exercised  as  a  birthright  inalien- 
able. Freedom  exists,  therefore  neither  fate  nor 
chance  controls  the  universe.  Freedom  exists,  there- 
fore there  must  be  a  God  who,  in  the  exercise  of 
supreme  freedom,  hath  created  a  world  in  which 
freedom  is  possible  and  beings  whom  he  hath  en- 
dowed with  this  exalted  prerogative  ;  and  more,  in 
the  exercise  of  supreme    freedom    he    doth  forever 


140       •     FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

preside  over  the  universe,  so  that  no  law  or  order, 
however  long  or  invariably  it  may  have  operated, 
shall  ever  obtain  control  over  the  law-giver.  The 
argument  is  complete  in  itself,  and  although  arranged 
as  accessory,  yet,  if  all  the  other  arguments  were 
withdrawn,  this  alone  would  remain  a  decisive  proof 
of  a  God  and  Governor  of  the  universe,  supreme, 
and  supremely  free. 

Another  important  accessory  argument,  the  last 
which  we  have  room  to  mention — an  argument 
closely  allied  to  those  from  reason  and  free-will,  is 
the  argument  from  conscience  —  the  moral  argu- 
ment. Everywhere  and  by  every  one  moral  obliga- 
tion is  recognized,  and  its  consequent  moral  desert. 
Even  the  atheist  applauds  and  condemns,  rewards 
and  blames.  In  every  language  and  in  every 
land  we  find  this  recognition,  and  find  it  always 
expressed  in  laws  and  religions,  in  approbation 
and  disapprobation,  in  rewards  and  penalties.  The 
law  and  order  of  society  proceed  on  this  very  prin- 
ciple ;  public  and  private  worship  everywhere  pro- 
ceeds on  this  principle.  The  individual  conscience 
everywhere  repeats  it.  As  sure  and  universal  as 
the  fact  of  moral  freedom,  is  the  fact  of  moral 
responsibility  and  desert.  And  were  it  possible  for 
a  man,  anywhere  or  at  any  time,  to  annihilate  his 
moral  freedom,  and  by  his  own  free  act  forever  to 


I 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  I41 

enslave  his  soul  to  lust  and  sin  and  Satan,  conscience 
would  forever  condemn  him  as  guilty  of  immeas- 
urable folly  and  ill-desert ;  and  attendant  penalty 
would  forever  chastise  the  criminal.  The  individual 
and  universal  recognition  of  moral  obligation  and  its 
consequent  moral  desert,  is  proof,  universal  and 
unvarying  proof,  of  a  Moral  Governor  who  presides 
over  the  universe,  who,  with  the  moral  freedom  he 
hath  bestowed,  hath,  in  the  interests  of  supreme 
holiness,  inseparably  connected  moral  obligation 
and  moral  desert. 

The  argument,  then,  is  this:  Morahty  (moral 
merit  and  demerit)  is  impossible  where  necessity 
pervades  all  things.  Did  fate  or  chance  control  the 
universe,  moral  praise  and  blame,  reward  and  punish- 
ment, would  necessarily  be  excluded  as  out  of  place. 
Morality  would  be  impossible  and  absurd.  But 
moral  obligation  and  desert  everywhere  exist ;  there- 
fore there  must  be  a  moral  governor  who  presides 
over  the  universe,  who,  in  the  exercise  of  supreme 
wisdom  and  supreme  freedom,  doth  reign  in  supreme 
holiness;  who  hath  ordained  the  moral  law,  and, 
with  the  gift  of  moral  freedom  to  all  his  rational 
creatures,  hath  inseparably  connected  moral  obliga- 
tion and  moral  desert  ;  and  faith  may  forever  rejoice 
in  the  security  of  liberty  and  morality  ;  more  than 
this,  faith  may  forever  rejoice  in  God  as  Almighty, 


142  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

supremely  wise,  and  free,  and  holy  ;  the  author  and 
finisher,  the  Alpha  and  Omega. 

This  argument,  also,  is  complete  in  itself,  and 
although  arranged  as  accessory,  yet,  if  all  the  other 
arguments  were  withdrawn,  this  alone  would  remain 
the  decisive  proof  of  a  moral  governor  who  presides 
over  the  universe,  who  is  the  source  of  the  moral 
law,  and  the  security,  as  well  as  the  source,  of  mo- 
rality. 

Thus,  both  by  the  distinct  affirmations  of  reason, 
and  by  strict  induction  guided  by  reason,  we  are 
led  to  Deity,  and  by  their  united  authority  we  rest 
in  God.  As  our  line  of  direct  argumentation  began, 
so  it  ends,  with  the  full  recognition  of  God  as  a 
Divine  Personality,  supremely  wise,  supremely  free, 
and  holy — with  whom,  as  the  Supreme  Reason, 
human  reason  may  hold  increasing  communion — 
from  whom  we  receive  the  exalted  endowment  of 
moral  freedom — and  whom,  as  holy,  we  are  to  wor- 
ship and  imitate,  that  we  may  be  holy  as  He  is 
holy ;  whose  transcendent  wisdom  is  manifest  in 
ourselves,  who  are  fearfully  and  wonderfully  made, 
and  in  the  earth  and  heavens  which  are  full  of  his 
praises. 

By  these  varied  arguments  of  morality  and  of 
moral  freedom,  of  order  and  of  design,  of  universal 
belief  and    of  the    affirmations  of   reason,  faith    in 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  1 43 

God  is  not  only  authorized  but  pronounced  most 
rational. 

Thus  a  place  for  religious  faith  is  not  only  vindi- 
cated by  the  admissions,  expressed  or  implied,  of 
objectors ;  but  a  place  for  faith  in  God  is  estab- 
lished upon  positive  and  reliable  grounds. 

It  remains  to  present  the  scriptural  argument  for 
faith  in  Christ  and  the  Gospel,  together  with  some 
of  the  prerogatives  of  faith. 


144  FAITH  AND  MODERN  THOUGHT. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

Faith  and   Positivism. 

The  Written  and  the  Living  Word, 


"ii 


/^UR  course  of  discussion  has  led  us,  first,  into 
^^  "  The  Field  of  the  Philosophic  and  Finite  ;  "  * 
secondly,  into  ''  The  Field  of  the  Religious  and 
Infinite."  \ 

In  the  former  we  have  shown,  both  by  indirect 
and  direct  arguments,  that  philosophic  faith  (intel- 
lectual belief)  in  things  unseen,  for  example,  in  sub- 
stance and  the  relation  between  substance  and  qual- 
ity, in  cause  and  the  relation  between  cause  and 
effect,  etc.,  has  valid  ground. 

In  the  latter  we  have  shown,  by  cumulative  and 
conclusive  reasons,  the  validity  of  faith  in  God. 

This  ground  already  gained  and  securely  held, 
we  are  prepared  finally  to  consider  the  Revelation  of 
God  in  the  written  and  in  the  living-  Word — in  the 
Scriptures  and  in  Christ.     Is  Christian  faith  valid  ? 

We  have  an  indefeasible  right,  henceforth,  to 
*  See  Ch.  ii.  f  See  Ch.  iii. 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  1 45 

assume  the  premise  that  God  is.  Will  he  reveal 
himself?  An  antecedent  probability  is  sufficient  for 
our  argument  here.  But  more  than  this  has  been 
shown  in  the  preceding  discussion.  God  has  re- 
vealed himself  in  Creation  and  in  Providence. 

Thus  we  have  found  him,  not  as  a  logical  necessity 
elaborated  by  a  dialectical  process,  but  as  a  divine 
reality.  God  the  Father,  Almighty,  maker  of  heaven 
and  earth — giving  infallible  proofs  of  his  presence 
and  power  in  making,  upholding,  and  governing  the 
universe.  A  book  of  high  antiquity  and  one  which 
will  challenge  our  special  attention  in  this  closing 
discussion  precisely  expresses  our  thought :  "  For 
the  invisible  things  of  him  from  the  creation  of  the 
world  are  clearly  seen,  being  understood  by  the 
things  that  are  made,  even  his  eternal  power  and 
Godhead."     Rom.  i.  20. 

''  He  left  not  himself  without  witness,  in  that  he 
did  good,  and  gave  us  rain  from  heaven,  and  fruit- 
ful seasons,  filling  our  hearts  with  food  and  glad- 
ness."    Acts  xiv.  17. 

Now  in  the  sobriety  of  prose  it  speaks,  and  now 
in  the  rapture  of  poetry.  "  The  heavens  declare  the 
glory  of  God  ;  and  the  firmament  sheweth  his  handy 
work.  Day  unto  day  uttereth  speech  and  night 
unto  night  sheweth  knowledge."     Ps.  xix.  i,  2. 

God    has   thus    revealed  himself;  he  may,  then. 


146  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

reveal  himself  more  fully.  What  shall  decide?  His 
own  infinite  wisdom  and  will.  The  revelation  hith- 
erto made  has  occurred  in  the  ongoings  of  Creation 
and  Providence,  and  would  have  been  made  had 
only  material  things  been  created  and  upheld,  with 
no  finite  minds  to  recognize  God's  handiwork,  and 
wonder  and  adore.  But,  now  that  finite  minds 
appear,  will  not  God  reveal  himself  in  these  higher 
creations,  and  to  these  spiritual  creatures,  and 
through  them  to  others  ?  There  is  abundant  a  priori 
ground  for  expecting  this.  Indeed,  we  can  scarcely 
conceive  of  Divine  action  without  Divine  revelation. 
If  God  has,  by  the  very  process  of  his  action,  re- 
vealed himself  in  the  lower,  the  physical  creation, 
will  he  not,  by  a  nobler  process  of  divine  action, 
reveal  himself  in  the  higher,  the  spiritual  creation  ? 
Mind  alone  can  originate  mind.  Will  not  God 
appear  more  manifest,  and  be  better  understood,  by 
the  living  soul  which  he  hath  made  ? 

This  book  of  singular  wisdom,  as  well  as  antiqui- 
ty, precisely  states,  perhaps  suggests,  my  thought : 
"  Let  us  make  man  in  our  image,  after  our  hke- 
ness.  ...  In  the  image  of  God  created  he  him." 
Gen.  i.  26,  27.  Man  stands  forth  in  this  lower  world 
as  the  representative  of  intelhgence  and  volition  and 
morality,  holding  dominion  subordinate,  but  repre- 
sentative of  God's  supreme  dominion.     Gen.  i.  28. 


FAITH  AiVD  POSITIVISM,  I47 

Thus,  in  brief,  does  God  reveal  himself  in  the 
human  soul  ;  will  he  not  also  reveal  himself  to  the 
human  soul  ?  For  this  the  soul  would  long  intensely, 
even  hunger  and  thirst  for  it.  Without  this  there 
would  be  the  ceaseless  cry  of  the  human  to  the 
divine. 

Until  the  creation  of  man,  neither  could  this 
revelation  be,  nor  could  there  be  the  demand  for 
it.  Will  the  divine  Father  turn  away  in  disregard 
of  his  own  spiritual  children  ?  Will  not  God  avenge 
(satisfy)  his  own  elect,  his  chosen  ones  among  all  the 
creatures  on  earth,  that  with  filial  yearning  day  and 
night  cry  unto  him  ?  He  will ;  our  better  Reason 
replies.     He  will ;  saith  the  Saviour.     Luke  xviii.  8. 

Such  revelation,  if  it  occur  at  all,  would  seem  to 
be  especially  desirable  and  fitting  in  the  earlier  his- 
tory of  man  until  not  only  the  eternal  power  and 
Godhead  should  be  known,  but  until  God  be  known 
in  his  moral  character, — his  holiness,  his  justice,  his 
benevolence,  his  spiritual  care  and  kindness  towards 
his  spiritual  creatures ;  in  a  word,  in  his  divine 
Fatherhood,  holy,  just,  kind,  yearning  toward  his 
spiritual  children. 

Has  such  a  revelation  been  made, — a  revelation 
corresponding  to  these  very  wants  of  the  human 
soul  ?  There  is  a  book  claiming  to  be  a  record  of 
such  revealings.     The  book  is  not  a  modern  fabrica- 


148  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

tion  as  an  after-thought  to  satisfy  a  logical  necessity, 
or  to  embody  a  cunningly  devised  theory.  The 
book  is  genuine  ;  this  can  not  be  successfully  dis- 
puted. It  is  of  the  highest  antiquity ;  this  all  admit. 
The  theory  is  in  the  book  itself,  else  it  had  not  been 
thought  of.  The  book  has  been  wondrously  pre- 
served amid  the  shock  and  change  of  ages.  A 
people,  specially  selected  for  this  purpose,  marvel- 
lously protected  from  extermination,  though  often 
conquered — from  absorption,  though  everywhere 
scattered,  have  carried  with  them  everywhere,  and 
everywhere  guarded  this  book  as  a  sacred  treasure. 
Early  in  this  record,  be  it  observed,  the  Divine  Unity 
is  revealed — the  Divine  Unity,  as  the  basis  of  all 
true  religion,  as  contradistinguished  from  polytheism, 
which  is  the  parent  of  idolatry  with  its  endless  brood 
of  follies  and  sins. 

This  doctrine  of  the  Divine  Unity  which  Socrates 
hailed  as  a  great  light  shining  from  the  page  of  An- 
axagoras,  (cf.  Georg.  2,  490)  this  doctrine  had  been 
divinely  revealed  a  thousand  years  before  the  time  of 
Anaxagoras. 

Beyond  this  fundamental  doctrine,  thus,  and 
thus  early  revealed,  the  most  progressive  theology 
of  modern  times  has  realized  its  inability  to  make 
the  least  advance.  This  fundamental  doctrine  to- 
gether  with  the   rehgious    and    moral  principles   it 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  149 

involves  was  not  only  revealed  as  divine  truth,  but 
promulgated  as  a  divine  law,  enforced  by  divine 
sanctions,  and  enjoined  upon  men  as  the  universal 
and  perpetual  law,  thus  indicating  its  importance  in 
the  divine  estimate.  Has  any  proficiency  in  morals 
or  in  theology  superseded  these  commands  of  Jeho- 
vah or  improved  upon  God's  moral  law  ?  This  book 
has  been  multiplied  and  circulated  as  has  no  other 
in  time's  whole  history;  translated  into  unnumbered 
tongues  ;  made  accessible  to  the  multitude,  the 
companion  and  guide  both  of  the  illiterate  and  the 
learned.  Upon  the  best  and  wisest  men  the  world 
has  ever  known,  it  has  made  the  impression  of  a  rev- 
elation from  God — upon  the  best  and  wisest  nations 
of  all  time  it  has  made  this  impression. 

If  God's  power  and  wisdom  could  be  seen  in  the 
order  and  harmony  of  the  universe,  could  not  his 
moral  character  be  expressed  in  the  Scriptures  ? 
According  to  the  written  record,  God  now  manifests 
himself  to  men  in  fuller  revelations,  in  spiritual  com- 
munings with  patriarchs  and  priests  ;  he  speaks  unto 
the  fathers  by  the  prophets  ;  he  proclaims  a  moral 
law  for  his  moral  subjects  to  guide  and  guard  them 
— as  he  has  already  ordained  physical  laws  for  mate- 
rial things  ;  he  establishes  a  theocracy  over  a  nation 
showing,  at  once  and  to  all  men,  what  shall  be  the 
theocracy  for  mind  and  how  it  shall  differ  from  the 


ISO  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

theocracy  for  matter.  Sin  is  prohibited  by  the  moral 
law,  and  doomed  to  penalty.  Sacrificial  propitiation 
is  introduced.  Redemption  is  typified  and  prophe- 
sied. The  Church  is  organized  ;  its  future  foretold  ; 
a  Messiah  predicted  by  whom  in  the  last  days  God 
should  more  fully  reveal  himself  unto  men. 

Such,  in  brief,  is  an  outline  of  revelation  in  the 
earlier  Scriptures  of  the  Old  Testam.ent.  It  is  ad- 
dressed to  man  as  a  rational  spirit.  Is  it  Divine  ? 
Is  it  a  revelation  of  God  and  from  God  ?  How  shall 
we  as  rational,  spiritual  beings  decide  ?  The  conclu- 
sive answer  must  be  given  by  the  revelation  itself, 
involved  in  the  very  revealing.  Are  these  evidences 
of  the  supernatural  in  the  record  ?  To  the  law  and 
the  testimony  the  candid  inquirer  will  turn  first,  and 
most  earnestly,  and  without  prejudice.  In  nature 
we  decided  in  the  same  way.  We  met  with  eviden- 
ces of  the  supernatura,! — order,  harmony,  adaptation 
— which  matter  could  neither  originate  nor  regulate ; 
and  thus  we  found  God  as  appearing  in  the  things 
he  had  made. 

So,  here  are  the  evidences  of  God's  appearing  in 
the  things  revealed.  We  have  already  referred  to 
the  revelation  of  moral  attributes  and  a  moral  law 
supreme  in  authority,  supreme  in  excellence.  We 
now  specify  some  attendant  characteristics  befitting 
these  moral  attributes  and  this  moral  law  : 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  151 

There  is  majesty  unrivalled  ;  majesty  more  ex- 
alted even  than  the  material  universe  reveals;  majesty 
that  subjects  all  nature  to  the  omnipotence  of  God, 
— and  this  with  no  labor  of  expression,  but  with  a  re- 
pose and  ease  which  become,  and  become  only,  the 
grandeur  of  a  God  and  the  original  right  of  eternal 
possession.  "  He  spake  and  it  was  done.  He  com- 
manded and  it  stood  fast.  He  said,  Let  there  be  light, 
and  there  was  light.  By  the  Word  of  the  Lord  were 
the  heavens  made.  He  gave  to  the  sea  his  decree. 
He  weigheththe  mountains  in  scales,  and  the  hills  in 
a  balance.  He  taketh  up  the  isles  as  a  very  little 
thing.  He  bringeth  out  the  (heavenly)  host  by 
number  ;  because  he  is  strong  in  power ;  not  one 
faileth."  The  same  supreme  majesty  pervades  the 
attendant  miracles  recorded.  There  is  also  purity 
that  is  perfect ;  so  that  highest  angels  veil  their  faces 
in  its  ineffable  light,  and  the  elect  prophet  declares 
himself  undone,  because,  a  man  of  unclean  lips,  his 
eyes  had  seen  the  King,  the  Lord  of  Hosts.    Isa.  vi.  5. 

There  is  a  marvellous  consistency  in  the  spiritual 
purpose  and  prophecy  and  precept  and  providence 
revealed,  all  of  which  centre  in  one  great  Messianic 
fact — a  purpose  and  prophecy  and  precept  and 
providence  which  no  human  ingenuity  could  have 
devised  or  regulated — a  fact  which  no  human 
wisdom   could    have   furnished    or  foreseen,  toward 


152  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

which  history  was  made  steadily  to  advance,  which 
in  the  fullness  of  time  became  complete,  appearing 
then,  at  onoe,  as  the  key  to  all  history — the  in- 
terpretation of  all  time,  the  past  and  the  future ; 
a  consistency  marvellous  not  alone  in  theory,  but  no 
less  marvellous  practically,  providing  salvation  for 
sinners,  one  Saviour  for  all  mankind  ;  announcing 
the  brotherhood  of  man,  whose  nature  a  divine 
being  should  take  upon  himself  that  he  might  reach 
and  rescue  the  lost.  Attending  the  divine  redemp- 
tion is  a  promised  ideal  of  perfect  excellence,  rising 
up  amid  but  above  all  humanity,  inviting  and 
helping  to  a  higher  even  a  holy  life,  reminding  the 
soul  of  its  infinite  value,  promising  a  better  future 
even  the  heavenly,  and  pointing  to  a  progress  illimit- 
able, even  "  the  measure  of  the  stature  of  the 
fullness  of  Christ." 

In  all  this  revealing  of  purpose,  and  prophecy, 
and  precept,  and  providence,  and  propitiation,  the 
supernatural  everywhere  appears.  The  promised 
Messiah  is  supernatural,  God  incarnate,  man  divine  ; 
to  be  made  sin  for  us,  yet  holy,  harmless,  undefiled; 
dying  for  sin,  yet  separate  from  sinners.  The 
predicted  redemption  is  supernatural,  saving  the 
people  not  in  but  from  their  sins,  thus  redeeming 
humanity.  The  agency  foretold  is  supernatural. 
It  is  the  Holy  Ghost  which  should  reason  of  sin  and 


FAITH  AND    POSITIVISM.  I53 

righteousness    and     judgment,    and    regenerate    the 

soul. 

The  Kingdom  to  be  estabh'shed  is  supernatural, 
— the  Kingdom  of  God  diffusing  righteousness  and 
peace  and  joy  in  the  Holy  Ghost.  The  promises 
are  exceeding  great  and  precious,  such  as  no  human 
thought  could  conceive;  but  what  is  especially 
significant  is,  that  they  involve  a  condition  unheard 
and  unthought-of  till  announced  in  the  revelation, — 
purity  of  character  in  the  recipients,  wherein  they 
become  partakers  of  the  divine  nature.  And  the 
future  revealed  is  supernatural,  in  which  the  purity, 
the  promise,  the  kingdom,  shall  culminate  in  a  new 
heaven  and  a  new  earth,  in  which  dwelleth  right- 
eousness. Even  after  the  revelation  it  requires  the 
most  careful  discrimination  to  repeat  the  statement 
without  confusing  or  humanizing  the  divine  ideal, 
e.  g.,  in  regard  to  God's  spiritual  perfections,  or 
Christ's  complex  nature,  or  the  ministration  of 
the  Spirit,  or  the  purity  of  the  divine  promises, 
or  the  perfection  of  the  kingdom  of  God.  This 
characteristic  of  revelation  grows  upon  the  human 
soul  as  it  becomes  more  intelligent  and  more 
studious  of  the  Scriptures. 

All  this  divine  presence  is  revealed  as  pervading 
and  interfusing  human  history,  continuous  and  con- 
trolling, yet  consistent,   producing  no   discord   nor 


154  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

disorder;  but,  on  the  contrary,  reconciling  the  world 
unto  God,  and  so  not  only  involving  harmony  in  the 
plan,  but,  in  its  onvvorking,  diffusing  spiritual  har- 
mony. The  wonder  grows  with  our  increasing  knowl- 
edge ;  and  unlike  acquaintance  with  the  uninspired, 
the  human,  here  familiarity  leads  to  adoration. 

The  study  of  revelation  culminates  in  worship  ; 
''  Blessed  art  thou,  O  Lord  ;  teach  me  thy  statutes. 
Thy  word  have  I  hid  in  mine  heart,  that  I  might  not 
sin  against  thee." 

The  human  reason  bows  before  this  divine  re- 
vealing with  profounder  reverence  than  any  marvel 
or  miracle  addressed  to  the  physical  sense  could 
possibly  produce.  It  is  God  appearing  in  the  pene- 
trating power  of  his  Word,  as  to  Elijah,  not  in 
the  tempest  nor  the  earthquake  nor  the  fire,  but  in 
the  still  small  voice,  when  the  prophet  wrapped  his 
face  in  his  mantle. 

If  mere  reasoning  attempt  an  explanation  of  this 
revelation  as  uninspired,  the  wonder  becomes  inex- 
plicable. But  human  reason  discerns  a  revealing  of 
the  divine  reason,  and  thus  the  mystery  becomes  a 
revelation. 

To  recapitulate :  this  revelation  claims  to  be 
divine.  Can  we  conceive  of  nobler  attributes?  Jus- 
tice, truth,  holiness,  benevolence.  Do  we,  elsewhere, 
find   anything   surpassing   this   revelation  ?     In    all 


FAITH- AND  POSITIVISM.  1 55 

succeeding  ages  has  highest  human  wit  or  wisdom 
originated  or  demanded  anything  worthier  of  divin- 
ity ?  Men  of  most  exalted  genius,  in  their  loftiest, 
boldest  statements  of  the  divine  character,  have 
resorted  to  the  Scripture  vocabulary.  If  divinity 
is  not  revealed  here,  how  could  it  be  revealed  in  any 
written  word  ?  What  shall  decide?  Does  it  satisfy 
the  highest  demand  of  reason  ?  Then  reason  de- 
cides that  there  is  a  revelation  of  God  in  the  written 
Word.  What  if  some  have  not  believed  ?  Shall 
the  unbelief  of  some  make  the  truth  of  God  of  none 
effect  ?  This  unbelief  of  written  revelation  has  its 
parallel  in  the  unbelief  of  natural  revelation. 
Though,  according  to  our  preceding  argument,  in 
the  language  of  Paul:  ''The  invisible  things  of  God 
from  the  creation  of  the  world  are  clearly  seen, 
being  understood  by  the  things  that  are  made,  even 
his  eternal  power  and  Godhead  ;  so  that  they  are 
without  excuse,"  yet  there  have  been  those  who 
have  not  believed — determined  atheists,  notwith- 
standing the  cumulative  testimony  of  nature  and 
the  general  belief  of  mankind. 

By  this  line  of  internal  evidence,  then,  we  are 
led  to  the  inevitable  conclusion,  that  the  written 
record  has  inherent,  infallible  proofs  of  a  divine 
revelation. 

But  there  may  be   external  evidence   also.     In- 


156  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT, 

ternal  there  must  be,  for  this  is  essential  to  satisfy 
the  reason.  The  external  can  only  be  corroborative  ; 
for  no  amount  of  external  evidence  can  vindicate  as 
divine,  a  revelation  of  folly,  absurdity,  and  sin.  At 
the  same  time,  it  seems  most  fitting  that  such  a 
revelation  come  with  attendant  external  evidences, 
corresponding  to  the  supernatural  character  of  the 
revelation.  Precisely  this  is  the  recorded  statement. 
The  revelation  is  not  primarily  of  power,  ubiquity,  in- 
telligence, as  in  the  physical  world  ;  but,  as  we  have 
just  seen,  of  holiness,  justice,  truth,  benevolence, 
presenting  a  divine  personality,  revealing  to  the 
human  spirit  a  divine  spirit  infinite  in  wisdom  and  in 
goodness,  *'  proclaiming  the  Lord  God,  merciful  and 
gracious,  long-suffering,  and  abundant  in  goodness 
and  truth."  Exod.  xxxiv.  6.  With  this  internal 
evidence  there  are  corresponding  external  evidences 
of  supernatural  revealing:  (Exod.  xix.  16-19,  ^^  ^^^ 
miraculous  control  over  the  forces  of  nature  as  at 
Sinai  and  Horeb,  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Wilderness, 
Jordan  and  Canaan,  showing  that  the  forces  of  nature 
are  subject  to  the  divine  control  and  subservient  to 
the  divine  purpose  in  the  higher,  spiritual  revealings 
of  God. 

Such  a  revelation,  if  desirable  for  man,  must,  for 
the  same  reason,  be  continuously  repeated,  or  be 
written  for  preservation  and  transmission,  that   the 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  1 57 

human  race  may  know  the  mind  and  motive  and 
will  of  God. 

Shall  the  revelation  be  continuous,  or  written  ? 
It  is  both — continuous,  till  the  time  of  its  comple- 
tion ;  and  written,  for  the  ages  to  come. 

But  up  to  this  point,  the  revelation  of  God  and 
of  the  .divine  plan  is  by  no  means  complete.  If  it 
be  made  complete,  this  must  be  in  the  fullness  of 
time.  Until  then,  mankind  must  desire  and  wait 
for  it.  Completeness  will  supplement  the  Old  with 
the  New — the  Written  with  the  Living  Word. 

Deferring  the  consideration  of  this  for  a  little, 
we  pause  to  notice  an  objection,  the  objection  of 
the  rationalist,  that  we  have  human  reason  to  decide 
what  the  divine  revelation  shall  be,  and  thus  annul 
the  value  and  the  necessity  of  a  written  revelation. 

We  reply  that  we  have  reason  to  decide,  not 
what  the  revelation  shall  be,  but,  as  Coleridge  puts 
it,  "  what  it  shall  not  be  ;  "  that  it  shall  not  be  a 
revelation  of  folly,  absurdity,  and  sin. 

Hume,  pressing  an  objection  from  an  opposite 
direction,  concludes  his  essay  on  miracles  with  this 
disingenuous  sneer :  "  Our  most  holy  religion  is 
founded  on  faith,  not  on  reason  ;  mere  reason  is 
insufficient  to  convince  us  of  its  veracity." 

To  this  skeptical  objection  we  reply,  that  our 
initial  work  has  been  in  the   light  of  reason  to  find 


158  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

God  as  he  has  revealed  himself  in  the  material  and 
mental  universe. 

With  Theism  thus  securely  established,  faith  in 
God  reposes  upon  rational  and  valid  ground.  Thus, 
at  the  very  outset,  the  objection  of  Hume  is  more 
than  answered,  it  is  denied  and  ruled  out  of  the 
discussion. 

After  this  initial  work  we  proceed,  in  the  light 
of  Reason,  seriously  to  examine  the  evidences  of 
Divine  Revelation  in  the  written  word  to  which  we 
are  earnestly  invited  by  the  Scriptures  themselves. 
As  Reason  has  already  found  in  Theism  a  valid 
basis  for  Revealed  Religion,  so  Revelation  makes  its 
appeal  to  Reason  and  commends  itself  to  the  ra- 
tional soul.  This  is  the  uniform  tenor  of  Scripture, 
as  well  as  the  explicit  invitation  of  its  Divine  Author. 
The  Holy  Ghost  reasons  with  men  ;  and  the  apos- 
tolic injunction  is :  "■  Be  ready  always  to  give  an 
answer  to  every  man  that  asketh  you  a  reason  of 
the  hope  that  is  in  you."  I  Pet.  iii.  15.  Not  only 
at  the  outset,  then,  is  Hume's  objection  ruled  out  of 
the  discussion  ;  it  is  all  along  and  forever  excluded. 
Revelation  instead  of  doing  violence  or  discredit  to 
Reason  is  addressed  directly  to  the  rational  nature 
of  man.  Revelation  everywhere  assumes  the  exist- 
ence of  a  moral  sense — a  Reason  and  Conscience — 
in  man,  and  thus  it  ever  addresses  him.     Did  Chris- 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  1 59 

tianity  vindicate  itself  by  the  false  process  of  Hume, 
then  would  faith  deserve  the  supercilious  sneer  of 
this  arch  skeptic.  For,  as  it  has  been  justly  said  : 
'*  If  there  be  no  truth  set  before  the  faith  it  may 
become  the  weakest  credulity."     (McCosh). 

There  is  then  a  proper  limit  to  be  observed  in 
either  direction,  toward  the  atheistic  objection,  and 
toward  the  rationalistic  ;  on  the  one  hand,  preserv- 
ing Christian  faith  from  sinking  into  senseless  super- 
stition ;  on  the  other  hand,  from  vaulting  into 
arrogant  censorship.  Sin  is  in  the  world.  The 
consciousness  of  it  is  confessed  by  the  individual 
soul.  Its  prevalence  oppresses  humanity.  History 
bears  witness  to  its  universal  presence.  How  shall 
sin  be  treated  ?  In  the  method  of  justice  or  of  grace? 
Of  penalty  or  of  pardon  ?  If  of  penalty,  to  what 
extent  ?  If  of  pardon,  upon  what  ground  and  con- 
dition? If  an  administration  of  grace  be  adopted, 
how  shall  it  be  made  to  harmonize  with  justice? 
If  there  be  propitiation,  what  shall  be  the  sacrifice? 
If  there  be  mediation,  who  shall  be  the  mediator? 

To  whose  hands  shall  the  administration  of  grace 
be  committed  ?  Shall  this  gracious  administration 
continue  forever?  If  not,  when  shall  it  end  and 
how?  If  there  has  been  temptation  shall  grace 
reach  the  tempted  only,  or  the  tempter  also? 

These,   and   the   like,  are   unavoidable  questions 


l6o  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

which  human  reason  must  ask  in  the  interests  of  the 
human  soul  and  of  the  divine  government,  but  is 
incompetent  to  answer.  These  questions  more  than 
refute  the  objection  of  the  rationaHst.  They  demon- 
strate the  urgent  necessity  of  a  completed  revelation 
to  a  world  of  sinners.  They  indicate,  also,  the  pos- 
sible, if  not  the  necessary  revelation  of  a  Saviour  and 
by  a  Saviour  ;  and  they  suggest  the  necessity  of  satis- 
factory evidences  attending  such  a  revelation ;  eviden- 
ces the  more  requisite  and  satisfactory  because  of 
the  important  issues  involved,  even  salvation  for 
sinners  and  the  integrity  of  the  divine  government. 

By  this  very  statement  three  representative  ob- 
jections are  at  once  met  and  refuted  ;  the  rational- 
istic objection  of  Parker  and  others,  refuted  by  the 
need  of  a  revelation  ;  the  atheistic  objection  of  Hume 
and  others,  refuted  by  the  evidences  to  be  can- 
vassed ;  the  mythical  objection  of  Strauss  and 
others,  refuted  by  the  reality  required, — a  salvation 
and  a  Saviour,  a  real  Redeemer  and  a  real  redemp- 
tion. A  brief  unfolding  of  this  statement  must 
conclude  this  chapter. 

What  is  the  revelation  ?  It  is  of  grace  rather 
than  of  justice  ;  by  propitiation  rather  than  by  pen- 
alty ;  through  a  Saviour  for  sinners  rather  than 
by  a  sentence  of  execution  ;  for  the  tempted  but 
not  for  the  tempter;  on  one  condition,  repentance 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  l6l 

toward  God  and  faith  in  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ. 
The  Saviour  is  the  son  of  God  and  son  of  man, 
divinely  begotten  but  humanly  born,  thus  wonder- 
fully qualified  for  the  work  of  mediation.  Into 
the  hands  of  this  one  Mediator  all  things  are  now 
ordained.  He  must  reign  till  he  hath  put  all  things 
under  his  feet,  destroying  sin  and  death  the  last 
enemy,  and  him  that  hath  the  power  of  death,  thus 
bringing  in  everlasting  righteousness,  when  the  ad- 
ministration of  grace  shall  be  complete  and  the  king- 
dom be  given  up  unto  God,  even  the  Father,  that 
God  may  be  all  in  all.     (Cor.  xv,  25,  ^^  seq^ 

Thus  the  new  revelation  is  of  and  by  a  Person 
combining  in  himself  all  typical  and  verbal  reveal- 
ings  ;  in  whom  dwelleth  all  the  fullness  of  the  God- 
head bodily.     (Col.  ii.  9.) 

The  new  revelation  is  of  a  person  and  a  life  that 
is  at  once  divine  and  human,  actualizing  before  men 
the  doctrines  of  theology — God  manifest  in  the  flesh, 
so  that  Jesus  replied  to  Philip  :  *'  He  that  hath  seen 
me,  hath  seen  the  Father  ;  "  and  John  declared  :  ''  The 
life  was  manifested,  and  we  have  seen  it,  and  bear 
witness,  and  shew  unto  you  that  eternal  life  which 
was  with  the  Father,  and  was  manifested  unto  us." 
I  John  i.  2.  This  is  a  revelation  of  the  substance 
hitherto  foreshadowed,  of  types  realized,  of  prophe- 
cies fulfilled,  of  sacrifices   ended   by   a   propitiation 


1 62  FAITH  AND   MODERN   THOUGHT. 

offered  once  for  all,  attended  by  evidences  both 
human  and  divine,  internal  and  external,  character 
and  conduct,  life  and  teaching,  works  and  words,  in 
trial  and  triumph  from  the  lowly,  lonely  birth  at 
Bethlehem  to  the  ascension  from  Olivet  in  the 
presence  of  all  the  disciples  when,  as  he  blessed 
them,  he  was  taken  up  and  a  cloud  received  him  out 
of  their  sight. 

This  person,  this  character,  this  life  and  teaching 
and  work,  revealing  God,  redeeming  the  sinner, 
reconciling  God  and  man — this  stands  forth  before 
the  world  as  unique  and  divine,  challenging  and 
securing    faith  and  devotion. 

The  revelation,  then,  is  by  no  means  complete 
without  the  coming  of  a  Redeemer  consummating 
in  himself  the  mystery  and  the  manifestation  of 
godliness,     (i  Tim.  iii.  i6.) 

Until  this  revelation  came,  no  questions  could  be 
so  m.omentous  to  the  human  soul  as  those  involved 
in  his  appearing,  no  knowledge  could  be  so  import- 
ant to  gain  ;  and  now  that  the  revelation  is  made,  no 
knowledge  is  so  important  to  retain  and  apply. 

It  might  have  been  justly  expected  that  the 
divine  Law-giver  would  maintain  the  law.  But 
how?  By  penalty?  If  thus,  what  would  be  the 
doom  of  the  transgressor?  And  what  would  be  the 
future   relation    and    conduct    of    God    toward    the 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  163 

sinner?  No  finite  reason  could  tell  what  God 
should  do,  although  it  could  be  readily  and  safely 
affirmed  that  the  Divine  Reason  would  do  nothing 
irrational  ;  and  highest  human  reason  in  this  uni- 
versal emergency  of  condemnation,  could  only  wait 
for  the  divine  revelation.  And  is  not  the  announce- 
ment full  of  the  supernatural  ?  The  revelation  self- 
evidenced  as  divine  ?  *'  Thou  hast  destroyed  thyself, 
but  in  me  there  is  hope."  *'  I  have  found  a  ransom." 
**  His  arm  brought  salvation."  God  reveals  himself 
as  just,  and  yet  '*  the  justifier  of  the  ungodly." 
Rom.  iv.  5. 

This  is  a  new  and  wondrous  revelation  of  God, 
no  less  merciful  than  just.  The  wonder  grows  with 
every  new  revealing.  Who  is  this  Ransom,  human 
reason  reverently  inquires.  The  answer  is  from  the 
highest  heaven  :  *'  Lo,  I  come,"  saith  the  Saviour. 
"  In  the  volume  of  the  book  it  is  written  of  me. 
Sacrifice  and  offering  thou  wouldest  not,  but  a  body 
hast  thou  prepared  me."  Heb.  x.  5,  7.  In  the 
revelation  as  it  rises  to  completeness,  Christ  and 
redemption  are  central.  Around  these,  prophecies 
and  promises  circle  ;  and  to  them,  unerringly  point. 
The  character  and  coming  of  Immanuel,  his  incarna- 
tion, his  work,  his  human  sympathy  and  suffering, 
the  death  which  he  should  accomplish  at  Jerusalem 
that  he  might  deliver  man  and  destroy  the  works  of 


164  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

the  devil  — these  revelations  fill  the  vision  of  seers  ; 
make  up  the  burden  of  prophecy  ;  give  heavenly 
rapture  to  the  Songs  of  David  ;  inspire  Isaiah  to 
prophesy,  "■  Prepare  ye  the  way  of  the  Lord  :  "  and 
Malachi  to  give  the  nearer  prediction,  *'  Behold,  I 
will  send  my  messenger,  and  he  shall  prepare  the 
way  before  me ;  and  the  Lord  whom  ye  seek  shall 
suddenly  come  to  his  temple ;  "  and  him  that  was 
more  than  a  prophet,  even  John  the  harbinger, 
to  repeat  the  prophecy  as  fulfilled,  '*  Behold  the 
Lamb  of  God  which  taketh  away  the  sin  of  the 
world.'  Inspired  apostles  take  up  the  heavenly 
theme,  repeating  evermore  the  name  that  is  above 
every  name,  until  in  the  apocalyptic  vision  Jesus 
again  appears  as  the  alpha  and  omega,  the  begin- 
ning and  the  ending,  the  first  and  the  last ;  and  with 
the  revelation  completed  is  heard  the  echo  of  the 
new  song  in  heaven  :  "  Unto  him  that  loved  us,  and 
washed  us  from  our  sins  in  his  own  blood,  and  hath 
made  us  kings  and  priests  unto  God  and  his 
Father ;  to  him  be  glory  and  dominion  forever  and 
ever."     Rev.  i.  5,  6. 

Along  this  line  of  divine  revealing  it  were  ration- 
al to  expect  that  attendant  miracles  would  gather. 
That  they  multiply  in  number  and  in  significance 
would  not  surprise  us,  but  would  rather  comport 
with  the  greatness  of  the  revealing  and  thus  the 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  1 65 

better  satisfy  our  rational  expectation.  And  this 
accords  precisely  with  the  record.  These  are  the 
external  credentials  of  the  revelation,  corroborat- 
ing the  internal  evidences.  They  are  the  works  of 
Christ.  He  maketh  the  dumb  to  speak,  the  deaf  to 
hear,  the  blind  to  see,  the  lame  to  walk ;  he  heals 
the  leprous ;  restores  the  paralytic  ;  walks  upon  the 
sea;  ca  ms  the  winds  and  the  waves;  multiplies  the 
five  loaves  to  feed  the  hungry  thousands ;  casts  out 
devils  ;  raises  the  dead  ;  and,  higher  still,  forgives 
sin ;  transforms  moral  character ;  binds  sinners  to 
himself  in  bonds  of  everlasting  love,  making  them 
his  disciples  and  apostles;  breathes  upon  them  the 
Holy  Ghost ;  inspires  them  for  a  divine  mission  preach- 
ing Chiist  and  him  crucified  with  signs  following. 

This  general  survey,  which  involves  so  many 
convincing  particulars,  might  easily  be  made  specific. 
And  now,  to  a  candid  scrutiny  of  this  Revelation 
concerning  Christ  from  the  first  intimations  in  Eden, 
the  promises  to  Abraham  and  Isaac  and  Jacob,  the 
speaking  in  times  past  unto  the  fathers  by  the 
prophets,  the  Old  Testament  of  sacrifice  and  atone- 
ment sealed  with  blood  as  typical  until  the  types  are 
realized  and  the  prophecies  fulfilled  in  Christ — 
to  the  candid  mind  is  there  not  manifest  a  com- 
prehensive, consistent,  wonderful  plan  more  and 
more  fully  revealing  God  to  man  until  it  culminates 


1 66  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

according  to  prophecy  and  promise  in  the  Incarna- 
tion— "■  God  manifest  in  the  flesh,  justified  in  the 
spirit,  seen  of  angels,  preached  unto  the  Gentiles, 
believed  on  in  the  world,  received  up  into  glory?" 
1  Tim.  iii.  i6. 

Such  is  the  written  Word  of  Revelation,  and  such, 
the  living  Word.  Is  this  living  Word  a  revealing  of 
God  ?  In  what  way  could  God  reveal  himself  to 
men  more  fully?  How  otherwise  could  the  Divine 
be  brought  into  such  near  communion  with  men? 
What  divine  trait  can  human  reason  conceive  which 
is  not  revealed  in  Christ  ?  When  has  divine  excel- 
lence been  so  exalted  ?  How  could  holiness  receive 
a  higher  exemplification  ?  Christ  was  without  sin. 
How  could  divine  justice  receive  superior  vindica- 
tion? Christ  came  not  to  destroy,  but  to  fulfill  the 
law— every  jot  and  tittle.  How  else  could  the 
mercy  of  God  be  made  so  conspicuous?  "  Grace  and 
truth  came  by  Jesus  Christ."  "  He  was  full  of  grace 
and  truth."  ''Where  sin  abounded,  grace  did  much 
more  abound."  In  him  is  revealed  ''  the  exceeding 
riches "  of  divine  grace.  And  the  love  of  God  is 
commended  unto  us  in  that  ''  While  we  were  yet 
sinners,  Christ  died  for  us."  This  thought  is  capa- 
ble of  indefinite  expansion,  but  I  may  not  pursue 
it  here. 

In  this  Revelation,  ''  Mercy   and  truth  are  met 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  1 6/ 

together  ;  righteousness  and  peace  have  kissed  each 

other  " 

"  Nor  dare  a  creature  guess 

Which  of  the  glories  brighter  shines 
The  justice  or  the  grace." 

The  two-fold  method  of  argument, — the  direct 
and  the  indirect — is  applicable  in  this  as  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapters.  The  indirect  argument  is  cumula- 
tive with  the  admissions  of  objectors,  such  as  Rous- 
seau and  Renan  and  Strauss  and  Parker,  both  to  the 
supreme  excellence  of  Scripture  and  the  matchless 
merit  of  Jesus  ;  and  the  reply  of  Lessing  to  the 
neologists  is  more  than  an  admission — it  is  a  refuta- 
tion, as  well  as  an  argument. 

But  these  we  need  not  stop  to  particularize. 
Nor  need  we  extend  the  direct  argument  by  dwell- 
ing upon  the  doctrines  of  the  Gospel.  These  doc- 
trines are  but  the  outgrowth  of  the  Christian 
principle,  the  systematizing  of  the  revelations  of 
Christ,  to  be  preserved  in  the  divine  record  for 
universal  reference.  So  that  henceforth,  as  both 
fact  and  precept  it  may  be  said  :  Search  the  Script- 
ures :  they  are  they  which  testify  of  Christ.  So 
that  henceforth  in  the  ministration  of  the  Spirit,  He 
shall  take  of  the  things  of  Christ  and  shew  them  unto 
men.  And  in  the  highest  office  which  he  performs, 
he  doth  fulfill  the  Saviour's  prayer  :  "  Sanctify  thern 
through  thy  truth ;  thy  word  is  truth.'* 


1 68  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

The  Scriptures  are  their  own  best  interpreter. 
He  is  the  wisest  expounder  who  best  compares 
things  spiritual  with  spiritual. 

The  doctrines  of  the  gospel,  then,  constitute  the 
doctrine  of  Christ.  The  holy  Scriptures  are  the  re- 
pository divinely  appointed.  To  perpetuate  the 
Gospel  of  Christ  and  teach  it  to  all  nations,  the 
Scriptures  are  necessary.  De  Quincy  has  well  said  : 
**  No  book,  no  doctrine.     No  doctrine,  no  book." 

Words  of  intense  significance  conclude  the  reve- 
lation from  God  :  "  If  any  man  shall  add  unto  these 
things,  God  shall  add  unto  him  the  plagues  that  are 
written  in  this  book  ;  and  if  any  man  shall  take 
away  from  the  words  of  the  book  of  this  prophecy, 
God  shall  take  away  his  part  out  of  the  book  of  life, 
and  out  of  the  holy  city,  and  from  the  things  which 
are  written  in  this  book."     Rev.  xxii-  i8,  19. 

The  revelation  in  the  written  and  the  living 
Word  has  an  historic  reality  on  which  faith  may 
securely  rest ;  a  divine  personality  with  which  faith 
may  commune  ;  a  spiritual  life  which  faith  may 
share  ;  a  divine  doctrine  which  faith  may  practice 
and  proclaim  ;  a  gospel  of  salvation  which  faith  may 
preach  to  every  creature  with  the  abiding  pledge  of 
Christ's  presence  and  power. 

We  have  now  reached  a  valid  ground  for  faith  in 
its  highest  exercise, — saving  trust  in  the  Redeemer. 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM.  1 69 

There  is  not  only  faith  in  God,  as  he  is  seen  in 
nature,  in  providence,  in  scripture,  and  by  which  he 
is  known  so  far  forth  ;  but  faith  in  Christ  as  the 
revealer  of  God  and  the  reconciler  of  men,  the  ex- 
press image  of  the  one,  the  Saviour  of  the  other, 
the  mediator  between  God  and  man.  And  ''  This  " 
saith  the  Saviour,  *'  is  life  eternal,  that  they  might  know 
thee  the  only  true  God,  and  Jesus  Christ  whom  thou 
hast  sent."  Every  step  of  our  advance  has  been  upon 
valid  ground,  until  we  have  legitimately  and  securely 
reached  this  climax  of  faith — which  bringeth  salvation 
In  securing  this  result  as  a  personal  experience, 
it  is  to  be  especially  remembered  that  the  Holy 
Spirit  effectually  contributes  :  taking  of  the  things  of 
Christ  and  showing  them  unto  men.  Reasoning  of 
sin  and  righteousness  and  judgment,  quickening  the 
moral  powers  to  a  new  Hfe, — a  Hfe  of  faith  upon  the 
Son  of  God. 

A  new  experience  is  the  steady  spiritual  out- 
growth of  this  new  Hfe  of  faith.  This  experience  is 
to  the  soul  an  earnest  of  eternal  fruition,  and  a 
spiritual  support  and  defence,  invincible  by  any  form 
of  skeptical  or  vain  philosophy — more  than  this,  a 
defence  and  support  unassailable  by  any  foe.  To  the 
doubting,  the  hostile,  the  curious,  the  candid  in- 
quirer, the  reply  of  Christian  experience  is  :  We  have 
found  the  Messiah.  Come  and  see, 
8 


I/O  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

This  individual  (inner)  witness  is  corroborated 
and  confirmed  by  the  ministration  of  the  Spirit  in 
perpetuating  the  reign  of  Christ  and  extending  it, 
not  through  force,  but  through  faith  working  by  love. 
Christianity  vindicates  itself  by  its  power  over  the 
individual  soul  and  over  society,  purifying  and 
redeeming  the  one,  civilizing  and  exalting  the  other. 

Prophecy,  too,  is  a  standing  external  witness,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  dispersion  of  the  Jews  for  1800 
years,  and  onward  to  their  final  ingathering,  when 
the  fullness  of  the  Gentiles  be  come  in,  Rom.  xi., 
whose  dispersion  shall  be  the  reconciling  of  the 
world,  and  whose  receiving  shall  be  life  from  the 
dead. 

So,  universal  human  history  shall  contribute 
with  myriad  voices  to  verify  the  divine  revelation. 
Then  shall  it  appear  to  every  creature  that  the  Lion 
of  the  tribe  of  Judah,  the  Root  of  David,  hath  pre- 
vailed to  unseal  and  open  the  book  of  the  Divine  plan 
and  Providence  ;  and,  by  his  redemptive  work  as  the 
Lamb  that  was  slain,  ^'  is  worthy  to  receive  power 
and  riches,  and  wisdom,  and  strength,  and  honor, 
and  glory,  and  blessing,"     Rev.  v.  12. 

If  now  it  be  demanded.  Can  human  Reason  fully 
comprehend  Christianity  ?  Faith  replies :  No,  it 
is  a  life,  not  a  philosophy  of  life.  Can  it  be  proved  ? 
Faith  as  readily  replies  :   Yes,  by  divine  testimony 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  171 

and  by  Christian  experience.  How  shall  we  know  it 
as  a  reality?  The  answer  is  :  By  trying  it.  No  test 
can  be  more  simple,  or  can  more  readily  commend 
itself  to  human  reason.  The  answer  evermore  is 
and  can  be  no  otherwise  :  "  If  ye  do  his  will  ye  shall 
know  of  the  doctrine."  No  one  has  applied  this 
test  according  to  the  direction  of  faith  and  given  tes- 
timony against  the  Gospel. 

The  soul  fully  satisfied  that  God  has  given  a 
Revelation  in  the  written  and  the  living  Word — in 
the  Scriptures  and  in  Christ — Faith,  henceforth, 
assumes  its  legitimate  prerogative.  With  the  con- 
sent of  reason  it  looks  beyond  human  reason  to  a 
higher,  even  a  divine  guide.  It  believes  in  God,  and 
believes  also  in  Christ.  Having  rationally  received 
Christ  as  divine,  we  believe  that  he  is  competent  to 
instruct  our  ignorance  ;  and  believing  in  his  complete 
veracity,  we  accept  all  that  he  may  reveal  although 
we  are  unable  to  comprehend  all  that  he  may  say. 
He  may  speak  in  grace  as  freely  or  unexpectedly  or 
marvellously  as  in  nature.  Who  shall  dictate  to 
God  in  the  creation  and  control  of  worlds  or  of  atoms? 
Who  shall  dictate  the  revelation  or  the  riches  of 
divine  grace  ? 

The  Scientist,  with  philosophic  faith,  acts  as  the 
interpreter  of  nature ;  the  Christian,  with  Evangel- 
ical faith,  acts  as  the  minister  of  grace. 


172  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Now,  it  is  easy  by  faith  to  understand  that  the 
worlds  were  framed  by  the  Word  of  God. 

Now,  in  the  superior  h"ght  of  Revelation,  it  is 
rational  and  easy  to  look  not  at  the  things  which  are 
seen  and  temporal,  but  at  the  things  unseen  and 
eternal.  Now,  in  this  superior  light  Vv^hich  reason 
recognizes  as  divine,  it  seems  not  only  desirable,  but 
clear  to  faith  that  God  should  establish  his  kingdom 
among  men  ; — a  kingdom  that  is  not  meat  and 
drink,  but  righteousness  and  peace  and  joy  in  the 
Holy  Ghost — a  spiritual  kingdom. 

In  order  to  this,  it  seems  to  faith  consistent  that 
material  interests  be  made  subordinate  and  subserv- 
ient to  the  spiritual ;  and  so,  that  all  be  ordained  in 
the  hands  of  the  Mediator,  and  that  this  gracious 
work  of  renovation  and  purification  and  exaltation 
be  effected  by  the  ministration  of  the  Spirit,  the  only 
competent  agency.  Henceforth,  faith  becomes  to 
the  human  soul  the  substance  of  things  hoped  for, 
the  evidence  of  things  not  seen.  The  soul  is  justified 
by  faith  in  Christ  who  is  made  unto  us  wisdom  and 
righteousness  and  sanctification  and  redemption. 
Thus  we  rise  to  a  new  spiritual  life  of  communion 
with  God  through  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ ;  so  that 
henceforth  we  live — in  the  truest,  highest,  best  sense 
— we  live  by  faith.  This  is  not  abstract  or  mythical, 
but  rational  and  simple,  commended  to  human  rea- 


FAITH  AND  POSITIVISM.  1 73 

son  in  the  light  of  infinite  reason.  Henceforth,  we 
walk  by  faith  as  seeing  God  who  is  invisible,  and 
have  the  testimony  that  we  please  God — for,  at  this 
stage  of  our  advance,  even  finite  reason  is  competent 
to  affirm,  (what  revelation  declares)  that  without 
faith  it  is  impossible  to  please  God.  At  every  pro- 
gressive step  we  rise  higher  and  higher  into  spiritual 
life  and  spiritual  communion  with  him  who  is  the 
fountain  of  life  and  of  light.  Henceforth,  faith  works 
by  love,  combining  graces  in  one  spiritual  charac- 
ter which  becomes  more  excellent  as  the  combina- 
tion of  graces  becomes  more  comprehensive : 
"  Until  we  all  come  in  the  unity  of  the  faith  and  of 
the  knowledge  of  the  Son  of  God,  unto  a  perfect 
man."     Eph.  iv.  13. 

Now.  whether  faith  be  set  forth  prominently  by 
Paul,  or  love  by  John,  or  hope  by  Peter,  or  works 
by  James,  it  is  to  the  believer  only  the  clearer  un- 
folding of  graces  which  are  really  inseparable.  To 
the  view  of  faith,  variety  in  revelation  harmonizes 
in  a  higher  unity  hke  the  separate  colors  of  the  rain- 
bow blending  in  the  clear  light  of  day.  It  is  then 
the  prerogative  of  faith  to  illumine,  to  guide,  to 
stimulate  the  soul.  *'  Paganism,"  as  De  Quincy  has 
justly  said,  "  Paganism  aimed  at  no  distant  prize 
ahead  ;  it  fled  from  a  danger  immediately  behind." 


174  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

This  is  equally  true  of  rationalistic  infidelity  and 
atheistic  materialism. 

In  the  darkness  which  surrounds  them,  they  are 
confronted  evermore  by  despair,  by  which,  though 
resisted  again  and  again,  they  must  at  length  be 
overborne.  The  spirit  of  the  times,  so  far  forth  as 
divorced  from  Christ,  is  one  of  spiritual  unrest  and 
despair. 

This  appears  in  literature  and  science,  as  well  as 
in  morals  and  religion.  But  faith,  saving  faith  in 
Christ,  gives  rest — the  rest  of  a  liberated  soul — a 
rest  at  once  intellectual  (for  they  that  do  his  will 
know  of  the  doctrine)  and  spiritual — repose  in  God 
as  a  Father,  in  Christ  as  a  Saviour,  in  the  Holy 
Ghost  as  a  purifier,  in  the  Scriptures  as  the  word  of 
truth  making  wise  unto  salvation.  They  which 
have  believed  do  enter  into  rest. 

In  its  complete  exercise,  then,  as  saving  trust  in 
the  Redeemer  faith  assumes  exalted  prerogative.  It 
commends  to  the  human  reason  the  highest  guide, 
even  the  divine ;  the  loftiest  motives,  even  those 
that  are  infinite  and  eternal ;  an  infallible  rule  for 
belief  and  life,  even  the  inspired  Scriptures  ;  an  Al- 
mighty Saviour,  even  Jesus ;  an  unfailing  witness, 
companion  and  comforter,  even  the  Holy  Ghost. 
By  rightful  prerogative  higher  than  the  human  it 
secures  for  man   all  the  blessings  of  salvation,  and 


FAITH  AND   POSITIVISM,  1/5 

from  man  humble  and  hearty  obedience.  It  prompts 
to  this  obedience  by  presenting  a  faultless  model, 
even  the  perfect  Christ,  tempted  in  all  points  like 
as  we  are,  yet  without  sin,  leaving  us  an  example 
that  we  should  follow  his  steps;  a  divine  friend 
whom  it  behooved  to  be  made  like  unto  his  brethren 
that  he  might  be  a  merciful  and  faithful  high  priest ; 
stooping  to  our  low  estate  that  he  might  redeem  us 
from  the  curse  of  the  law  and  lift  us  with  himself  to 
the  throne  of  his  divine  majesty  ;  encouraging  us  to 
overcome  and  sit  with  him  in  his  throne,  as  he  also 
overcame  and  is  set  down  with  the  Father  in  his 
throne.     Rev.  iii.  21. 

In  the  light  of  revelation,  faith  evermore  cheers 
the  soul  with  divine  promise,  begetting  patience  in 
sorrow,  waiting  for  God  —  strength  in  weakness, 
resting  on  God — courage  in  danger,  trusting  in  God 
— diligence  in  business,  serving  the  Lord — peace,  vic- 
tory even  in  death,  through  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ. 


1/6  FAITH  AND  MODERN  THOUGHT. 


CHAPTER  V. 

ADMISSIONS   OF    PHILOSOPHICAL  SCEPTICISM. 

PHILOSOPHICAL  scepticism,  not  content  with 
-■"  occupying  the  neutral  ground  of  doubt,  prefers 
to  be  polemic.  Studiously  avoiding  the  defensive, 
it  adopts  an  aggressive  policy.  Affecting  the  hau- 
teur of  positivism,  it  boasts  that  along  its  march  lie 
tattered  creeds  and  theologians  slain.  By  this  dia- 
lectic legerdemain  it  has  been  wont  to  divert  critical 
attention  from  itself,  and  impose  the  burden  of  proof 
upon  Christian  theism. 

Christianity  has  never  shirked  the  burden  of 
proof.  The  Master  assumed  it,  as  a  divine  Teacher 
pointing  to  divine  credentials,  saying :  "  Go  and 
show  John  again  those  things  which  ye  do  hear  and 
see :  The  blind  receive  their  sight,  and  the  lame 
walk,  the  lepers  are  cleansed,  and  the  deaf  hear,  the 
dead  are  raised  up,  and  the  poor  have  the  gospel 
preached  to  them  "  (Matt.  xi.  4,  5).  "  The  works 
that  I  do  in  my  Father's  name,  they  bear  witness 
of  me "   (John    x.    25).     "  If  I    do   not   the   works 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  1 7/ 

of  my  Father,  believe  me  not.  But  if  I  do,  though 
ye    believe    not     me,    believe     the    works  "    (John 

X.  37,  38). 

The  apostles,  as  they  proclaimed  the  gospel  of 
Christ,  accepted  the  burden  of  proof.  Peter  declares : 
''  We  have  not  followed   cunningly  devised  fables, 

but  were  eye-witnesses  of  his   majesty.  .  .  . 

The  voice  which  came  from  heaven  we  heard  when 
we  were  with  him  in  the  holy  mount  "  (2  Pet.  i.  16, 
17,  18).  *'  We  speak  that  we  do  know,  and  testify 
that  we  have  seen  "  (John  iii.  1 1).  And  they  charged 
the  disciples,  *'  Be  ready  always  to  give  an  answer 
to  every  man  that  asketh  you  a  reason  of  the  hope 
that  is  in  you  "  (i  Pet.  iii.  15). 

But  while  Christianity,  in  the  spirit  of  the  Mas- 
ter, is  always  ready  to  take  the  burden  of  proof, 
and  frankly  answer  the  inquiries  of  every  candid 
mind,  it  has  a  logical  and  a  moral  right,  after  eigh- 
teen hundred  years  of  recognition  by  the  best  and 
the  most  intelligent  individuals  and  nations — it  has 
a  right  to  claim  the  presumption  in  its  favor,  to 
challenge  the  strength  of  its  modern  adversary,  and 
put  philosophic  scepticism  upon  the  defensive.  The 
inevitable  reply  to  this  challenge  is  the  acknowl- 
edged inability  to  prove  that  there  is  no  God. 
This  acknowledgment,  however  reluctant,  is  uni- 
versal.    The  attempt,  persistent  and   repeated,  has 


178  FAITH  AMD  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

issued  not  in  demonstration,  but  in  denial,  supported 
evermore  by  negative  premises,  like  the  assertion  of 
La  Place,  that  no  God  could  be  seen  within  the 
range  of  his  telescope.  But,  as  every  logician  knows, 
negative  premises  prove  nothing.  The  telescope  of 
La  Place  could  not  survey  the  universe  ;  and  if  it 
could,  yet  would  it  discern  only  material  bodies, 
which  appear  in  space.  God  is  not  such  a  being. 
The  telescope  of  La  Place  could  not  detect  the  mind 
even  of  its  maker,  much  less  of  Him  who  created 
the  heavens  and  the  earth.  Neither  the  telescope 
nor  the  microscope  can  detect  mind  and  thought. 
Such  denials  are  only  argiunenta  ad  ignorantiam. 
This  first  admission  of  philosophical  scepticism  is 
fundamental,  and  reveals  its  essential  weakness,  and 
yields  to  theism  a  matchless  advantage  both  for 
attack  and  for  defence. 

But  the  admission  is  not  exhausted  with  this 
statement.  The  very  attempt  to  prove  that  there  is 
no  God  has  been  rebuked  by  the  school  of  sceptics 
as  unauthorized  and  rash.  The  latest  attempt  of 
this  kind,  that  of  the  intrepid  Dr.  Biichner,  is  re- 
ferred to  by  the  Westminster  Review  (Oct.  1872)  in 
the  following  words  of  friendly,  but  significant  warn- 
ing :  *'  Dr.  Biichner  seems  to  overstep  the  limits  of 
scientific  argument,  in  that  he  endeavors  to  prove 
the  Unknowable  [Herbert  Spencer's  nomenclature] 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  1 79 

to  be  untrue — a  position  which  seems,  on  the  face 
of  it,  to  be  self-contradictory." 

Here,  not  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  but  to 
reHeve  the  mind  of  some  unfledged  sceptic  who  may 
deem  this  warning  gratuitous,  it  may  be  mentioned 
that  Mr.  Spencer  affirms  the  existence  of  the  infi- 
nite, the  unknowable,  as  source  of  all  that  is.  "  The 
ultimate  religious  truth  of  the  highest  possible  cer- 
tainty "  is  ''  that  the  power  which  the  universe  man- 
ifests to  us  is  utterly  inscrutable."  *  And  again  : 
**  Appearance  [manifestation]  without  reality  is 
unthinkable." t  Therefore  "the  inscrutable  power" 
is  *'  a  reality  "  ;  and  still  again,  according  to  Mr. 
Spencer,  "  to  say  that  we*can  not  know  the  absolute 
[or  inscrutable  power]  is,  by  implication,  to  affirm  that 
there  is  an  absolute,"  %  and  more  to  the  same  effect. 

Mr.  Darwin  declares :  "  The  question  whether 
there  exists  a  Creator  and  Ruler  of  the  universe  has 
been  answered  in  the  affirmative  by  the  highest 
intellects  that  have  ever  lived."  Again  he  says  : 
"  An  omniscient  Creator  must  have  foreseen  every 
consequence  which  results  from  the  law  imposed 
by  him "  ;  and  again,  referring  to  natural  laws : 
"  An  omnipotent  and  omniscient  Creator  ordains 
everything  and  foresees  everything."  § 

*  First  Principles,  p.  46.  t  p.  88.  %  p.  91. 

§  Animals  and  Plants  under  Domestication,  Vol.  ii.  p.  431. 


l8o  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT, 

Sir  John  Lubbock,  speaking  of  ^'  The  Origin  of 
Civilization   and   the  Primitive  Condition  of  Man," 
says  :   *'  The  whole   exhibits  one  grand  scheme  of 
progression,     .     .     .     having  for  its  object  the  con- 
tinual manifestation   of  the  design,  the  power,  the 
wisdom,  the  goodness  of  Almighty  God."     Thomas 
Paine  inserts  in  his  creed:  **  I  believe  in  one  God, 
and  no  more,  and  I  hope  for  happiness  beyond  this 
life."  *     "  The  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy  " 
(William    Harris  of  St.  Louis,  editor),   the  modern 
representative   of  the  Hegelian   school  in   America, 
vindicates   Hegel   against    the    charge  of  irreligion, 
"  Not  only  in  not  denying  God,  freedom,  and  immor- 
tality— the  three  cardinal  points  of  religious  faith — 
but  in  affirming  them  as  the  highest  consequences 
of  his  speculations,  rejecting  atheism  and  pantheism 
in  the  clearest  words."     And,  not   to   extend   this 
line   of    admission,    ''  the   new   philosophy,"    in    its 
newest   drift,t  admits — asserts — ''  an  almighty  will, 
whose  very  life  is  idea,  whose  action  produces  time 
and  all  its  facts  and  phenomena     ...     an  uncon- 
scious will  and  idea  which  called  all  creatures  into 
being."     His  system,  like  that   of  his  master,  Scho- 
penhauer, **  starts  from  a  positive  idea  of  the  spirit- 
uality,  and    also    impersonality,    of    an    overruling 

*  See  Frothingham's  "  Beliefs  of  Unbelievers." 
f  Hartmann's  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious. 


ADMISSIONS   OF  SCEPTICISM.  l8l 

power — a  will  ruling  over  all  nature  and  life,"  and 
rejects  with  contempt  the  gross  hypothesis  which 
would  make  matter  originant,  and  reduce  all  things 
to  materialism. 

This  primary  admission  of  philosophical  scep- 
ticism, we  repeat,  is  fundamental,  and  at  once  casts 
suspicion  upon  the  whole  sceptical  superstructure. 

Closely  related  to  this  is  another  admission,  viz., 
the  inherent  weakness  of  philosophical  scepticism. 
Speaking  of  physical  science,  Professor  Tyndall 
says :  "  The  logical  feebleness  of  science  is  not 
sufficiently  borne  in  mind."  "^  And  again  :  "  We 
know  not  the  connection  between  the  body  and 
mind."  f  As  Mivart  has  forcibly  said,  "  Physical 
science,  as  such,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  soul  of 
man,  which  is  hyperphysical,"  :j:  a  fortiori,  we  say,  it 
has  nothing  to  do,  as  such,  with  God  who  is  a 
Spirit,  who  is  before  all  things,  and  by  whom  all 
things  consist.  It  can  not  reach  to  the  question  of 
the  supernatural,  the  question  at  issue.  **  The  su- 
pernatural is  not  to  be  expected  or  looked  for  in 
the  sphere  of  mere  nature."  §  "  No  investigation  of 
natural  laws  can  show  the  conception  of  the  divine 
action   to    be    false."     *'  Physical    science   can    have 

*  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  June  15,  1868. 
f  Eclectic  Magazine,  p.  380,  1869. 
X  p.  303.  §  P-  284. 


1 82  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

nothing  whatever  to  do  with  absolute  or  primary 
creation."  This  point  is  well  stated  by  Baden  Pow- 
ell :  *'  Science  demonstrates  incessant  past  changes, 
and  dimly  points  to  yet  earlier  links  in  a  more  vast 
series  of  developments  of  material  existence  ;  but 
the  idea  of  a  bes^innin^  or  of  creation  in  the  sense 
of  original  operation  of  divine  volition  to  constitute 
nature  and  matter,  is  beyond  the  province  of  physi- 
cal philosophy.''  "^  Mr.  Darwin  says :  "  Our  ignorance 
of  the  laws  of  variation  is  profound."  f 

Comte  proclaimed  that  philosophy  must  be  posi- 
tive, that  is,  leave  no  unknowable  behind  it,  thus 
directly  contradicting  Herbert  Spencer.  But  if  phi- 
losophy ought  to  be  so,  it  can  not  be  so  on  Comte's 
plan — the  plan  of  mere  experience ;  for  no  experi- 
ence can  affirm  with  certainty  that  behind  the 
phenomenal  there  is,  or  is  not,  an  unknown  reality. 
For  philosophical  scepticism  to  deny  or  ridicule,  on 
physical  grounds,  the  doctrine  of  divine  existence 
were  as  illogical  as  for  the  blind  man  to  deny 
the  existence  of  the  sun.  Had  this  admission  not 
been  made  by  Tyndall  and  others,  it  were  no  less 
obvious ;  for  positive  science  in  its  very  nature 
involves  it.  Positive  science  instructs  us  to  advance 
only  so  far  as  we  know.     Mr.  Mill,  its  most  precise 

*  Philosophy  of  Creation,  Essay  iii.  Sec.  4,  p.  480. 
f  Origin  of  Species,  Summary  of  chap.  v. 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  1 83 

and  profound  exponent,  declares  that  we  know  only 
phenomena  ;  that  these  have  no  real   bond  of  con- 
nection ;  that  they  are  only  associated  by  the  know- 
ing soul  as  antecedent  and  sequent ;  that  the  soul 
itself  is  only  a  series  of  feelings  with  no  more  real 
bond  of  connection  than  belongs  to  the  external  phe- 
nomena— mere  antecedence  and  sequence  ;  that  by 
such  an  unreliable  association,  which  such  an  unrelia- 
ble   soul    has     exalted    into   an    unreliable    law    of 
unreliable  induction,  we  know  for  all  things  phenom- 
enal   their    phenomenal    law    may    change    on    this 
phenomenal   planet.       Even    the    phenomenal   soul 
may  undergo  a  like  complete  change  in  its  phenom- 
enal law  of  knowing,  so  that  even  here  what  seems 
to   be,  and    to    be  a   law,  may  not  be,  or   may  be 
reversed  ;     so    that   two    and    two    shall  make    five 
in    mathematics,   two  straight  lines    may  inclose    a 
figure   in  space,  intelligence  become   folly  in   mind, 
and    right   become  wrong  in   morals,  and  why  not, 
with  the  utmost  precision  of  Mr.  Mill's  logic,  a  God 
not  appearing  be  at  the  next  moment  a  God  appear- 
ing?     Or,    to   put    it    on    the    negative    side   more 
strongly  than    Mr.    Mill    could   by  his   phenomenal 
system,  a  God  impossible  be  a  God  possible  !     And 
if  for  this  world  this  is   the  logical  and   inevitable 
resultant  of  positivism,  in  the  prudent  and   precise 
interpretation    of    its   ablest    exponent,   a   fortiori 


1 84  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

it  may  be  for  other  worlds.  By  the  very  constitu- 
tion of  its  system  positivism  deprives  itself  of  the 
possibility  of  making  any,  the  least,  positive  denial 
of  the  question  at  issue  ;  and,  further  still,  its  princi- 
ples (if  they  deserve  the  name)  are  subversive  even 
of  positive  science.  Its  fundamental  premise — 
while  it  is  all  that  mere  sensation  can  furnish,  is, 
in  the  light  of  reason,  positively  unstable  and  self- 
destructive.  ''  All  things  flow,"  said  the  old  Ionic 
positivists ;  but  these  modern  positivists  assert  that 
there  is  nothing  but  the  flow,  and  that  is  only 
a  "possibility  for  sensation,"  and  therefore  may  not 
be  what  it  seems  ;  the  very  consciousness  in  which 
the  seeming  *'  flow  "  appears  is  only  a  flow,  and  may 
not  be  what  it  seems;  and  the  soul  itself  is  a  flow 
of  flowing  feelings.  So  that,  things  are  only  phe- 
nomenal; consciousness  is  only  phenomenal;  the 
soul  is  only  phenomenal.  There  is  nothing  but  the 
flow,  and  that  may  not  be  what  it  seem.s;  indeed,  it 
may  not  be  at  all. 

Can  such  a  fundamental  premise  be  other  than 
self-destructive  ?  Can  such  principles  be  other  than 
subversive  of  "  positive  science  "  ?  Is  not  such  a  sys- 
tem (we  repeat)  by  its  very  constitution  forever  de- 
prived of  the  possibility  of  making  any,  the  least, 
positive  denial  of  the  issue  involved  in  this  discussion  ? 
Besides,  how  reliable  can  be  an  induction  based  upon 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  1 85 

such  a  shifting  ground  ?  We  wonder  not  that  when 
the  possible  sensation  reached  Mr.  Mill's  "  series  of 
feelings "  (for  soul)  that  his  fundamental  premise 
was  silently  stealing  away,  the  despairing  admission 
escaped  his  lips :  "  Faith  in  induction  is  of  slow 
growth."  Alas  !  the  utter  imbecility  and  nescience 
of  positivism  !  Weaker  than  a  broken  reed  to  lean 
upon,  it  is  at  best,  and  only,  a  seeming  reed — "  Only 
this,  and  nothing  more."  Its  appropriate  description 
would  be  a  philosophic  parody  on  Poe's  "  Song  of 
the  Raven."  Is  such  a  system  a  thing  to  be  proud 
of?  Does  it  offer  a  fitting  Hcense  for  dogmatism? 
Above  all,  does  it  authorize  its  votaries  to  indulge 
in  defiance  and  insult  toward  faith  in  God,  the  faith 
of  our  age,  the  faith  of  all  the  ages  ?  If  mere  ante- 
cedence and  sequence  make  up  all  there  is  in  caus- 
ality, then  science  is  a  mere  seeming,  the  absurd 
assertion  that  Tenterden  steeple  is  the  cause  of  Sud- 
bury downs  should  satisfy  the  author  of  Mill's  Logic, 
and  the  reasoning  of  the  peasant  should  take  rank 
with  that  of  the  philosopher.* 

But  the  admission  does  not  exhaust  itself  with 
this  statement.  Still  more  is  implied  in  the  failure 
to  array  science  against  Christian  theism.  In 
almost  every  case — astronomy,  geology,  comparative 
philology,  etc.  —  the  attempt  has  been  made,  and 

*  Mill's  Logic,  i. 


l86  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

the  pre-judged  opposition  trumpeted.  But  uniformly 
has  time  compelled  the  admission  that  true  science  is 
not  hostile  to  true  religion.  Indeed,  since  the  time 
of  Bacon,  science  has  been  the  strong  and  sure  ally 
of  religious  faith ;  stronger  and  surer  as  it  has 
grown  mature.  x\stronomy  has  enlarged  and 
established  the  illustrations  of  eternal  power  and 
wisdom,  until,  as  never  before,  the  heavens  have 
declared  to  man  the  glory  of  God,  and  the  firmament 
has  showed  his  handiwork.  *'  Elegantissima  haecce 
compages  solis,  planetarum,  et  cometarum  (et  stel- 
larum),  non  nisi  consilio  et  dominio.  Entis  cujusdam 
potentis  et  intelligentis  oriri  potuit.  "  ^  Although 
celestial  bodies  moving  through  the  depths  of  illim- 
itable space  have  not  all  regarded  the  scientific  dictate 
of  La  Place,  f  that  all  generated  motion  must  lie 
in  the  same  direction,  yet  they  have  implicitly  re- 
garded a  higher  law  and  Lawgiver ;  so  that  the 
satellite  of  Neptune,  or  of  Uranus,  however  opposite 
its  direction,  has  not  disturbed  the  harmony  of 
celestial  motion.  Suns  and  satellites  now,  as  when 
Newton  wrote  or  David  sung  or  Isaiah  prophesied 
declare  the  glory  of  him  "  who  bringeth  out  their 
host  by  number ;  who  calleth  them  all  by  names  by 
the  greatness  of  his  might,  for  that  he  is  strong  in 

*  Newton's  Principia. 

f  Systerae  du  Monde,  Livre  iv.  chap.  2,  p.  226. 


ADMISSIONS   OF  SCEPTICISM.  1 8/ 

power  ;  not  one  faileth  '  (Isa.  xl.  26).  The  preva- 
lence and  fitness  of  one  simple  but  efficient  law, — the 
law  of  gravitation — has  been  inductively  traced, 
until,  not  by  demonstration,  but  by  progressive 
approach,  it  has  been  declared  and  believed  to  be 
universal ;  as  if  the  universe  were  in  fact  one — 
bound  to  one  centre  by  one  law  ordained  by  one 
supreme  Creator. 

Geology  has  not  only  illustrated,  but  well-nigh 
demonstrated,  tenets  of  religious  faith  held  for  ages 
as  most  exalted  and  far-reaching.  In  all  this  array 
of  scientific  witness  for  religious  faith  there  has  been 
no  speech,  no  language.  No  voice  has  been  heard ; 
but  the  words  (the  expression)  have  gone  forth 
through  all  the  earth  and  to  the  end  of  the  world. 

But  another  scientific  witness  has  recently  offered 
its  testimony  for  religious  faith  through  speech,  in 
language  and  with  a  voice  coming  up  from  all  the 
earth, — the  science  of  comparative  philology.  All 
through  the  Aryan  family,  as  it  has  spread  over  Eu- 
rope and  over  India  from  its  Asiatic  centre  more  than 
five  thousand  years  ago,  religious  faith  has  been 
invariably  and  universally  entertained  and  expressed, 
repeated  and  recorded  in  living  words.  In  the  She- 
mitic  language,  Jehovah  God  has  been  the  sacred 
name  supreme,  borne  everywhere  most  piously  by 
every  member  of  the  whole  Shemitic  family  whether 


1 88  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Chaldean,  Mohammedan,  or  Jew,  whether  in  Asia  or 
Africa,  or  the  Moor-lands  in  Spain,  or  the  Islands  of 
the  Sea.  While  the  remnants  of  the  human  race, 
however  concentrated  or  dispersed,  wherever  wan- 
dering, whether  Basque  or  Finn  or  Tartar  or  Ameri- 
can savage,  have  carried  with  them  the  idea  of  the 
Great  Spirit,  have  believed  in  him  reverently  and 
worshiped,  and  have  piously  transmitted  this  faith 
to  their  children  and  their  children's  children  forever. 

The  science  of  comparative  philology,  in  all  the 
speech  of  earth,  with  myriad  living  voices  and  count- 
less winged  words,  not  only  testifies  for  the  past,  but 
tells  to  the  present  and  to  all  coming  time — tells  of 
faith  in  God.  Mr.  Spencer  has  asserted  a  postulate, 
which  is  fundamental  with  him,  that  invariable  behef 
is  the  highest  possible  test  of  certainty  in  human 
knowledge.  In  his  own  words,  '-The  invariable  ex- 
istence of  a  belief  is  our  sole  warrant  for  every  truth 
of  immediate  consciousness,  for  every  primary  gener- 
alization of  the  truths  of  immediate  consciousness,  for 
every  axiom,  and  for  every  demonstration."  ^  The 
youngest  neophyte  can  easily  apply  Mr.  Spencer's 
postulate  to  the  case  in  hand.  One  thing,  at  least, 
is  evident,  that  there  is  no  conflict  between  true 
science  and  true  faith. 

In  reaching  the  conclusions  to  which  I  have  just 

*  Psychology,  p.  28. 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  1 89 

alluded,  science  has  in  each  direction  pursued  the 
hne  of  induction,  assuming  for  an  invariable  law,  as 
Bacon  did,  the  principle  that  every  effect  must  have 
a  cause,  an  adequate  cause,  and  therefore  the  course 
of  nature  is  uniform  and  constant,  and  the  method 
of  induction  is  valid.  This  is  in  direct  contrast  to 
the  bastard  induction  of  Mill,  which,  as  he  complains, 
is  "  slow  of  acceptance,"  and  should  be  ;  because  it 
can  never  be  reliable,  based  as  it  is  upon  a  baseless 
''possibility  of  sensation,"  which  is  itself  based  upon 
the  baseless  *'  series  of  feelings  "  of  a  baseless  men- 
tal being,  which,  if  it  exist,  according  to  this  use- 
less and  spurious  induction,  "  never  can  be  truly 
known." 

True  science,  following  not  the  false  but  the  true 
Baconian  method  of  induction,  has,  in  its  different 
directions,  reached  these  conclusions  confirming  re- 
ligious faith ;  while  the  great  representatives  of 
science,  Bacon,  Locke,  Newton,  Whitney — not  to 
mention  a  host  of  no  less  worthy  names  which 
throng  the  vast  temple  of  science — really  and  rever- 
ently believe  in  God.  We  recall  Mr.  Darwin's 
testimony,  which  will  be  admitted  as  "  calm  and 
impartial,"  at  least  in  this  direction  :  ''  The  question 
whether  there  exists  a  Creator  and  Ruler  of  the 
universe  has  been  answered  in  the  affirmative  by  the 
hicrhest    intellects  that    have   ever  lived."     To   the 


190  FAITH  AND  MODERN  THOUGHT. 

sceptical  scientist  we  commend  the  most  thorough 
appHcation  of  the  Baconian  method,  "  for,"  in  the 
words  of  its  author,  "  while  the  mind  of  man  looketh 
upon  second  causes  scattered,  it  may  sometimes  rest 
in  them,  and  go  no  farther  ;  but  when  it  beholdeth 
the  chain  of  them,  confederate  and  linked  together, 
it  must  needs  fly  to  Providence  and  Deity." 

We  do  not  notice  materialism  for  the  reason  that 
it  is  not  a  settled  science,  nor  can  it  be,  by  its  very 
nature.  Scientific  knowledge  is  based  upon  con- 
sciousness,— the  consciousness  of  the  knower.  But 
consciousness  testifies  to  the  self  and  the  not-self — 
to  mind  as  knowing,  and  matter  as  known  but  not 
knowing — to  both  as  existing,  and  existing  in  con- 
trast. To  impugn  consciousness  is  to  undermine 
science;  to  discard  the  testimony  of  consciousness  is 
to  destroy  the  possibility  of  science.  I  might  in- 
clude another  reason,  which  may  have  greater  weight 
with  those  who  are  curious  for  anything  in  this 
direction, — the  admission  of  Professor  Huxley:  **  I 
am  no  materialist,  but,  on  the  contrary,  believe 
materialism  to  involve  grave  philosophic  error."  * 
And  yet  another  reason,  which  may  have  still  greater 
weight :  According  to  Professor  Fiske,  who  will  be 
readily  accepted  as  good  authority  by  the  class  just 
referred  to  :    "  Those    who  wish  to  see  materialism, 

*  Physical  Basis  of  Life. 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  IQI 

refuted  by  philosophic  reasoning,  and  not  by  appeals 
to  vulgar  prejudice,  may  be  referred  to  the  latter 
portion  of  Mr.  Spencer's  lately-published  volume  on 
Psychology."  ^ 

In  the  light  of  these  preliminary  admissions  we 
discern  more  clearly  the  appropriateness  of  Pro- 
fessor Tyndall's  *'  Lecture  on  the  Scientific  Use  of 
the  Inaagination,"  before  the  Liverpool  Association, 
and  the  peculiar  force  of  his  statement  :  *'  The  imag- 
ination has  become  the  mightiest  instrument  of  the 
ph)'sical  discoverer  "  ;  and  that  "  by  this  power  we 
can  lighten  the  darkness  which  surrounds  the  world 
of  the  senses " ;  that,  *'  in  much  which  has  been 
recently  said  about  protoplasm  and  life,  there  was 
only  the  outgoings  of  the  same  power."  But,  not 
to  multiply  quotations  :  after  such  statements  by  a 
master  of  exact  science  we  cease  to  wonder  that 
experts  in  positive  philosophy  and  sympathetic 
reporters,  who  nurse  their  scepticism  at  the  neglect 
not  only  of  duty,  but  of  philosophy,  who  proclaim 
the  great  discoveries  of  physical  science  which  they 
do  not  even  comprehend,  and  the  explosion  of  the- 
ology which  they  do  not,  and  will  not  understand, 
would  thus  conceal  the  weakness  of  their  position, 
or  comfort  themselves  by  imaginary  victories. 

*  Letter  of  March  i,  1871,  to  the  New  York  World,  from  Mr. 
John  Fiske,  of  Harvard  University. 


192  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

But  we  turn  to  another  admission, — that  man  is 
a  reHgious  being. 

Of  rationalism  this  is  not  only  the  admission, 
but  the  assertion.  Assuming  as  an  axiom  the  prin- 
ciple of  an  absolute  religion,  which  belongs  to  man's 
nature,  and  as  such  is  common  to  humanity,  ration- 
alism arrays  its  objection  against  a  written  revelation 
as  philosophically  and  practically  irrational  ;  that  no 
external  revelation  can  extend  the  religious  con- 
viction already  universal,  or  improve  the  internal 
revelation  of  God  to  the  soul.  The  Radical  Club 
recently  listened  with  manifest  approbation  to  this 
statement  from  one  of  its  lecturers,  that  "  the  relig- 
ious element  is  one  of  the  strongest  in  the  hum.an 
soul  " — an  admission  offered  as  at  once  an  explana- 
tion and  a  confirmation  of  the  fact  that  **  religious 
controversies  and  wars  have  been  the  most  bitter 
and  deadly  which  the  world  has  ever  known." 

Spinoza,  whom  Dr.  Hedge  styles  the  typical 
exponent  of  pantheism, — Spinoza  taught  the  im- 
manence and  prevalence  and  interfusion  of  God, 
flowing  throughout  the  universe ;  so  that,  in  the 
language  of  one  of  his  interpreters,  '*  All  religions 
ha\'e  windows  that  open  to  those  all-governing 
skies."  Satan  is  expelled  from  the  universe  as  an 
impossibility,  and  all  are  religious,  since,  according 
to  pantheism,  each  beHeves  in  nothing  but  God. 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  1 93 

On  the  other  hand,  Comte,  at  first,  magisterially 
excluded  religion  from  his  positive  system  as  a 
delusion  characterizing  the  childhood  of  the  human 
race  ;  but,  finding  the  sentiment  still  prevalent  and 
persistent,  upon  maturer  reflection  he  supplemented 
positive  science  by  an  elaborate  system  of  religion, 
demanding  for  each  day  two  hours  of  religious  serv- 
ice, with  a  '*  Catechism  of  Positive  Religion  "  and  a 
''  Positivist  Calendar."  * 

While  Mr.  Mill  rejects  Comte's  "  Politique  Posi- 
tive "  as  a  system  of  politics  and  morals,  he  applauds 
his  religious  systems,  but  suggests  as  an  improve- 
ment that  the  "  grand  etre,"  the  divinity  Comte 
would  adore  as  collective  humanity,  we  should  wor- 
ship in  private  adoration  to  woman  as  the  sexeaimant, 
the  proper  representative  of  the  "  grand  etre,"  and, 
whether  dead  or  alive,  "  les  vrais  anges  gardiens." 

Mr.  Spencer  would  rear  his  altar  not  to  collective 
humanity,  but  to  the  unknown  God  ;  where  Mr. 
Huxley  would  unite  with  him  in  worship,  not  per- 
chance with  the  expressiveness  of  Mr.  Mill  in  his 
private  adoration  of  woman,  or  of  Comte  with  the 
public  assembly  of  the  French  positivists  in  the  two 
hours  daily  devotion  to  the  ''  grand  etre,"  or  with 
the  English  positivists  in   the   presence   of  "  coUec- 

*  See  Publications  of  the  English  Branch  of  the  Positive  School 
or,  Publications  of  the  American  Branch. 
9 


194  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

tive  humanity  "  ;  but  Mr.  Spencer  and  Mr.  Huxley, 
apart  from  the  positivist  assembly,  would  unite  in 
higher  worship,  ''for  the  most  part  of  the  silent 
sort." 

Mr.  Froude  tells  us  that  "  God  gave  us  religion, 
although  the  devil  gave  us  theology." 

Mr.  Huxley  speaks  of  the  religious  sentiments  as 
"  the  noblest  and  most  human  of  man's  emotions."  * 
Mr.  Higginson  declares  :  "  The  religion  of  the  heart 
can  never  perish,  because  it  is  a  human  instinct ;  " 
and  he  predicts  that  at  some  time  in  the  future 
**  there  will  meet  in  some  one  of  the  world's  great 
centres  an  oecumenical  council  of  the  human  race, 
drawn  together  by  the  natural  religion  of  the  human 
race — the  religion  of  the  heart."  \ 

I  have  dwelt  the  longer  upon  this  admission  of. 
philosophical  scepticism, — that  man  is  a  religious 
being,  because  it  is  fundamental  toward  theism  and 
significant  of  its  inherent  strength,  in  contrast  with  the 
preliminary  admissions  already  noted  as  significant 
of  the  inherent  weakness  of  scepticism.  All  religions 
lead  to  the  great  question  of  God.  Indeed,  religion 
is,  strictly,  a  recognized  relation  toward  God  and 
dependence  upon  him.  Without  this  the  term  itself 
is  deprived  of  significance.     The  alternative  is  una- 

*  Lay  Sermons,  etc.,  p.  i6. 
f    See  Lectures  at  Horticultural  Hall,  Boston,  January,  1871. 


I 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  I95 

voidable  :  Religious  worship  and  dependence  have  a 
correlative  object,  or  this  '*  strongest  element  in  the 
human  soul,"  this  "  noblest  and  most  human  of  man's 
emotions,"  is  most  false  and  deceptive — a  conclusion 
which  would  not  only  endanger  religion,  but  with  it 
also  endanger  "  positive  philosophy." 

But,  while  philosophical  scepticism,  by  its  own 
admission,  can  not  disprove  the  prevalence  of  the 
religious  sentiment  among  mankind,  it  is  especially 
powerless  to  disprove  the  facts  of  Christian  expe- 
rience. 

This  experience  is  attested  by  the  best  and  the 
wisest  of  each  sex  in  every  clime  and  in  every  age. 
With  the  progress  of  civilization  and  the  growth  of 
intelligence,  the  testimony  accumulates.  Challenged 
to  reply,  philosophical  scepticism  remains  in  self- 
adjudged  silence.  By  its  own  admission  it  has  not 
applied  the  very  test  required  by  its  own  philosophy. 
In  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  it  does  not,  can  not 
claim  to  have  entered  upon  the  ground  of  Christian 
experience,  much  less  to  apply  this  test  to  the  sys- 
tem of  faith,  and  still  less  to  disprove  the  experimen- 
tal argument  which  every  Christian  affirms  for  him- 
self, and  which  the  whole  Christian  world  reaffirms 
with  combined  consciousness  and  sincerity.  This  con- 
cession, it  should  be  observed,  is  by  no  means  gracious, 
but  unavoidable,  and  is,  it  should  be  remembered, 


ig6  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

fundamental  toward  Christianity  as  experimental. 
This  is  not,  indeed,  the  field  of  sense,  where  men  walk 
only  by  sight,  and  live  by  bread  alone.  The  phe- 
nomena are  not  material ;  "  The  kingdom  of  God  is 
not  meat  and  drink  " ;  yet  the  experience  is  no  less 
real,  no  less  intense.  It  is  a  life  which  transcends  the 
life  of  the  animal  as  far  as  "  righteousness  and  peace 
and  joy  in  the  Holy  Ghost "  is  more  exalted  than 
mere  sensual  gratification.  Nor  is  it,  indeed,  the  field 
of  the  understanding,  when  it  judges  merely  accord- 
ing to  sense,  depending  for  its  premises  solely  upon 
observation,  and  thence  deducing  conclusions  by 
dialectical  processes,  which  the  apostle  Paul,  in  the 
light  of  his  Christian  experience,  has  significantly 
styled  "■  vain  philosophy."  Yet  the  knowledge  is  no 
less  satisfying,  no  less  certain.  We  speak  what  we 
do  know.  We  have  not  followed  cunningly  devised 
fables.  Whether  there  be  tongues  they  shall  cease, 
or  knowledge  [phenomenal  knowledge],  it  shall  van- 
ish away  ;  but  "  this  is  life  eternal,  to  know  the  only 
true  God  and  Jesus  Christ  whom  he  hath  sent." 
Within  this  field  of  "  noblest  and  most  human  ex- 
perience," thronged  by  multitudes  of  the  best  and 
wisest  witnesses — within  this  field  physical  science, 
by  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  can  not  enter  ;  and 
here  philosophical  scepticism  can  only  in  silence 
doubt ;  it  can  not  deny ;  and  here  most  forcibly  is  it 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  1 9/ 

reminded  of  Tyndall's  confession  :  "  The  logical 
feebleness  of  physical  science  is  not  sufficiently 
borne  in  mind."  Yet  this  is  only  the  negative 
statement  of  a  fact  self-evident,  that  for  philo- 
sophical scepticism  on  physical  grounds  to  deny  or 
ridicule  religious  experience  is  not  only  feeble,  but 
illogical. 

But  not  to  linger  within  the  field  of  religion  and 
religious  experience  :  in  this  extremity,  philosophical 
scepticism  puts  forth  the  plea  of  reason,  instead  of 
experience, — that  *'  Reason  is  the  only  arbiter  be- 
tween truth  and  falsehood  which  we  are  sure  we 
possess."  Such  is  the  re-statement  of  the  admission 
by  an  authority  no  less  unquestionable  than  the 
Westminster  Review,  and  as  recent  as  October, 
1872  ;  an  admission,  be  it  however  remembered, 
though  so  recent,  yet  by  no  means  novel — an  ad- 
mission, which  it  would  seem  might  win  the  very 
elect,  but  whose  context  warns  of  a  foe  in  the  garb 
of  friendship,  while  it  discourses  thus  upon  "  The 
-Esthetics  of  Physicism  "  :  "  As  reason  must  ever  be 
the  only  medium  by  which  the  truth  can  be  demon- 
strated between  man  and  man,  it  may  be  taken  for 
granted  that  pure  materialism  is  the  only  creed 
which  a  rational  creature  can  adopt."  However  we 
may  regard  the  admission,  it  is  utterly  impossible  to 
accept  the   logic.     Indeed,  we   can   conceive   of  no 


igS  FAITH  AND   MODERN   THOUGHT. 

principle  of  reason  or  process  of  reasoning-  which 
authorizes  the  conclusion  ;  not  even  with  "  the 
possibiHty  for  sensation  "  and  "  the  series  of  feel- 
ings "  (for  soul)  manipulated  by  the  adroit  induction 
of  Mr.  Mill's  logic  that  two  and  two  may  make  five 
and  that  two  straight  lines  may  inclose  a  triangle  ; 
for,  in  the  enthymeme  of  the  Westminster  Review, 
not  only  is  a  premise  wanting  and  the  process  vitia- 
ted by  an  illicit  major,  but  the  very  terms  assumed 
are  lost  from  the  conclusion.  However  we  may  regard 
this  admission,  it  proves  quite  too  much  for  the  pur- 
pose of  "  physicism."  This  appeal  to  reason  as  ar- 
biter we  not  only  accept  as  timely,  but  commend 
as  highly  rational,  if  we  may  be  pardoned  the 
apparent,  but  unreal  pun.  It  is  timely  that  expe- 
rience itself  be  tested,  which  is  possible  only  by  the 
proper  standard  ;  it  is  essential  that  induction  have 
some  reliable  guide,  which  can  only  be  by  the 
application  of  some  authoritative  rule.  We  thank 
our  modern  sceptic  ''  for  that  word," — reason  as  ar- 
biter. True,  it  does  not  harmonize  precisely  with 
the  claim  of  Spencer,  that  "  Experience  is  the  sole 
origin  of  knowledge"  ;  *  or  of  Comte,  that  "  Phys- 
ics is  the  mother  of  all  science."  f  Still,  reason  shall 
be  the  arbiter.  It  may  not  confirm  the  declaration 
of  Schelling  and  Hegel  that  ''Nature  is  petrified 
*  Recent  Discussions,  pp.  119,  167.  f  p.  117. 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  1 99 

intelligence  "  ;  '^  nor  the  opinion  of  the  materialist 
that  mind  is  rarefied  matter.  Still  reason  shall  be 
the  arbiter.  It  may  find  something  to  condemn  m 
Spencer's  definition  of  science,  as  *' an  extension  of 
perceptions  by  means  of  reasoning  "  ;  f  or  the  state- 
ment of  Oken  and  Hegel,  that  "  to  philosophize  on 
nature  is  to  re-think  the  great  thought  of  creation. ";]: 
Yet,  according  to  the  philosophical,  and  at  the  same 
time  sceptical,  Westminster  Review,  "  Reason  is  the 
only  arbiter."  Indeed,  to  our  surprise,  Herbert 
Spencer,  in  a  careful  review  of  Oken  and  Hegel, 
seems  to  recognize  the  same  authority,  and  make  the 
same  appeal.  Condemning  Oken  for  applying  *'  a 
bastard  a  priori  method,"  Spencer  proposes  "  the  le- 
gitimate a  priori  method,  which  sets  out  with  proposi- 
tions of  which  the  negative  is  inconceivable."  There 
is,  then,  an  a  priori  method,  which  is  legitimate  ; 
and,  by  the  admission  and  example  of  Mr.  Spencer, 
in  the  highest  appeal,  ''  reason  shall  be  arbiter." 

We  are  thus,  by  this  combined  admission, 
referred  to  an  authority  which  may  decide  whether 
experience  itself  can  in  any  department  of  phenom- 
ena be  trusted — whether  the  senses  themselves  in 
the  reports  they  bring  us  are  reliable  ;  or  whether 
the  internal  and  the  external  worlds  which  are  thus 
reported  are  unreal  and  illusory,  "  like  an  insubstan- 
*  Recent  Discussions,  p.  169.  \  p.  160.  %  p.  167. 


200  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

tial  pageant."  It  is  evident  that  some  unquestion- 
able authority  must  rule  this  testimony  as  valid,  or 
philosophical  scepticism  will  invade  the  field  of  the 
senses,  and  wrest  even  from  positive  philosophy  all 
assurance,  and  drive  us  into  the  formless  void  of 
nihilism. 

And  beyond  this,  if  bare  facts  and  phenomena 
are  true,  as  the  senses  report,  is  there  nothing  else 
— no  bond  of  connection  to  unite  these  effects  to 
causes,  and  relate  these  phenomena  to  things,  and 
thus  combine  facts  and  forms  and  things  into  worlds, 
and  worlds  into  a  real  universe,  existing  in  space 
and  time  ?  What  shall  decide  whether  this  work  of 
the  understanding  is  valid  or  vain? 

No  experience  has  reached  and  settled  this 
great  question  ;  and  if  there  be  no  other  appeal, 
then  philosophical  scepticism  may  successfully  in- 
vade the  field  of  the  understanding,  and  vitiate  with 
doubt  the  very  process  of  induction.  Without  some 
first  principles,  induction  itself  is  impossible,  and 
neither  experience  nor  understanding  can  avail. 
But  these  first  principles  reason  alone  can  supply. 
Thus  reason,  and  reason  only,  can  guarantee  the 
validity  of  induction  and  deduction,  and  regulate 
experience;  in  a  word,  save  us  from  credulity  on 
the  one  hand,  and  doubt  on  the  other — the  Scylla 
and    Charybdis   which    threaten    every    course    of 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  201 

thought.     Reason,  then,  shall  be  the  arbiter.     While 
we  promptly  pledge  submission  to    its    rulings,  we 
shall  insist  that  philosophical  scepticism,  according 
to  its  own  arrangement,  be  subject  to  the  same  au- 
thority.    If  reason  verify  for  the  sense,  we  will  accept 
it,  even  to  the  utmost  limit  of  physical  science.     If 
it  verify  for  the  understanding,  not  only  ourselves, 
but  positive  philosophy  must  accept  the  verifications 
with  the    authorized  deductions.     And   if  it  verify 
for  itself,  revealing  to  us  in  its  own  light  fundamental 
truths,  reached  by  *'  a  legitimate  a  priori  method  "; 
if  in  morals  it  rule  the  testimony  of  conscience  to  be 
valid,  and  in   religion   assert   the  validity  of  revela- 
tion ;   if  it  discriminate  between  material  and  men- 
tal  phenomena,  and    refer  the    one   to   a   physical, 
the  other  to  a  metaphysical  origin  ;  if  it  relate  effect 
to  cause  and  qualities  to  substance  ;  if  it  affirm  spir- 
itual identity  and  free  personality  and  moral  obliga- 
tion and  the  duties  of  religion,  and  thus  condemn 
philosophical    scepticism    as    not    only  illogical,  but 
also  irrational,  we  are  still  to  abide  by  its  superior 
rulings.     There  is  no  appeal ;    ''  Reason,"  says  the 
Westminster   Review,   *'  is  the    only  arbiter."     Cer- 
tainly, we  respond,  if  reason  can  and  must  verify  for 
the  sense  ;  if  it  can  and  must  verify  for  the  under- 
standing—certainly, it  can  verify  for  itself,  in  its  own 
light  and  by  its  own  authority.     And  were  we  called 
9* 


202  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

upon  to  establish  an  affirmative,  instead  of  consid- 
ering the  admissions  of  philosophic  scepticism,  we 
would  show  that  thus  reason  does  verify  in  the  pre- 
cise particulars  indicated,  and,  having  done  this, 
rest  our  cause.  For,  however  man  becomes  man, 
— whether  by  "  natural  selection,"  "  evolution,"  or 
"  special  creation,"  it  is  but  a  truism  to  assert  that 
man  is  what  he  is,  and  as  such  he  must  be  regarded, 
by  common  consent  of  selectionist,  evolutionist,  and 
creationist,  as  the  highest  being  on  the  earth  ;  as 
such,  his  testimony  must  be  admitted  as  the  high- 
est within  the  same  sphere.  And  further,  since  he 
can  investigate  and  measure  all  things  around  him, 
but  can  not  be  measured  by  them,  so  he  is  philo- 
sophically the  measure  of  all  things.  And  further 
still,  he  alone  takes  testimony  from  all  the  rest, 
which  he  examines  and  pronounces  upon  in  the 
light  of  his  own  reason,  thus  guiding  his  own  testi- 
mony, and  confirming  it  as  the  highest  of  all,  and 
decisive  in  the  field,  of  science  and  philosophy. 
This,  his  own  reason  declares  legitimate,  and  from 
this  decision  of  human  reason  there  can  be  no 
appeal  to  an  inferior  tribunal. 

But  since  the  Westminster  Review,  notwith- 
standing its  admission,  volunteers  its  support  to  Dr. 
Buchner's  theory  of  "  matter  and  force  "  as  *'  all 
that    is,"  and    to    "  materiahsm    as   the    only  creed 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM,  203 

which  a  rational  creature  can  adopt,"  it  is  fitting 
that  we  call  attention  to  other  admissions  of  philo- 
sophic scepticism,  which  have  an  important  bearing 
on  this  discussion. 

Philosophic  scepticism,  be  it  physical  or  meta- 
physical, admits  that,  at  least,  something  is.  Doubt 
is.  This  is  known  by  consciousness.  And  Mr.  Mill 
admits  that  "what  is  known  by  consciousness  is 
known  beyond  the  possibility  of  question,"  "^  and 
that  thus  "  we  know  our  feelings."  But  doubt  is  not 
an  abstraction,  independent  and  unrelated.  Doubt 
is  the  mind  doubting.  It  is  the  mind  which  doubts, 
not  mere  matter.  Already,  by  this  admission,  the 
sceptic  is  borne  beyond  the  control  of  his  own  scep- 
ticism. The  effect  and  the  cause,  that  is,  the  actor 
and  the  act,  both  are  at  once  known  and  affirmed 
by  the  consciousness.  Even  Herbert  Spencer,  with 
singular  precision,  pointing  out  the  divergence  be- 
tween some  of  his  own  views  and  those  of  Comte, 
admits  our  consciousness  of  cause — "a  consciousness 
which  remains  dominant  to  the  last  as  it  was  at  the 
first,"  f  and  declares:  "  The  consciousness  of  cause 
can  be  abolished  only  by  abolishing  consciousness 
itself."  X  The  doubt,  then,  is  accounted  for  by  re- 
ferring it  to  the  doubter.     Thought  and  feeling  and 

*  Logic,  Introduction,  p.  191.  +  Recent  Discussions,  p.  124. 

X  First  Principles,  Sec.  26. 


204  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

volition, — these  appear  in  the  Hght  of  consciousness. 
Reason  and  conscience,  too,  are  known  with  the 
same  conscious  certainty;  and  these  are  accounted 
for  by  referring  them  to  the  same  conscious  mind. 
Mr.  Spencer  admits  "  the  personality  of  which  each 
is  conscious,  and  of  which  the  existence  is  to  each  a 
fact  beyond  all  others  the  most  certain."  * 

But  the  phenomena  around  him  which  bear  no 
resemblance  to  doubt  or  belief,  to  thought  or  feeling 
or  volition  ;  in  a  word,  which  bear  no  resemblance 
to  the  phenomena  of  mind — how  shall  these  be  ac- 
counted for?  Evidently  by  referring  them  to  some- 
thing material,  in  which  they  inhere,  and  which 
produces  them.  These  phenomena  do  not  exist  as 
abstractions,  independent  and  unrelated.  In  the 
irrefutable  assertion  of  Mr.  Spencer,  which  amounts 
to  more  than  an  admission,  "  It  is  rigorously  impos- 
sible to  conceive  that  our  knowledge  is  a  knowledge 
of  appearances  only,  without  at  the  same  time  con- 
ceiving a  reality  of  which  they  are  appearances ;  for 
appearances  without  reality  is  unthinkable."  f  The 
admission,  then,  is  inevitable  that  matter  is,  and 
that  mind  is  ;  or  distinguishing  them  by  whatever 
names,  that  something  is  which  has  material  quali- 
ties,— extension,  figure,  solidity,  weight,  and  measure  ; 
and  that  something  is  which  has  mental  qualities, — 

*  First  Principles,  p.  66.  f  p.  88. 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  20$ 

thought,  feeling,  volition,  reason,  and  conscience. 
By  this  admission  the  sceptic  is  borne  beyond  the 
control  of  his  own  scepticism.  But  these  material 
things — how  are  they  accounted  for  ?  By  a  reason 
in  or  out  of  themselves  ?  And  the  doubting  mind — 
how  shall  this  be  accounted  for  ?  By  a  reason  within 
or  without  itself?  For  even  Mr.  Darwin  admits  not 
only  that  mind — finite  mind — is,  but  also  that  it  has 
not  always  been ;  an  admission  which  history  ap- 
proves and  geology  confirms.  Must  there  have  been 
a  super-cosmical  mind,  as  the  cause  or  origin  ?  Why 
the  demand  that  qualities  be  related  to  some  sub- 
stance as  inherent — a  demand  which  common  sense 
makes,  and  forever  speaks  ?  Nothing  but  a  thinking 
soul  would  raise  such  a  question,  or  could  answer  it. 
The  mind  for  itself  sees  what  reason  affirms  and 
consciousness  reveals,  that  mental  qualities,  e.  g., 
thought,  feeling,  volition,  inhere  in  mental  substance. 
A  like  demand  is  made  that  material  quahties  be 
related  to  some  substance  as  inherent.  These 
special  questions  concerning  quality  and  substance, 
effect  and  cause,  and  the  all-embracing  questions. 
Whence?  and  How?  and  Why?  are  not  peculiar  to 
the  metaphysician  and  theologian.  They  are  no  less 
common  and  urgent  among  the  scientists  and  phi- 
losophers, even  the  most  positive  of  the  positivists. 


206  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

The  intrepid  Buchner  *  not  only  raises  these  ques- 
tions ;  but  in  Part  I.  claims  to  answer  the  question 
Whence  do  we  come  ?  in  Part  II.,  Who  are  we?  in 
Part  III.,  Whither  do  we  go?  In  the  first  and 
second  Parts  he  modestly  claims  to  "  solve  the  great 
mystery  of  existence  "  ! 

Theoretically,  indeed,  as  we  are  reassured,  these 
inquiries  are  magisterially  forbidden.  But  the 
irrepressible  questions  will  not  down  at  the  bidding. 
Theory  is  powerless  here.  Practically  these  ques- 
tions are  indulged  ;  in  fact,  they  are  continuously 
repeated.  What  are  the  phenomena?  is  the  clamor- 
ous demand  of  positive  science  ;  and  whence  ?  from 
force  or  volition  ?  from  matter,  or  from  mind  ?  and 
how  ?  in  correlation  and  conservation,  or  in  persist- 
ence and  distinction  ?  by  the  law  of  evolution, — the 
heterogeneous  evolving  from  the  homogeneous  ?  or 
by  the  contrary  process, — the  heterogeneous  appear- 
ing according  to  intelligent  prevision  and  superin- 
tendence ?  Are  all  phenomena  the  manifestation 
of  forces?  And  if  so,  are  these  forces  correlative 
and  convertible?  And  if  so,  is  matter  force,  or  is  it 
motion  ?  And  which  is  first,  force  or  motion  ?  And 
if  matter  is  either,  what  is  force  ?  or  what  is  motion  ? 
and  whence  is  it  ?  And  if  matter  is  neither,  what  is 
it  ?     And  which  is  first,  matter  or  force  or  motion  ? 

*  Place  of  Man  in  Nature. 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  20/ 

While  such  questions  of  positive  science  are 
ceaselessly  recurring,  until  they  burden  the  press 
and  the  public,  it  will  not  do  for  philosophical  scep- 
ticism to  pretend  disapprobation  or  contempt  of 
such  inquiries,  as  if  they  were  unauthorized  or  unim- 
portant. The  admission  is  as  full  as  if  it  were  for- 
mal. This  admission  is,  at  the  same  time,  confirmed 
and  extended  by  the  varied,  but  unsatisfactory, 
attempts  of  philosophy  to  answer  these  profound 
questions.  What?  and  Whence?  and  How?  and 
Why  ?  questions  which  are  at  once  fundamental  to 
all  science  and  native  to  all  minds.  Philosophical 
theories  have  been  elaborated  and  multiplied  and 
modified,  until  imitation  has  seemed  unconscious, 
and  the  old  faintly  or  fully  reappears  in  the  new, 
and  originality,  if  longer  possible,  seems  no  longer 
certain.  As  we  may  have  occasion  to  refer  to  some 
of  these  theories  shrewdly  labeled  "  modern,"  and 
presented  by  the  "  new  philosophy  "  as  original,  and 
industriously  paraded  as  triumphs  of  recent  discov- 
ery, it  may  be  well  to  mention  some  of  the  earlier 
theories.  Even  a  brief  mention  will  prepare  us 
somewhat  the  better  to  recognize  old  forms  in  new 
faces.  There  is  the  theory  that  all  things  came  by 
chance,  and  then  that  all  things  are  by  fate  ;  that 
even  God  can  not  be  God  since  he  must  be  con- 
trolled by  fate. 


208  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

The  atomic  theory  of  Democritus.  or  Moschus, 
that  atoms  by  fortuitous  concurrence  form  this  intri- 
cate and  orderly  mechanism  of  man,  and  the  no  less 
intricate  and  orderly  universe  of  worlds. 

The  hylopathian  theory  of  Anaximander,  that 
there  are  phenomena  or  qualities,  but  there  is  no  sub- 
stance ;  that  these  qualities  are  real,  yet  originating 
from  nothing  ;  and  that  this  dead  matter,  this  chaos 
of  insubstantial  yet  real  qualities,  issued  in  an  orderly 
arrangement  of  organic  and  inorganic  beings  and 
worlds  and  systems,  and  a  universe  evolving  life  and 
mind  and  spirit. 

The  hylozoic  theory,  differing  from  the  former 
not  in  making  matter  the  source  of  all  things,  but  in 
"  ascribing  latent  life  and  understanding  to  the  dead 
matter." 

I  might  omit  the  mention  of  the  homoeomery  of 
Anaxagoras,  who  sought  to  avoid  the  absurdity  of 
producing  phenomena  from  nothing,  or  qualities 
without  substance,  and  therefore  supposed  that  the 
atoms  of  Democritus  '*  were  originally  endued  with 
all  those  forms  and  qualities  that  are  vulgarly  con- 
ceived to  be  in  bodies,  some  bony,  some  fleshy 
some  fiery,  some  watery,  some  white,  some  black, 
some  bitter,  some  sweet,  and  the  like."  I  might 
omit  the  mention  of  homoeomery,  since  Anaxagoras 
himself  was  a  theist,  at  least  not  an  atheist,  and 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  209 

taught  that  an  eternal  mind  fashioned  the  eternal 
matter.  But  this  theory  has  been  perverted  to  the 
service  of  atheism,  and,  contrary  to  the  intention  of 
its  author,  has  been  made  to  deny  the  existence 
of  God. 

The  theory  of  Parmenides  (whom  some  theis- 
tic  apologists  have  vindicated  from  the  charge  of 
atheism),  the  theory  partly  true  and  partly  false, 
that,  *'  as  something  could  not  come  from  nothing, 
therefore  creation,  [absolute  origination]  was  im- 
possible " — a  theory  which  has  been  suborned  to 
deny  the  existence  of  God  ;  though,  if  unbribed  by 
atheism,  and  uninfluenced  by  a  false  theory  of  crea- 
tion, it  would  testify  for  God  as  Creator,  and  most 
consistently  with  the  true  view  of  creation. 

The  theory  of  Empedocles,  that  hyle  or  rudiment- 
ary matter  was  increate  and  indestructible.  How- 
ever this  theory  has  been  perverted,  yet  Empedocles 
repudiated  atheism. 

Another  theory,  like  the  Ionic,  taught  that  all 
things  flow  without  a  guide  or  governor  to  regulate 
the  ceaseless  movement ;  yet,  unlike  the  Ionic, 
that  not  natural  forces,  resulting  in  motion,  but  fire 
penetrated  and  subdued  all  things  unto  restless 
commotion. 

The  theory  of  Protagoras,  that  whether  there  is  a 
real  world  which  all  in  common  may  know  as  existing 


210  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

is  wholly  uncertain,  since  there  is  nothing  in  the 
consciousness  but  sensations  which  are  ever  chang-. 
ing  and  transitory.  Man  is  the  measure  of  all  things, 
but  only  for  himself,  and  not  for  another.  In  this, 
the  self-styled  modern  theory  of  Mr.  Mill  may  see 
itself  reflected.  Such  a  theory  would  be  too  narrow 
and  fluctuating  for  establishing  even  a  physical 
science,  much  less  a  science  of  the  human  mind  or 
of  God  —  a  psychology  or  theology.  While  the 
one  theory  referred  all  things  to  fire,  another  as- 
cribed all  things  to  water,  and  still  another  attrib- 
uted all  things  to  air  as  first  mover  in  producing  a 
universe. 

Thus  has  the  atheistic  (or  non-theistic)  adven- 
turer in  his  chaotic  realm  of  speculation  been  relent- 
lessly tossed,  fleeing  now  from  the  tempest  of  wind, 
and  now  from  the  fiercer  tempest  of  w^ater,  and  anon 
from  the  still  fiercer  tempest  of  fire,  only  to  plunge 
into  the  fortuitous  whirl  of  the  restless  atoms  of  a 
universe — the  sport  of  capricious  chance,  or  the  vic- 
tim of  blind  and  pitiless  fate. 

Such  labored,  confused,  and  unsatisfactory  the- 
ories— of  which  I  have  presented  only  a  specimen — 
imply  the  admission  of  a  demand,  which  even  the 
atheist  can  not  resist,  to  account  for  the  existence 
and  order  and  design  of  himself  and  the  universe  ; 
to  seek,  unintentionally,  for  the  Author  and  Disposer 


ADMISSIONS   OF  SCEPTICISM.  211 

of  all  things  ;  in  the  simple  but  significant  language 
of  Scripture,  to  ''  seek  the  Lord,  if  haply  they 
might  feel  after  him,  and  find  him,  though  he  be  not 
far  from  every  one  of  us  ;  for  in  him  we  live  and 
move  and  have  our  being." 

Lucretius,  with  logical  dexterity  equaled  only  by 
the  Westminster  Review  in  its  defence  of  Dr.  Buch- 
ner,  denied  that  anything  could  have  been  made  for 
intended  use,  for  the  thing  must  exist  before  the  use. 
Hence  he  says  there  is  no  such  thing  as  antecedent 
knowledge  doing  anything  by  intention.  Such  logi- 
cal adroitness  could  as  well  dispense  with  principle 
or  premise,  and  at  once  assume  the  desired  conclu- 
sion. It  would  not  only  abbreviate,  but  improve  the 
process. 

Hobbes  and  the  French  atheists  assert  that 
there  is  no  higher  power  than  the  forces  of  nature, 
and  assume  that  the  ideal  element  of  thought,  of 
being,  of  power,  of  cause,  and  of  nature  is  identical, 
and  therefore  attribute  to  the  material  forces  of 
the  material  universe  what  the  theist  attributes  to 
the  supreme  intelligence. 

Others,  as  Bruno,  Hegel,  and  Schelling,  maintain 
that  God  is  only  the  principles  and  laws  of  the  uni- 
verse ;  that  the  universe  is  thus  a  sort  of  self-existing 
and  self-developing  organism. 

Others,  as  Spinoza,  hold  that,  "  prior  to  the  crea- 


212  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

tion  of  the  world  God  was  not  God  :  he  was  what  he 
was  ;  that  God  and  all  things  are  one  and  the  same  ; 
that  beside  God  no  substance  can  be  or  be  consid- 
ered ;  that  God  in  the  evolution  of  the  material  and 
spiritual  is  the  absolute  Spirit ;  that  this  Spirit  be- 
comes objective  to  itself  in  nature,  and  returns  to 
itself  through  the  human  spirit;  that  God  becomes 
self-conscious  in  man." 

Lucretius  denied  the  possibility  of  final  cause. 
These  deny  the  possibility  of  miracle. 

Antiquated  sceptical  theories  have  been  repro- 
duced, sometimes  with,  sometimes  without,  modern 
modification. 

"  Gemmules  infinitely  numerous  and  infinitely 
minute,"  which  no  human  vision  or  skill  of  science 
has  ever  detected — ''  gemmules  "  have  been  sug- 
gested, and  *' pangenesis,  "  and  ''natural  selection 
and  sexual,"  to  account  for  the  origin  of  species  and 
the  descent  of  man.  This  theory,  embalmed  and  for 
twenty  centuries  enjoying  undisturbed  repose, 
scarcely  introduced  to  the  modern  world,  and  by  no 
means  established — this  theory  has  been  seized  upon 
by  the  eager  sceptic,  apparently  longing  for  some 
demonstration  of  his  near  kinship  with  the  ape,  and 
of  his  more  distant,  but  unbroken  relation  to  the 
Ascidian,  and  with  undisguised  satisfaction  has  been 
pressed  into  the  service  of  philosophical  scepticism, 


ADMISSIONS   OF  SCEPTICISM.  213 

with  persistent  obliviousness  of  Mr.  Darwin's  admis- 
sion that  "  animals  have  descended  from  at  most 
four  or  five  progenitors,  and  plants  from  an  equal  or 
lesser  number  ;  life  with  its  several  powers,  having 
been  originally  breathed  by  the  Creator  into  a  few 
forms  or  into  one."  "^ 

The  hypothesis  of  "  natural  and  sexual  selection," 
even  if  established,  could  not  be  decisive  of  the  great 
issue  involved  in  this  discussion.  There  would  re- 
main the  question  of  origin  to  settle.  For  the  sake 
of  argument,  if  we  admit  Darwin's  theory  that  man 
descends  (is  developed)  from  the  monkey,  differing 
only  in  degree,  that  the  ape  descends  from  something 
lower,  and  lower,  and  lower  still,  until  we  reach  blank 
matter,  like  the  stock  or  the  stone  ;  yet,  since  man 
has  the  highest  authority  of  anything  in  the  domain 
of  nature  as  he  is  the  highest  development,  and 
since  man  is  by  this  theory  as  strictly  nature  as  the 
stock  or  the  stone,  the  testimony  of  man's  inner 
voice  or  reason  must  be  paramount.  What  is  this 
testimony?  Is  it  for  or  against  the  supernatural? 
Evidently  for  it.  All  history,  religions,  literatures, 
languages  prove  this.  All  these  have  recognized  the 
supernatural.  We  have  the  thoughts  and  the  words 
and  the  worship,  the  systems  and  the  practice  of  all 
the  past  in  evidence  on  this  point.     We  know  not 

*  Origin  of  Species,  p.  569,  quoted  by  Mivart,  p.  292. 


214  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

but  other  things,  could  they  speak,  would  give  the 
same  testimony.  We  know  that  man  —  rational 
man — everywhere  and  in  all  the  ages,  gives  this 
testimony.  This  is  one  horn  of  the  dilemma.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Darwin  admits  that  man  dif- 
fers from  animals  and  things  not  only  in  degree,  but 
in  kind  (as  we  affirm,  for  man  is  person,  not  thing), 
then  man  is  supernatural — then  he  is  miraculous  in 
his  origin  and  supernatural  in  his  testimony.  This 
is  the  other  horn  of  the  dilemma.  According  to  the 
one,  nature  (if  man  and  all  is  nature)  turns  state's 
evidence  against  Darwin  as  soon  as  it  can  speak  (e.g. 
as  a  man),  and  by  its  own  united  voice  declares  a 
Supernatural,  to  be  worshiped,  feared,  and  obeyed. 
According  to  the  other,  the  testimony  itself  is  ra- 
tional— supernatural,  as  well  as  witness  for  the 
supernatural. 

But  the  theory  of  ''  gemmules  infinitely  numerous 
and  infinitely  minute."  What  are  these,  and  whence, 
and  how?  Does  the  ''exact  science"  positively 
know  that  they  are  ''  infinitely  minute  ?  "  How  can 
we  know  them,  if  they  are  infinitely  minute  ?  How, 
especially  when  the  *'  positive  science  "  declares  as  a 
"■  first  principle  "  that  we  can  not  know  the  infinite  ? 
And  if,  according  to  such  a  ''  first  principle,"  we  can 
not  know  a  single  "gemmule,"  because  it  is  "  infi- 
nitely minute,"  how  can  we  know  that  one  exists  ; 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM  21  5 

and  how  especially,  that  they  are  '*  infinitely  numer- 
ous ?  "  This  obvious  criticism  concerns  at  least  the 
sceptic  who  would  avail  himself  of  this  theory  to 
dispense  with  a  Creator.  I  know  it  is  said  that 
'*  gemmules  multiply  by  fission  "  ''^  and  to  confirm 
this  it  is  asserted  that  "  Thuret  has  seen  the  zoospore 
of  an  alga  divide  itself,  and  both  halves  germinate." 
But  how  does  this  reach  the  difficulty  unless  the 
zoospore  be  a  gemmule  ?  And  if  it  be,  then  the  dif- 
ficulty increases,  since  we  are  required  not  only  to 
know  a  "  gemmule,"  which  is  "  infinitely  minute," 
but  also  to  know  "  both  halves  "  of  the  infinitely 
minute  gemmule !  To  make  the  point  clearer  for 
the  scepticism  which  would  adopt  this  theory,  Pro- 
fessor Delpino  has  arranged  this  convenient  formula  : 
**  The  existence  of  the  gemmules  is  a  first  unknown 
element  ;  the  propagative  affinity  of  the  gemmules 
is  a  second  ;  their  germinative  affinity  is  a  third  ; 
their  multiplication  by  fission  is  a  fourth, — and  what 
an  unknown  element !  " 

'*  Physical  units "  have  been  proposed,  "  with 
mysterious  powers  of  producing  and  reproducing 
organisms."  Atomism,  hylozoism,  and  hylopathian- 
ism  of  the  pagan  period,  with  the  increate  and  inde- 
structible forces  of  Empedocles,  have  been  severally 
recalled    in  our    day,  and  merged    into    ''  evolution 

*  Scientific  Opinion,  Oct.  13,  1869,  p.  408,  quoted  by  Mivart,  p.  231. 


2l6  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

and  correlated  forces,"  and,  bearing  this  new  name 
upon  their  modern  frontlet,  have  been  hailed  as  the 
climax  of  modern  scientific  discovery — the  veriest 
wonder  of  the  nineteenth  century.  This  admiration 
of  the  "  younger  naturalists,"  as  Professor  Youmans 
patronizingly  puts  it,  may  be  deserved.  To  ques- 
tion its  propriety  is  not  our  province  nor  our  purpose. 
Of  the  valid  advances  in  this  direction  we  would  not 
withhold  our  own  admiration,  nor  refuse  our  hearty 
assent  to  authorized  conclusions  ;  but  we  protest 
against  the  crude  haste  displayed  in  the  effort  to 
array  the  doctrine  of  the  *'  conservation  of  forces  " 
against  theism,  and  to  thrust  evolution  into  the 
false  attitude  of  atheism. 

Suppose  matter  itself  in  its  final  analysis  is  force, 
as  some  of  our  most  profound  and  philosophic  the- 
ists  have  held  and  taught.  Then,  certainly,  upon 
any  well-defined  and  consistent  view  of  creation, 
there  is,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  a  conserva- 
tion of  forces. 

Suppose  all  the  primary  forces  which  constitute 
elemental  matter  are  ultimately  reducible  to  ''  grav- 
ity and  heat,"  or  ''the  antagonistic  and  diremptive," 
or  "  the  centripetal  and  the  centrifugal,"  or  "  the 
potential  and  the  actual."  Does  this  thorough  anal- 
ysis array  the  doctrine  of  forces  against  theism  ? 
Certainly  not.     Some  of  our  ablest  theologians  have 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  21/ 

insisted  upon  this  very  analysis,  anticipating  Mr. 
Spencer  and  his  disciples  both  in  the  classification 
and  the  conservation  of  forces. 

But  "the  correlation  of  forces,"  it  is  sometimes 
defiantly  demanded — does  not  this  disprove  theism  ? 
It  may,  according  to  the  logical  rules  of  the  objec- 
tor ;  but  not  according  to  the  logical  rules  of  Aris- 
totle and  Bacon,  of  Hamilton  and  Mill,  not  according 
to  the  ordinary  process  of  induction  or  deduction. 
If  the  forces,  when  they  are  gravity  and  heat,  do 
not  disprove  theism,  it  is  difficult  to  understand 
how,  by  any  known  logic,  they  can  disprove  theism 
when  they  become  correlated  or  converted  into  heat 
and  gravity.  Thus  far  we  have  referred  to  material 
forces  only.  Whether  all  the  forces  which  are  im- 
plied in  a  living  body  may.  be  correlated  or  converted 
into  gravity  and  heat  in  a  lifeless  body — whether  all 
the  forces  which  are  implied  in  an  organic,  living, 
thinking  man  may  be  correlated  or  converted  into 
gravity  and  heat  of  an  unthinking,  lifeless,  inorganic 
stock  or  stone  may,  at  least  a  httle  longer,  remain 
an  open  question.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  mature  and  earnest  champions  of  the  doctrine 
of  "  conservation  and  correlation  of  forces  "  admit 
that  entire  correlation  is  an  open  question.  Even 
Professor  Barker,  incidentally,  and  so  the  more 
strongly,   admits    this   very   state    of  the    question : 

lO 


2l8  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

*'  Can  we  longer  refuse  to  believe  that  even  thought 
is  in  some  mysterious  way  correlated  to  the  other 
natural  forces  ?  And  this  even  in  face  of  the  fact 
that  it  [thought]  has  never  been  measured?"  Sci- 
entists, then,  know  of  no  way  in  which  thought  and 
material  force  can  be  correlated  ;  they  can  not  weigh 
nor  measure  thought?  Is  not  this,  then,  an  open 
question?  We  commend  the  question  to  ''positive 
science,"  as  one  which  deserves  and  demands  addi- 
tional (scientific)  research.  And  we  suggest  to  the 
eager  philosophic  sceptic  impatient  to  publish  the 
decisive  oracle  to  the  long-desired  confusion  of  the- 
ism, that  he  cultivate  patience,  lest  he  run  upon  a 
fool's  errand. 

At  the  scientific  reunion  in  Inspriick,  M.  Mayer, 
a  prominent  physicist  of  Germany,  who  has  directed 
especial  investigation  to  the  correlation  of  forces, 
made  an  address.  Repudiating  the  hypothesis  that 
thought  is  only  a  form  of  chemical  force,  and  cog- 
nition the  result  of  free  phosphorus  in  the  brain,  he 
declared  it  "  a  great  error  to  identify  molecular 
activity  and  intellectual  action,  which  may  be  paral- 
lel, but  are  not  identical.  As  what  the  telegraph 
says — the  contents  of  the  dispatch — could  never  be 
regarded  as  a  function  of  the  electro-chemical  action, 
.  .  .  so  the  brain  is  only  the  machine.  It  is 
not  thought ;  intelligence,  which  is  not   a  part  of 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  219 

sensible  things,  can  not  be  submitted  to  the  investi- 
gations of  the  physicist  and  anatomist."  In  the 
mean  time,  let  the  eager  philosophic  sceptic  care- 
fully consider  his  logic,  lest,  if  the  oracle  announce 
correlation  of  forces  as  demonstrable,  the  atheistic 
herald  even  then  should  run  upon  a  fool's  errand. 
The  question  of  forces,  their  conservation  and  corre- 
lation and  analysis,  falls  far  within  the  comprehensive 
question  involved  in  this  discussion, — the  question 
of  a  God  and  of  faith  in  God. 

These  are  but  a  itw  of  the  many  theories  pro- 
posed to  account  for  and  explain  the  system  of 
things.  In  these  manifold  and  diverse  theories,  old 
and  new,  and  old  renewed,  there  is  involved  not  only 
an  admission  of  the  importance  and  difficulty  of 
answering  these  great  questions  of  the  soul,  but  also 
the  admission  of  inherent  weakness  in  the  theories 
themselves.  They  are  mere  hypotheses.  Even  the 
very  positive  Westminster  Review  (Oct.,  1872)  says 
of  Darwin's  theory:  "The  case  of  man's  descent 
does  not  yet  admit  of  proof.  The  same  may  be  said 
of  the  origin  of  any  other  species,  of  Darwin's  hy- 
pothesis in  general,  and  of  the  hypothesis  of  special 
creations  which  it  denies." 

La  Place,  while  he  would  dispense  with  the  theism 
of  Newton — La  Place,  bold  among  the  boldest 
scientific    investigators,   offers    his    "  Exposition    du 


220  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Systeme  du  Monde  "  as  an  hypothesis,  and  as  such 
presents  it  with  becoming  diffidence  :  ''  Je  presente 
avec  la  defiance  que  doit  inspirer  tout  ce  qui  n'est 
point  un  resultat  de  Tobservation,  ou  du  calcul." 
But  not  only  are  these  theories  of  "  exact"  science 
mere  hypotheses  concerning  the  questions  at  issue  ; 
they  are  made,  it  should  be  remembered,  with  the 
provisional  admission  that  '*  science  can  not  find  a 
first  cause."  "^  Whatever  science  may  answer  to  the 
soul's  irrepressible  and  comprehensive  challenge,  it 
refers  to  method  only,  not  to  origin.  Transcending, 
as  well  as  comprehending,  the  field  of  its  investi- 
gations are  evermore  the  questions,  Whence  ?  and 
Why?  The  positive  philosophy  affirms  truly,  and 
must  perpetually  affirm  :  **  Science  can  not  find 
a  first  cause."  Science  evermore  traces,  and  can 
only  trace,  the  manifestations  of  the  first  cause. 
Whatever  it  be — material  or  spiritual — science  stu- 
diously traces  the  manifestations  of  the  first  cause 
in  the  order  or  law  which  it  discovers,  and  which  it 
seeks  to  generalize.  Retracing  specific  to  more 
general  laws,  it  classifies  evermore  in  higher  and 
still  higher  generalizations,  steadily  extending  its 
knowledge  as  it  reaches  a  larger  unit.  This  it  makes 
the  point  of  a  new  departure,  forever  asking,  What 

*  Comte. 


ADMISSIONS  OF  SCEPTICISM.  221 

is?  and  the  higher  question,  How  ?  or  in  what  order, 
or  by  what  law  it  is. 

And  here,  at  length,  we  reach  the  comprehensive 
admission  that  science  seeks  to  trace  all  effects  to 
unity — that  philosophy  would  unify  its  knowledge  by 
retracing  all  phenomena  to  one  common  origin. 
Each  particular  science  seeks  this  unity  for  itself, 
and  "  universal  science  seeks  after  absolute  unity." 
To  this  ultimate  result  all  its  processes  tend.  To 
seek  this  unification  it  is  authorized  ;  nay,  it  is  com- 
pelled. It  is  claimed,  on  the  one  hand,  that  this 
final  unification  may  consist  in  matter,  and  not  in 
mind;  that  matter  exists  by  a  reason  in  itself;  and 
that  matter  is  the  beginning,  the  originator.  But 
how  do  we  get  a  notion  of  any  beginning  ?  Is  it  not 
by  the  power  (the  energy)  of  our  own  minds  putting 
forth  new  activities,  producing  effects,  originating 
phenomena?  What,  we  ask,  is  matter,  that  it  should 
be  the  originator,  the  beginning?  Does  scepticism 
reply,  "  It  is  force  "  ?  Again  we  ask.  Is  force  an  ab- 
straction, independent  and  unrelated  ?  Does  not 
force  itself  originate  in  mind  ? 

These  and  similar  questions  confront  the  theory 
of  materialistic  unity. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  claimed  that  multiplicity 
in  the  universe  may  be  reduced  to  pantheistic  unity  ; 
that  there  is  not  only  theism,  but   pantheism.     God 


222  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

is  all,  and  all  is  God.  But,  as  no  one  else  will  believe 
that  the  pantheist  is  God,  and  as  each  knows  for 
himself  that  he  is  not  God,  the  excess  of  pantheistic 
admission  is  apparent. 

The  fault  is  not  in  the  attempt  at  unification  ;  for 
this  is  unavoidable.  Atheist,  pantheist,  and  theist, 
materialist  and  spiritualist,  are  alike  compelled  to  it 
by  the  very  law  of  thought.  The  admission  is  inevi- 
table. The  fault  lies  in  the  principle  and  the  process 
of  unifying.  Is  the  principle  right  ?  Is  the  process 
broad  enough  ?  Here  is  the  point  of  divergence. 
Which  is  the  true  course?  Which  is  the  false? 
These  questions  remain  to  be  considered. 


MODERN   THOUGHT,  223 


I 


CHAPTER  VI. 

MODERN   THOUGHT. 

IN  the  strife  of  theories,  both  science  and  faith 
should  be  saved  from  confusion.  Carefully,  at 
least,  if  not  repeatedly,  should  we  take  our  bearings, 
that  we  may  better  detect  the  drift  of  modern 
thought,  and  distinguish  the  course  of  false  thinking 
from  that  of  the  true. 

At  the  outset,  it  is  obvious  to  remark,  but  it  is 
important  to  remember,  that  thought  has  its  laws  as 
fixed  as  those  of  material  nature — perhaps  compre- 
hending the  laws  of  nature  and  confirming  the  laws 
of  faith. 

The  primary  law  of  thought  is  the  recognition  of 
existence  ;  the  existence  of  the  thinker,  and  then  of 
the  act  of  thinking  as  involving  content.  This  is 
illustrated  by  the  proposition  cogito,  expressing  the 
simplest  judgment.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of 
Descartes'  familiar  enthymeme,  cogito  ergo  sum,  to 
which  we  do  not  refer,  the  proposition  cogito  (I 
think),  illustrates  this  primary  law  which  thought  im- 
plicitly follows  in  the  simplest  judgment,  /^;;2  think- 


224  FAITH  AND  MODERN  THOUGHT. 

ing.  In  the  simplest  and  earliest  thought,  then, 
there  is  by  inevitable  law  the  consciousness  of  ex- 
istence and  action — of  the  thinker  thinking. 

But  more  than  this,  there  can  not  be  thought 
without  content,  and  the  primary  law  involves  this, 
that  in  every  thought  there  shall  be  the  thinker,  the 
thinking,  and  the  theme ;  the  agent  and  the  content, 
the  subject  and  the  object,  to  both  of  which  the 
thinking  relates.  This  primary  law  is  so  compre- 
hensive that  if  the  mere  phenomena  seem  to  furnish 
the  content,  the  law  is  not  satisfied.  It  claims  more 
than  this,  viz.  some  substance  underlying  the  phe- 
nomena, as  well  as  some  person  originating  the  act 
of  thinking.  So  scrupulous  is  this  fundamental  law 
of  thought,  in  each  direction  requiring  reality,  imply- 
ing that  there  can  not  be  an  appearing  or  manifesting 
without  some  thing  which  furnishes  the  appearance 
or  manifestation.  Even  Herbert  Spencer  admits, 
asserts  this,  to  the  confusion  of  Comte  and  Mill  and 
Lewes  and  all  mere  phenomenalists.  There  must  be 
a  seeing  self  or  mind  as  well  as  an  object  seen.  For 
example,  a  sensation  or  impression  can  not  be,  unless 
there  be  something  to  produce  the  sensation  or  im- 
pression ;  and  more,  something  to  cognize  the  im- 
pression or  sensation.  Without  a  mind  to  receive, 
there  could  be  no  appearing  in  the  universe,  no 
manifestation.      So    that  at   the  outset,  we   find    a 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  225 

certain  modern  system,  in  both  directions  violatin^^ 
this  primary  law,  and  therefore  doomed  to  self-re- 
nunciation or  to  self-destruction. 

Let  valiant  knight-errants  of  science  who  would 
fiercely  slay  theologians  and  metaphysicians,  on  the 
right  hand  and  on  the  left,  sheathe  their  swords. 
Their  own  safety  and  the  higher  interests  of  science 
will  be  promoted  by  peace  rather  than  by  Quixotic 
warfare.  Mr.  Spencer's  advice  to  scientists  is  timely 
and  significant :  "  He  who  contemplates  the  universe 
from  the  scientific  point  of  view,  must  learn  to  see 
.  .  .  that  religion  must  be  treated,  as  a  subject 
of  science,  with  no  more  prejudice  than  any  other 
reality."  '^ 

Even  Mr.  Mill  admits  that  ''  there  are  laws  of 
thought  and  of  feeling  which  rest  on  experimental 
evidence  which  are  a  clue  to  the  interpretation  of 
ourselves  and  others.  Such  laws,  so  far  forth,  make 
psychology  a  positive  science,  as  certain  as  chemis- 
try." f  According  to  the  involuntary  confession  of 
the  '*  straitest  of  the  sect  "  of  inductionists,  then, 
we  shall,  as  we  advance,  meet  with  other  laws  of 
thought. 

Knowledge  begins  in  consciousness.  Without 
consciousness  knowledge  were  impossible.     Whether 

*  First  Principles,  p.  21. 

f  See  his  Inaugural  Address  at  the  University  of  St.  Andrew. 


226  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

or  not  suggested  by  Socrates,  at  least  since  the  time 
of  Descartes  this  principle  has  been  admitted.  In 
regard  to  knowledge,  then,  the  subjective  factor  is 
primary  and  chief,  and  is  to  be  studied  first  and 
chiefly,  if  we  would  ascertain  what  can  be  known 
and  how  it  can  be  known.  What  then  is  the  scope 
of  our  knowledge  ?  Evidently,  the  scope  of  our 
consciousness.  Whatever  ma}^  be  presented  to  con- 
sciousness may  become  matter  of  knowledge. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  primary  law  of 
thought  is  that  there  must  be  both  content  of 
thought,  and  agent — something  which  thinks  and 
something  about  which  it  thinks.  Now  what  and 
whence  and  how  is  the  content  furnished  ?  Whether 
these  essential  questions  can  be  answered  a  priori  we 
do  not  stop  to  inquire.  We,  at  least,  will  make  the 
approach  to  the  answer  a  posteriori ;  and  by  the 
process  of  observation,  which  the  most  fastidious 
Comtean  must  approve,  detect  the  law  w^hich  regu- 
lates thinking  in  relation  both  to  the  agent  and  to 
the  content. 

Starting  with  simple  apprehension,  we  pass,  by  a 
process  of  the  judgment,  from  premise  to  premise, 
and  thus  to  conclusion.  This,  which  is  completed 
reasoning,  may  be  in  the  line  of  analysis  or  synthesis 
from  the  general  to  the  particular,  or  from  the  par- 
ticular to  the  general,  and  so  be  legitimate  reasoning, 


MODERN-   THOUGHT.  22/ 

either  deductive  or  inductive.  These  laws  devel- 
oped into  a  science  constitute  logic.  To  ascertain 
these  logical  laws,  and  properly  to  apply  them,  is  the 
appropriate  work  of  thinkers  in  any  and  in  every 
age.  To  invent  a  new,  another  logic,  and  call  it  a 
science,  is  quite  incompetent  for  any  thought  in 
any  age.  The  simple  apprehension  of  terms — the 
first  elements  of  knowledge — belongs  to  the  mind 
alone  ;  but  it  is  dependent  upon  the  presentation. 
The  senses  are  to  do  at  least  a  part  of  this  important 
service  ;  and  the  apprehension,  without  which  the 
presentation  can  be  of  no  avail,  the  mental  appre- 
hension, must  be  intuitive.  The  senses,  in  this  pre- 
sentation, must  be  supervised  by  some  higher  faculty 
which  must  evermore  verify  for  the  sense,  so  as  to 
correct  for  the  mind  the  faulty  presentation  of  a 
sense,  and  confirm  the  true — as  in  the  opposite  cases 
of  healthy  condition  and  of  nervous  derangement,  or 
when  the  medium  for  the  action  of  sense  is  at  fault, 
as  in  beholding  a  distant  star  whose  light  has  been 
millions  of  years  coming  through  space,  coming  to 
report  to  us  the  position  of  the  star  in  the  heavens, — 
not  its  present  position,  but  the  position  it  held  ten 
thousand  centuries  ago. 

Sense  is  not  only  unable  to  verify  for  itself,  its 
report  may  be  actually  false  ;  e.g.,  sight  reports  as 
the  present  place  of  Sirius    that  which  it   occupied 


228  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

five  millions  (?)  of  years  ago,  and  from  which  place 
during  this  immense  period  it  has  been  steadily 
hastening  away.  Ratiocination,  having  from  the 
higher  laws  of  astronomy  deduced  the  distance, 
orbit,  and  motion  of  this  planet,  and  the  velocity  of 
light,  corrects  and  adjusts  the  report  of  sense  and 
tells  us  the  real  position  which  the  planet  now  occu- 
pies. Our  eyes  hail  the  morning  and  report  the  sun- 
rise. But  eight  minutes  have  actually  elapsed  since 
the  sun  rose  above  our  horizon  ;  and,  again  ratioci- 
nation must  correct  and  adjust  the  report  of  sense 
and  verify  for  the  mind  the  knowledge  thus  imper- 
fectly presented.  Sense  says  the  sun  rises,  the  sun 
sets,  daily  performing  its  revolution  round  the  earth. 
But  this  report  of  sense  must  be  corrected  by  some 
higher  mental  faculty  before  it  is  accepted  by  precise 
science  and  properly  announced  as  the  diurnal  revo- 
lution of  the  earth  upon  its  axis.  The  sailing  ship  is 
not  where  the  sense  reports  it,  nor  is  the  floating 
cloud,  nor  the  flying  bird.  Our  friend  receding  or  ad- 
vancing is  not  where  we  see  him,  nor  is  our  foe.  The 
lightning  flash  deceives  the  eye  ;  the  thunder's  roar 
deceives  the  ear.  Did  the  soldier  or  the  sailor  trust 
to  sight  or  sound,  disaster  would  prevail  on  land  and 
sea  ;  defeat  would  take  the  place  of  victory. 

Instead,  then,  of  sense  being  competent  to  verify 
to  the  mind  all  our  knowledge,  it  can    not    always 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  229 

verify  even  for  itself     Its  very  reports  can  not  be 
relied  upon.     In  the  instances  just  cited — and  these 
are  but  samples  of  unnumbered  instances — we  must 
needs  call  in  our  reasoning  faculty,  the  understand- 
ing, to  rectify  and  adjust  and  verify  for  sense.     Rea- 
son supervises  both,  and  as  between  the  two  decides 
that  the  conclusion  attested  by  the  higher  faculty  is 
to  be  accepted  as  valid.     And,  whatever  the  preten- 
sion of  some  '^  advanced  thinker"  or  scientific  coterie^ 
the    world  confirms  the  decision  as  rational.     And 
now  if  this  be  clear  and  trustworthy,  that  while  sense 
(sight,  hearing,  etc.)  reports  mere  phenomena,  mere 
qualities  and  attributes,  but  not  any  subject  to  which 
the  attributes  belong,  not   any  substance   in   which 
qualities  inhere,  nor  any  cause  which   produces   the 
phenomena,  the   reasoning  faculty — the   understand- 
ing— has  the  competency  and  the  right  to  supply  this 
deficiency, — to  correct  again  and  adjust  this  report 
of  sense,  and  affirm  to  the  mind  with   an   authority 
which  gives  higher  knowledge  than  mere  sense  can 
give, — knowledge  of  attributes  and  subject,  of  qual- 
ities and  substance,  effect  and  cause ;  i.e.  that  think- 
ing is  done  by  a  thinker  ;  that  extension  belongs  to 
a  body  ;  that   effect  is  related  to  its  cause.     Here, 
again,  reason  supervises  the  work  of  both,  and    as 
between  the  two  decides  that  the  conclusion  attested 
by  the  higher  faculty  is    to    be    accepted    as   valid. 


230  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

And,  whatever  the  pretension  of  some  "  advanced 
thinker  "  or  scientific  coterie^  the  world  confirms  the 
decision  as  rational. 

While,  then,  we  admit  and  affirm  what  every  ex- 
periential or  sense-philosopher  will  assert,  that  the 
senses  present  to  the  mind  elements  of  knowledge  ; 
we  deny  what  some  of  these  philosophers  assert, 
that  the  senses  alone  can  give,  and  can  verify  our 
knowledge. 

In  tracing  the  laws  of  thought  we  are  now  pre- 
pared to  take  another  step  forward. 

The  reasoning  faculty,  the  understanding,  may 
also  present  to  the  mind  elements  of  knowledge  de- 
duced from  observation  and  experience.  For 
example,  by  the  argument  from  progressive  approach, 
the  law  of  motion,  or  the  law  of  attraction,  may  be 
thus  presented  :  that  a  body  can  not  stop  nor  put  itself 
in  motion,  and  that  all  bodies  gravitate  toward  each 
other.  No  sense  has  discovered  these  conclusions 
or  can  verify  them.  Nevertheless  they  are  laid  down 
as  established  principles  in  science.  These  are 
among  a  thousand  illustrations  which  might  be 
given.  This  second  mode  of  presentation  as  super- 
vised by  the  reason  is  pronounced  rational.  The 
elements  of  knowledge  as  thus  presented  and  thus 
supervised  are  accepted  by  the  mind  as  verified 
knowledge.     This,  we  see  at  once,  is  a  larger  field  of 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  23 1 

knowledge  than  the  former,  while  it  is  certainly  none 
the  less  trustworthy,  perhaps  less  liable  to  suspicion 
and  vacillation. 

But  does  not  reason,  also,  present  elements  of 
knowledge  for  the  intuitive  apprehension  of  the  mind 
— as  intuitive  as  in  the  case  of  sense-presentation? 
An  effect  which  the  sight  presents  for  intuitive 
beholding  by  the  mind,  is  no  less  directly  presented 
by  the  reason  as  necessarily  produced  by  a  cause, 
and  this  whether  it  be  the  first  or  the  last  effect  ever 
presented  by  the  sense. 

The  wind  blows,  as  the  sense  affirms  to  the  mind ; 
but  sense  can  not  go  beyond  the  effect.  Reason, 
however,  as  quickly  affirms  that  this  effect  must 
have  a  cause  ;  and  the  mind  as  intuitively  sees  the 
latter  truth  through  reason  as  the  former  truth 
through  sense,  and  holds  the  latter  truth,  to  say  the 
least,  as  certainly  and  as  firmly  as  the  former. 
Again,  the  sense  can  not  see  or  feel  or  taste  or  smell 
space,  yet  it  affirms  extension — material  extension, 
as  of  some  body  great  or  small — which  the  mind 
intuitively  perceives  through  the  sense.  But  reason 
as  quickly  affirms  space  in  which  such  body  may  be 
extended — a  space  in  which  all  bodies  may  be  ex- 
tended— even  universal  limitless  space,  which  no 
sense  can  verify,  but  which  the  mind  sees  as  intui- 
tively through  the  reason  as  it  saw,  through  the  sense. 


232  FAITH  AN-D  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

a  body  extended.     Indeed,  the  latter  may  have  been 
a  fancy,  the  fancy  of  a  disordered  sense  ;  the  former 
is  a  fact  beyond  all  possible  doubt  or  uncertainty. 
Events  illustrate  the  same  truth.     The  event  is  re- 
ported to  the  mind,  reported  by  the  sense,  for  in- 
tuitive perceiving  ;    but  no  sense  can  affirm  the  time 
in  which  the  event  occurred.     Time  transcends  the 
cognizance  of  any  sense.     Neither  sight  nor  touch 
nor  taste  can  detect  it.     But  reason  as  quickly,  as 
certainly,  affirms  a  time  for  the  occurrence  of  this 
event — time  for  the  occurrence  of  every  event — time 
universal,  limitless;    and  the  mind  as  intuitively  be- 
holds this  through  the  reason  as  the  other  through 
the    sense.     Indeed    the   sense    may   be  at  fault  in 
respect  to  the  specific  event ;  but  the  reason  is  at  no 
fault  in  regard  to  time.      The  mind  holds  the  latter 
knowledge  at  least  as  certain  as  the  former.     If  it  be 
said    that    the  sense  verifies  for  itself  in  regard    to 
the  things  of  sense  and  the  mind  accepts  this  intui- 
tively  (a  statement   which  we  might  question,  but 
which  we  do  not  now  stop  to  challenge)  ;  may  we  not 
say  with  higher  certainty  that  the  reason  verifies  for 
itself  in  regard  to  the  things  of  reason,  a  verification 
which  the  mind  accepts  as  the  clearest  intuition  and 
as  of  supreme  authority?     We  may  apply  the  same 
principle  to  quality  and  substance,  phenomena  and 
subject,  effect  and  cause,  axiom  and  corollarv. 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  233 

The  inevitable  conclusion,  then,  is  that  sense  is 
not  the  only  agency  which  presents  to  the  mind 
elements  of  knowledge.  Reason  is  a  surer,  if  not  a 
more  fertile,  source  of  knowledge.  Again,  sense  is 
not  the  only  means  of  verification.  Reason  is  as 
prompt  to  verify,  and  no  less  competent.  Sense, 
perchance,  may  verify  for  the  things  of  sense.  It 
may  compare  sensation  with  sensation,  as  touch 
with  sight,  or  sight  with  sound  ;  but,  at  best,  how 
do  these  gross  sensations  differ,  while,  often,  they 
can  not  avail  to  help  each  other,  as  in  the  instance  of 
sight  and  smell,  or  taste  and  touch — in  the  universe 
of  color,  or  in  the  vast  realm  of  astronomy.  So  the 
verification  of  sense  is  ever  exposed  to  error  and 
attended  with  more  or  less  of  mental  misgiving,  until 
a  higher  faculty  has  been  called  in  to  decide  the 
case.  Indeed,  the  very  ground  for  any  confidence 
in  induction  and  generalization,  viz.  the  uniformity 
of  the  course  of  nature,  is  a  ground  which  no  sense 
can  furnish  and  no  sense  can  verify.  Withdraw  this 
ground  and  all  the  superstructure  of  induction  be- 
comes insubstantial  and  ''  like  the  baseless  fabric  of 
a  vision." 

On  the  other  hand,  reason  verifies  for  the  things 
of  reason  with  an  authority  which  does  not  require 
the  attestation  of  a  lower  faculty  to  confirm  ;  nor 
does   it   allow   the   intermeddling   of    subordinates. 


234  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Reason  may,  does,  accept  the  sympathetic  attesta- 
tion of  conscience,  and  the  responsive  assurance  of 
faith,  and  the  concurrent  testimonials  of  analogy 
and  order  and  design  from  ten  thousand  thousand 
voices  which  fill  the  universe.  Now  thinkers,  an- 
cient or  modern,  who,  in  obedience  to  mental  laws, 
have  employed  these  modes  of  presenting  knowledge 
to  the  mind,  and  these  modes  of  verification,  and 
these  processes  of  thought,  inductive  or  deductive, 
analytic  or  synthetic,  are  justified  in  their  work.  No 
arbitrary  method  in  the  interests  of  a  particular 
theory  or  school  can  be  foisted  into  scientific  service 
to  displace  or  exclude  the  method  which  the  com- 
mon consciousness  approves,  and  which  the  ages  of 
serious  and  sincere  thinking  have  employed  and 
established.  Such  a  change,  if  violently  precipi- 
tated, would  be  not  a  revolution,  but  a  rebeUion, 
against  the  laws  of  mind — a  rebellion  to  be  sup- 
pressed by  the  united  force  of  loyal  thought.  We 
would  be,  we  are,  no  less  alert  to  note  the  testimony 
of  sense  and  to  encourage  scientific  observation  and 
experiment  than  are  the  positivists.  We  use  the  re- 
sults differently,  perhaps,  while  we  claim  a  criterion 
at  once  higher  and  surer.  Within  the  scope  of  our 
theory  we  embrace  all  the  positive  knowledge,  all 
the  positive  science,  which  they  can  get ;  and  by 
our  theory  we  are  authorized  to  get  more. 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  235 

The  advances  of  modern  science  in  every  direc- 
tion are  to  be  hailed  with  sincere  gratification  by 
every  true  thinker.  Its  real  successes  can  not  be 
appropriated  and  monopolized  by  any  clique  or 
class  or  country ;  they  belong  alike  to  the  world. 
Everywhere  they  help  the  better  to  interpret  the  laws 
which  pervade  material  nature,  and  to  satisfy  the  phil- 
osophic longing  of  the  human  soul  to  know  things  in 
their  causes,  contributing  to  extend  and  unify  that 
knowledge  in  the  realm  of  thought  and  the  realm  of 
force,  everywhere  revealing  more  fully  the  reign  of 
law  and  the  prevalence  of  order.  As  true  science  is 
evermore  consistent  with  itself  (since  it  is  the  knowl- 
edge of  a  higher  and  all-surrounding  harmony),  its 
present  successes  do  not  annul  those  of  the  past, 
nor  demand  that  we  relinquish  what  has  been  gained 
in  order  to  receive  what  is  being  secured.  Its  real 
office  is  not  to  destroy,  but  to  conserve  ;  reverently 
to  guard,  reverently  to  gain.  Entertaining  ever- 
more this  twofold  purpose,  and  cherishing  this  gen- 
uine spirit  of  science,  he  is  the  best  modern  thinker 
who  is  grateful  for  the  past  and  hopeful  for  the 
future,  with  mind  alert,  actively  awaiting  every  pres- 
entation of  knowledge  by  the  lower  intuitions  of 
sense,  by  the  higher  intuitions  of  reason,  and  by  the 
logical  deductions  from  both.  It  is  evident  from 
this  threefold  presentation  of  knowledge  that  science 


236  FAITH  AND  MODERN  THOUGHT. 

is  by  no  means  restricted  to  the  narrow  circle  of 
sense.  To  change  the  figure,  the  great  superstruct- 
ure of  knowledge  which  the  individual  and  the 
universal  mind  are  uniting  to  rear  is  based  not  upon 
sense  alone,  but  upon  the  triple  foundation  of  sense, 
understanding,  and  reason  ;  reason  being  the  corner- 
stone. 

In  the  process  of  knowledge,  especially  in  the 
scientific  process,  ratiocination,  or  understanding, 
supports  sense,  gives  it  significance,  and  makes  it 
serviceable  to  science  by  arranging  in  order  the  inco- 
herent reports  of  each  sense,  and  of  all  the  senses, 
reducing  them  to  results,  connecting  them  to  con- 
clusions. With  sense  alone  there  could  be  no  sci- 
ence. However  strong  were  the  sight,  though  it 
could  penetrate  like  the  glance  of  the  eagle,  undaz- 
zled  by  the  noontide  blaze  of  the  sun ;  however 
acute  were  the  hearing,  though  it  could  detect  the 
harmony  of  the  spheres,  as  in  concentric  circles  they 
glide  through  outlying  realms  of  space ;  though 
touch  and  taste  and  smell  were  intensified  a  thou- 
sand and  a  thousandfold  ;  yet,  with  mere  sense  and 
without  understanding  there  would  be,  there  could 
be,  no  classification,  no  judgment,  no  generalizations, 
no  advance  towards  science.  Reason,  in  the  mean 
time,  supervises  the  whole  process  that  it  be  rational 
not  fanciful ;   that  science  itself  be  not  the  slave  of 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  237 

tyranny  nor  the  dupe  of  superstition  ;  and  that  sense 
become  not  false  through  fear,  nor  imbecile  through 
inaction,  nor  blunted  by  age,  nor  drowned  in  dis- 
sipation and  maddened  with  delirium.  If  reason  be 
enthroned  in  the  soul,  its  light  and  guidance  pene- 
trate the  understanding  and  pervade  the  sense  ;  both 
become  rational ;  and  man  is  exalted  to  his  proper 
place,  a  different  and  a  higher  sphere  than  that  of 
the  animal,  and  in  the  right  of  his  own  excellence 
holds  dominion.  But,  if  reason  be  dethroned,  hu- 
man knowledge  can  be  no  longer  verified  ;  sense  and 
understanding  both  wander,  lost,  without  the  light 
and  without  a  guide  ;  and  man  is  inferior  to  the 
meanest  brute.  In  the  exercise  of  these  threefold 
powers,  man  is  conscious  of  their  possession.  He 
needs  no  argument  to  make  that  possession  more 
apparent,  while  no  argument  can  lessen  his  assur- 
ance. But  more  than  this,  he  clearly  sees  the  pro- 
priety of  this  threefold  possession.  He  needs  the 
senses  to  commune  with  the  outer  world,  to  know 
its  varied  phenomena,  and  to  satisfy  his  physical 
wants.  He  needs  the  understanding  to  prepare  him 
for  scientific  knowledge  and  intellectual  advance- 
ment. He  needs  reason  to  satisfy  the  demands  of 
conscience  and  the  longings  of  faith  ;  and,  as  he 
holds  himself  and  others  morally,  responsible,  to  fit 
him  for  moral  responsibility.     This  is  the  more  ap- 


238  FAITH  AND  MODERN"   THOUGHT. 

parent,  since,  by  universal  consent,  when  reason  fails 
man  ceases  to  be  held  responsible.  He  may  be 
confined,  commiserated,  or  cast  out;  but  he  is  not 
held  responsible. 

There  need,  then,  be  no  conflict  between  true 
science  and  true  religion.  The  conflict  has  been  be- 
tween scientists  and  religionists.  The  best  thinkers 
have  often  been  the  most  devout.  Trite  as  the 
saying  has  become,  it  is  no  less  true,  and  Baconians 
at  least  should  not  object  to  its  repetition,  "  Depth 
in  philosophy  bringcth  men's  minds  back  to  relig- 
ion." Science  and  religion  heartily  bid  each  other 
good-speed.  Religion  has  served  science,  and  cer- 
tainly science,  especially  modern  science,  with  and 
without  intent,  is  doing  much-needed  and  lasting 
service  to  religion  in  the  increasing  demonstration  it 
affords  of  order,  ''  Heaven's  first  law,"  and  in  the 
steady  advance  toward  higher  and  still  higher  unifi- 
cation of  knowledge,  unmistakably  indicating  what 
religion  has  uniformly  maintained  :  that  there  is  a 
uni-verse,  giving  new  and  still  newer  significance  to 
that  term  held  in  common  both  by  science  and  re- 
ligion— the  universe. 

It  is,  then,  the  more  remarkable  with  what  refine- 
ment of  self-conceit  a  certain  set  of  thinkers  now-a- 
days  monopolize  the  merit  of  modern  thought,  and 
gratuitously  assume  that  all  other  thinking  in  these 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  239 

times  is  archaic  and  obsolete;  who  talk  boastingly  of 
philosophical  radicalism  that  shall  reverse  the  world's 
estimate  of  more  than  twenty  centuries,  proclaim  a 
new  definition  of  truth,  ostracize  the  old  leaders,  re- 
pudiate and  banish  the  established  method  of 
thought,  and  reconstruct  the  whole  empire  of  knowl- 
edge ;  '^  \\\vo  ostentatiously  parade  a  "  New  Philoso- 
phy ";  and  consistently  with  such  pretension,  sneer 
at  conservative  thought  as  superstitious  veneration 
for  the  past,  arrogating  to  themselves  the  purpose 
and  the  spirit  of  progress  ;  who  would  confine  science 
to  the  field  of  experience — the  field  of  sense — and 
then  patronize  this  bantling  as  the  sum  of  all  knowl- 
edge and  as  their  own  private  possession.  Lest  their 
bantling  be  not  sufficiently  dwarfed,  they  talk  ever- 
more of  material  science,  as  if  science  were  only  ma- 
terial, f  Sometimes,  in  more  liberal  mood,  they 
mention  both  mind  and  matter,  but  both  attenuated 
to  the  slightest  phenomenal  consistency  (Mill)  ;  while, 
in  severer  moods,  they  declare  feeling  and  even 
thought  to  be  material  secretions  of  the  brain,  as  the 
liver  secretes  bile  (Vogt,  etc.). 

From  such  premises,  self-styled  modern  thought 
would  proceed  to  divorce  science  and  Christianity  as 
incompatible,    framing   its   bill    of  indictment,    and 

*  See  Comte,  and  Lewes,  and  positivists  everywhere. 
f  See  Buchner,  Moleschott,  Maudsley,  Virchow,  etc. 


240  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

trumping  up  its  testimony  in  irrelevant  and  inconse- 
quential conflicts  between  science  and  religion.  With 
inflamed  zeal  it  would  banish  theology  as  a  hoary  in- 
truder upon  the  domain  of  scientific  thought,  slay 
theologians  as  enemies  of  scientific  progress,  and 
brand  metaphysics  as  an  outlaw  doomed  to  fetters 
and  perpetual  imprisonment.  Having  thus  cleared 
the  field,  it  would  consummate  the  new  regime  by 
enthroning  ""  The  New  Philosophy." 

The  effrontery  of  such  pretension  becomes  more 
manifest  when  we  remember  that  the  greatest  phi- 
losophers of  modern  times,  like  Newton  and  Bacon 
and  Locke  and  Leibnitz  and  Descartes  and  Kepler 
and  Galileo,  have  been  sincere  Christians,  and  that 
the  greatest  thinkers  of  all  times  have  been  most 
earnest  believers  in  the  supernatural  ;  and  still  more 
manifest,  when  we  remember  that  the  greatest  the- 
ologians, like  Augustine  and  Calvin  and  Edwards 
and  Bishop  Butler  and  Chalmers,  have  been  valiant 
champions  of  progress  ;  while  Christianity  has  been 
the  very  parent  of  modern  civilization,  more  indus- 
trious in  its  promotion  than  any  other  agent,  and  more 
successful  than  all  other  agencies,  and  most  success- 
ful when  most  thoroughly  imbued  with  the  spirit  of 
Christ,  the  Master ;  seeking  to-day  with  sublime 
zeal  and  courage  and  self-denial  to  extend  Christian 
civilization  and  Christian  progress  over  all  the  earth  ; 


MODERN    THOUGHT.  24 1 

desiring  at  once  to  plant  the  school  and  the  church 
everywhere,  at  home  and  abroad  ;  and  still  more 
remarkable,  when  we  remember  that  Christianity, 
not  satisfied  with  even  the  present  degree  of  progress, 
points  to  the  better  time  coming,  when  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  Lord  shall  fill  the  whole  earth  ;  bids  us 
as  sons  of  God,  "  Be  strong  and  of  a  good  courage," 
"  leaving  the  principles  of  the  doctrine  of  Christ, 
go  on  unto  perfection,"  when,  as  fuU  inheritors 
of  the  truth  of  God,  men  shall  grow  up  ^'  unto  the 
measure  of  the  stature  of  the  fulness  of  Christ," 
speaking  to  us  evermore  of  the  supreme  value  of  the 
soul,  and  stimulating  us  and  the  world  evermore 
with  the  significant  words  of  Jesus :  "  What  shall  it 
profit  a  man  if  he  shall  gain  the  whole  world,  and 
lose  his  own  soul?  " 

On  the  other  hand,  self-styled  modern  thought 
with  shameful  contradiction  of  its  pretensions  to 
progress,  goes  back  to  heathen  scepticism  for  its 
philosophy,  revives  the  defunct  notions  of  Democ- 
ritus  and  Leucippus,  exalts  nature  above  God,  and 
matter  above  mind,  asserts  the  descent  of  man  from 
the  monkey ;  and,  as  if  not  satisfied  with  such 
debasement,  declares  that  the  monkey  was  once  a 
slimy  ascidian,  and  that  the  ascidian — the  low%  but 
living  ascidian — had  a  spontaneous  generation,  tak- 
ing its  life  from  that  vv^hich  was  positively  and  utterly 
n 


242  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

lifeless  ;  so  that  the  human  soul  and  body  equally 
are  material  and  alike  subject  to  death  and  decay  ; 
while  '*  modern  thought "  completes  the  vicious 
circle  of  contradictions  by  declaring  that  the  future 
shall  be  not  a  progress,  but  a  regress  along  the  re- 
ceding curve  in  the  cycle  of  evolution  and  revolution. 
Such  is  the  pretension  and  such  is  the  mockery  of 
self-styled  modern  thought.  If  this  be  '*  advanced 
thinking,"  what,  we  ask,  is  the  direction  ?  What  a 
system,  we  submit,  is  this  to  be  proud  of!  How  well 
it  is  authorized  to  despise  Christ  and  Christians,  the- 
ology and  theologians,  civilization  such  as  Christianity 
has  produced  and  perfected,  progress  such  as  Chris- 
tianity promises — illimitable  in  the  opening  field  of 
the  future,  in  a  purer  moral  life  and  a  better  moral 
atmosphere  and  ^'  a  better  country,  even  an  heav- 
enly," saying  to  each  and  to  all  evermore  :  "  Be  ye 
perfect,  even  as  your  Father  in  heaven  is  perfect !  " 

These  general  criticisms  are  more  than  verified 
by  a  reference  to  specific  results  reached  by  modern 
thought  in  regard  to  science,  philosophy,  morals,  and 
religion.  This  reference  must,  of  course,  be  re- 
stricted ;  and,  it  need  be  the  less  extended,  by  reason 
of  the  notoriety  industriously  given  to  their  conclu- 
sions by  these  new  schoolmen. 

In  science,  which  is  their  especial  boast,  they  tell 
us  that  we  can  know  nothing  but  phenomena,  their 


MODERN    THOUGHT.  243 

antecedents  and  sequents.  Indeed,  this  is  all  we  can 
know  of  the  laws  of  nature.  In  fact,  this  is  the  law 
of  nature,  according  to  their  formal  definition,— the 
invariable  succession  and  resemblance  of  phenomena 
(Comte  and  Lewes  and  Mill).  After  all  the  vaunted 
talk  of  laws,  their  sum.  is  this,  and  nothing  more. 

According  to  "  modern  thought,"  so  extremely 
tenuous  and  insubstantial  a  thing  is  law.  And  yet 
we  are  told  by  these  ^'  advanced  thinkers  "  not  only 
to  study  the  laws  of  nature,  but  to  study  only  the 
laws  of  nature,  since  this  is  all  we  can  know.  At  the 
same  time  we  are  oracularly  informed  that  we  our- 
selves are  only  a  series  of  feelings  and  sensations, 
and  that  material  nature — the  universe  of  worlds — 
is  but  the  possibility  of  sensations  (See  Mr.  Mill). 

But  if  "  modern  thought  "  makes  the  realm  of 
knowledge  thus  phenomenal  and  fleeting,  still  more 
unstable  does  it  make  science  itself.  Even  so  simple 
a  fact  as  that  2  +  2=4  they  tell  us  is  not  fixed,  but 
that  at  some  other  time  or  place  2  +  2  may  make  5, 
that  two  lines  which  are  parallel  may  meet  some- 
where and  at  some  time,  and  that  effects  may  hap- 
pen without  any  cause.  Like  the  old  sceptics,  they 
can  not  affirm  ;  they  can  not  deny.  In  this  uncer- 
tainty of  knowledge,  which  is  more  tantahzing  than 
ignorance,  "  modern  thought  "  is  driven  like  a 
shuttle,  between  phantasms  without  and  phantasms 


244  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

within,  weaving  its  own  winding-sheet  of  nescience  ; 
so  that  Mr.  Mill,  coolest  and  steadiest  of  modern 
thinkers,  as  he  looks  in  another  direction  resolves  it 
all  into  self-knowledge,  and  then,  as  he  pauses  to 
look  at  his  theory,  denies  the  knowledge  of  self  and 
the  knowledge  of  things.  Driven  by  his  theory  of 
nescience,  he  concludes,  with  the  notorious  sophists 
of  twenty  centuries  ago,  that  nothing  is  truly  known  ; 
and  now,  driven  by  the  necessity  of  thought,  or  as 
he  styles  it,  ''irresistible  association,"  he  refers  every 
sensation  to  mind  and  matter — the  subject  and 
object ;  affirming,  "  I  can  not  be  conscious  of  the 
sensation,  without  being  conscious  of  it  as  related  to 
these  two  things."  ^ 

In  his  posthumous  essay  on  '*  Nature,"  he  says  : 
"  The  nature  of  a  thing  means  its  entire  capacity  of 
exhibiting  phenomena.  Nature  means  the  sum  of 
all  phenomena,  together  with  the  causes  which  pro- 
duce them."  Thus,  in  common  with  all  phenome- 
nalists,  he  fully  recognizes  both  the  principle  and  the 
terminology  of  causation.  Yet,  driven  by  his  theory 
in  common  with  all  phenomenalists,  he  repudiates 
the  principle,  and  emasculates  the  term  "  cause  ''  of 
its  meaning  t  "  I  do  not  mean  a  cause  which  is  not 
itself    a    phenomenon."  f      His    logic    should    have 

*  Mill's  Examination  of  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  pp.  214,  215. 
\  Logic,  i.  p.  358. 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  245 

saved  him  fi'om  contradictions.  It  should,  at  least, 
have  prevented  his  false  play  between  the  general 
and  the  special  use  of  such  a  term  as  "  cause,"  and 
from  the  convenient  fallacy  of  shifting  premises. 
The  teacher  of  logic  should  not  allow  his  own  prac- 
tice to  iUustrate  the  ignoratio  ckncJii.  More  than 
this,  if  he  disregards  the  claim  of  consistency,  he 
should  respect  the  claim  of  honesty  ;  and,  in  a  ques- 
tion so  manifestly  essential,  be  careful  neither  to 
deceive  himself  nor  to  mislead  others. 

Herbert  Spencer,  driven  by  the  necessity  of 
thought,  asserts  that  "  there  can  not  be  appearing 
without  an  underlying  reality  or  ground  of  the  ap- 
pearance, that  is  unthinkable  "  ;  ^ — striving  thus  to 
give  validity  to  science ;  and  now,  driven  by  his 
theory  of  nescience,  asserts  that  the  ultimate  ground 
is  unknowable,  and  thus  concludes,  with  the  sophists, 
that  nothing  is  truly  known.  His  whole  scientific 
superstructure,  which  seemed  so  fair  and  firm,  only 
deceives  us  by  concealing  from  our  view  the  fathom- 
less abyss  of  nescience  ;  and  as  we  enter  it,  seeking 
scientific  repose  and  security,  the  false  foundation 
suddenly  sinks,  precipitating  us  and  all  into  the 
frightful  vortex  of  the  unknown. 

Lewes,  who,  with  his  modern  definition  of  truth 
as  the  order  of  ideas  corresponding  to  the  order  of 

*  First  Principles. 


246  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

phenomena,^  asserts  that  we  know  only  phenomena, 
and  should  therefore  study  their  laws,  and  would 
make  science  at  least  legitimate,-informs  us  that 
law  is  only  invariable  succession,  having  no  vital 
connection  nor  real  power.  When  asked  whether 
there  is  an  external  world  or  an  internal  conscious 
being,  he  replies  that  we  know  only  phenomena — 
that  whether  there  is  really  anything  within  or  any- 
thing without,  we  know  not.  Driven  by  his  theory 
of  verification,  Lewes  would  make  science  legitimate. 
Driven  by  his  theory  of  nescience,  he  would  make 
the  internal  and  the  external  worlds  merely  phe- 
nomenal, and  science  itself — however  legitimate  by 
hypothesis — invalid  in  fact  ;  concluding,  with  the 
sophists,  that  nothing  is  truly  known,  and  even 
pausing  to  applaud  the  sophists  in  their  remark- 
able conclusion. 

A  single  quotation  from  Mr.  Bain  must  conclude 
our  illustration  of  science  as  presented  by  these  "  ad- 
vanced thinkers."  As  if  to  outdo  the  old  sophists 
in  this  direction,  and  thus  establish  some  apparent 
claim  to  originality  for  "  modern  thought,"  Mr.  Bain 
asserts  :  "  Both  as  to  the  reality  of  matter  and  as  to 
the  reality  of  spirit,  I  am  incapable  of  direct  knowl- 
edge, therefore  make  no  distinction  between  the. 
knowable    and    the    unknowable."  f      Such    is    the 

*  History  of  Philosophy,  i.  p.  31  fThe  Senses  and  the  Intellect. 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  247 

scope,  and  such  the  security  of  science,  according  to 
self-styled  "  modern  thought."  What  can  science 
such  as  this  avail,  even  if  perfected  ?  Is  this  the 
boasted  progress  of  our  century  ?  Stripped  of  its 
disguises,  such  thought  is  not  even  modern.  It  is 
not  only  ancient,  but  antiquated. 

Again,  we  are  reminded  of  Tyndall's  truthful 
confession :  "  The  logical  feebleness  of  science  is  not 
sufficiently  understood  " ;  and  the  more  forcibly, 
when  we  compare  the  assertions  and  admissions  of 
the  automatic  system  so  pompously  presented  by 
modern  materialists,  like  Maudsley  :  "  The  formation 
of  an  idea  is  an  organic  process.  Exquisitely  deli- 
cate is  the  mental  development  which  takes  place  in 
the  minute  cells  of  the  cortical  layers  ;  yet  the  mys- 
teries of  their  secret  operations  can  not  be  unravelled. 
Physiology  hitherto  has  been  unable  to  construct  a 
mental  science  "  ;  *  and  Carl  Vogt  :  "  Thought  stands 
in  the  same  relation  to  the  brain  as  bile  to  the  liver  " 
and  Moleschott :  ''  Thought  is  a  motion  of  matter  "  ; 
and  the  irrrepressible  Buchner  :  "  Mental  activity  is 
a  function  of  the  cerebral  substance  "  ;  in  contrast 
with  Tyndall's  acknowledgment  that  "  the  mole- 
cular groupings  and  molecular  motion  of  the  materi- 
alists explain  nothing.     The  problem  of  the  connec- 

*  Physiology  and  Pathology  of  Mind. 


248  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

tion  of  soul  and  body  is  as  insoluble  in  its  modern 
form  as  it  was  in  the  pre-scientific  ages." 

Mr.  Huxley,  who  significantly  points  to  materi- 
alism as  threatening  the  extinction  of  spirit,  and 
sneeringly  refers  to  the  public  solicitude  in  regard 
to  the  question  as  no  more  dignified  or  reasonable 
than  the  vulgar  lamentation  at  the  death  of  Pan,  feels 
compelled  to  vindicate  his  own  reputation  by  saying  : 
"  I  am  no  materialist.  On  the  contrary,  I  believe 
materialism  to  involve  grave  philosophical  error.'' 

''Modern  thought,"  in  its  phase  of  materialism, 
makes  mind,  like  heat,  a  mode  of  motion,  and 
thought  the  result  of  molecular  changes  ;  and  in  the 
phase  of  nescience,  finally  reduces  science  to  the 
knowledge  not  of  things,  but  of  relations,  and  these 
not  even  the  relations  of  things,  but  the  relations  of 
fleeting  appearances, — of  mere  phenomena — scien- 
tifically and  seriously  this,  and  nothing  more. 

But  if  *'  modern  thought "  is  so  faulty  and  false 
toward  true  science,  it  is,  as  we  should  expect,  fatal 
to  true  philosophy, — philosophy  as  knowledge  of 
things  in  their  causes.  Indeed,  Comte  magisterially 
ruled  out  philosophy  from  his  system,  as  irrelevant  to 
knowledge  and  impossible.  Lewes,  in  his  elegiac 
history  of  its  repeated,  but  fruitless  struggles,  reports 
philosophy  a  failure — the  study  of  causes  vain  and 
illusory. 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  249 

Mill,  who  ''  positively  "  condescends  to  examine 
the  philosophy  of  Sir  William  Hamilton,  repudiates 
all  consciousness  of  being,  or  knowledge  of  causes, 
and,  with  endless  iteration,  repeats:  **  All  our  knowl- 
edge is  only  of  phenomena  ;  of  things  and  causes  we 
can  know  nothing." 

Mr.  Spencer,  not  content  with  mere  phenomena, 
seeks  forever  for  something  real  ;  but,  having  extin- 
guished from  his  system  the  light  of  reason,  in  his 
blindness  postulates  despairingly  in  the  unknown 
what  he  longs  to  find,  but  forever  fails,  and  leaves 
philosophy  confounded  in  the  limitless  chaos  of  the 
unknowable.  If  positive  science  is  merely  of  the 
phenomenal,  not  of  the  real,  positive  philosophy,  at 
the  most,  can  be  no  more  than  this, — the  science 
ultimately  of  the  unknown  and  unknowable.  Thus 
does  the  nescience  of  ''  modern  thought "  summon 
the  scientific  crusade  against  theology  and  metaphys- 
ics and  philosophy,  against  the  being  of  God  and  of 
mind  and  of  matter.  In  this  war  of  extermination  it 
would  at  last  slay  knowledge  itself.  The  great  de- 
fect in  the  experiential  philosophy  is  the  chasm  be- 
tween mind  and  matter.  Whatever  the  persistency 
of  the  analysis,  mind  remains  conscious,  matter 
remains  unconscious. 

It  is  especially  noticeable  to  what  contradictions 
these  philosophical  repudiators  are  driven.     Now,  in 


250  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

their  theory,  they  repudiate  a  priori  principles  and 
processes.  And  now,  driven  by  the  necessity  of 
thought,  Spencer  rests  on  a  ''  fundamental  verity," 
and  postulates  a  force  unknowable,  as  persistent,  and 
as  a  ground  of  all  phenomena.  Mill,  driven  by 
**  irresistible  association,"  refers  all  phenomena  to 
matter  and  mind — to  the  "  me  "  and  the  "  not-me  " 
— the  subject  and  the  object.  And  Lewes  is  driven 
to  admit  that  "  the  fundamental  ideas  of  modern 
science  are  as  transcendental  as  any  of  the  axioms  in 
ancient  philosophy."  *  These  principles,  this  science 
(their  science  of  the  phenomenal)  will  not,  can  not 
give.  No  generalization  of  phenomena  can  give  the 
knowledge  of  being,  especially  to  those  who  scientific- 
ally deny  the  possibility  of  all  knowledge  of  things 
as  existing  ;  no  generalization  of  effects  can  give  the 
knowledge  of  cause,  especially  to  those  who  scien- 
tifically deny  all  possible  knowledge  of  things  and 
causes,  and  who  thus  ignore  and  rule  out  philosophy 
as  illicit  and  illusory. 

How  do  these  "  advanced  thinkers "  treat 
morality  } 

Mr.  Buckle  says :  ''  Every  new  fact  is  the  neces- 
sary product  of  antecedent  fact,  and  both  providence 
and  free-w^ill  are  a  delusion.  Physical  laws  take  the 
place  of  personal  agency.     Historic  actors,  therefore, 

*  Philosophy  of  Aristotle,  p.  66, 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  2$ I 

are  automatons."  In  this  personal  statement,  Mr. 
Buckle  indicates  the  general  drift  of  "  modern 
thought  "  in  regard  to  morals. 

Mr.  Mill,  in  reviewing  Comte's  theory  approvingly, 
saj^s :  "  The  transition  is  steadily  proceeding  from 
the  theological  mode  of  thought  to  the  positive,  which 
is  destined  finally  to  prevail  by  the  universal 
recognition  that  all  phenomena,  without  exception, 
are  governed  by  invariable  laws,  with  which  no  voli- 
tions, either  natural  or  supernatural,  interfere."  Mill 
would  subject  even  the  Creator  and  Governor  to 
necessity,  and  restrict  him  to  arbitrary  arrangements, 
permitting  no  belief  even  to  recognize  his  existence, 
unless  he  obey  fixed  laws,  which  are  never  to  be 
modified  or  counteracted  by  the  personal  preference 
of  the  Creator."^  Thus  does  "  modern  thought  " 
repudiate  responsibility,  and  reject  moral  freedom, 
and  inculcate  the  pernicious  theory  of  automatic 
action  on  earth  and  in  heaven. 

Mr.  Mill  introduces  his  view  of  punishment  by 
this  startling  preamble :  "  Though  a  man  can  not 
help  acting  as  he  does,  his  character  being  what  it 
is,"  and  much  more  to  the  same  effect.  ''  His  own 
good,  either  physical  or  moral,  is  no  warrant  for 
compeUing  him  "  to  do  otherwise.     "  The  most  we 

*  Mill's  Philosophy  of  Comte,  p.  i6. 


252  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

should  think  ourselves  justified  in  doing  is  leaving 
him  to  himself"  * 

And  yet,  whether  influenced  by  force  of  thought 
or  by  force  of  feeling  we  need  not  conjecture,  Mr. 
Mill,  with  strange  forgetfulness,  falls  into  gross  in- 
consistency :  He  has  made  up  his  mind,  if  the  First 
Cause  be  an  immoral  God,  he  will  defy  him  to  do  his 
worst,  and  will  not  worship  him.  f 

But  we  reply,  how  can  the  First  Cause,  according 
to  Mr.  Mill's  theory,  possibly  be  immoral  or  moral  ? 
As  a  necessary  and  necessitated  cause  he  can  have 
no  moral  character ;  or,  if  you  please,  he  must  be 
un-moral  (i.  e.  not  moral).  But  suppose  Mr.  Mill  will 
not  worship  such  a  God  ?  The  carping  philosopher 
must  obey,  as  the  effect  (according  to  his  system  of 
necessity)  must  obey  its  cause.  What  if  the  defiant 
philosopher  must,  even  if  he  will  not,  worship  the 
tyrant?  Such  talk,  from  a  philosophic  necessitarian 
is  mere  bravado.  In  spite  of  his  theory  excluding 
all  possible  morality,  Mr.  Mill  freely  employed  the 
terms  ''  moralit}^ "  and  "  morals,"  "  moral  results  "  and 
''  moral  causes  ;  "  admitted  the  prevalent  conviction 
of  choice  or  moral  freedom  both  before  and  after 
voluntary  action  ;    and  asserted  that  this  conviction 

*  See  Mill's  Essay  on  Liberty  ;  although  this  is  rather  a  vindica- 
tion of  necessity  or  denial  of  any  possible  morality  or  accountability. 

\  See  Mill's  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy, 
p.  103. 


MODERN    THOUGHT.  253 

could  only  be  acquired  by  experience.  The  admis- 
sion proves  too  much  for  the  necessitarian — proves 
the  undoing  of  his  theory.  The  conviction  is 
acquired.  The  freedom  has  been  exercised.  Moral 
freedom  is  vindicated  by  experience,  as  well  as  by 
universal  conviction.  Therefore  Mr.  Mill  is  held  to 
the  logical  consequence  of  moral  responsibility  and 
moral  government.  Hence  we  argue  to  the  moral 
character  and  moral  government  of  God. 

Comte,  at  first,  excluded  religion  from  his  system, 
or  referred  to  it  not  as  moral  or  spiritual,  but  merely 
as  intellectual — the  product  of  the  understanding 
striving  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  nature,  rather 
than  of  reason  and  conscience  recognizing  moral  ob- 
ligation and  seeking  communion  with  a  living, 
personal  God.  The  two  conceptions  differ  utterly 
in  regard  to  the  source,  the  character,  and  the  sphere 
of  religion.  Both  can  not  be  true.  One  must  be 
right  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other.  According  to 
Comte's  conception,  natural  history,  as  intellectual,— 
the  product  of  the  understanding  seeking  to  explain 
the  phenomena  of  nature — would  be  the  height  of 
relieion ;  though  it  involved  not  the  least  moral 
choice,  nor  the  slightest  moral  feeling,  nor  any  re- 
cognition of  God. 

But  at  length  intense  reaction  completely  reversed 
the  religious  attitude  of  Comte,  and  from  his  earlier 


2  54  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

exclusion  of  religion  he  proceeded  to  elaborate  the 
"religion  of  humanity,"  which  the  Catechism  Posi- 
tivist  since  1852,  has  made  more  familiar  to  the 
public,  perhaps  more  repugnant. 

In  his  review  of  Comte's  system,  Mr.  Mill  ex- 
pressly declares :  "  Comte's  religion  is  without  a 
God  "  ;  *  and  lest  the  reviewer  be  suspected  of  con- 
demning it  as  such,  he  remarks  approvingly  :  ''  We 
venture  to  think  that  a  religion  may  exist  without 
belief  in  a  God,"  and  be  at  once '' instructive  and 
profitable."  Mr.  Mill  will,  indeed,  allow  one  to  be- 
lieve or  disbelieve  in  a  God,  and  yet  have  religion. 
Nothing  could  more  clearly  indicate  his  complete  in- 
difference to  religion,  and  the  utter  emptiness  of  his 
religious  conception.  And  yet  for  this  careless 
permission  to  believe  in  a  God  he  is  severely  criti- 
cised and  condemned  by  Littre,  a  disciple  and 
successor  of  Comte.  The  religious  theory  of  Mr. 
Spencer  is  at  least  as  liberal  as  that  of  Mr.  Mill. 
From  his  system  he  rules  out  the  possible  recognition 
of  a  personal  God,  and  allows  nothing  but  an  inscru- 
table power,  while  he  makes  this  startling  statement : 
"  The  atheistic,  the  pantheistic,  and  the  theistic 
hypotheses  contain  the  same  element — an  absolute 
mystery."  f  Thus  modern  positivism  presents  a 
religion    without     a     God,    but    proposes    *'  a    new 

*  Mill's  "Examination,"  etc.  p.  120.         f  First  Principles,  p.  36^ 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  255 

Supreme  Being,"  the  ''  Grand  Etre,"  that  is,  Collect- 
ive Humanity—"  a  God  not  yet  formed,"  but  *'  to 
be  forming  of  new  component  parts  "  ;  "  the  dead  to 
occupy  the  first  place,  then  those  who  are  yet  to  be 
born."  Madame  Clotilde  de  Vaux — like  Comte 
himself  released  by  divorce  from  the  marriage  bond — 
becomes  his  "  angelic  interlocutrix  "  in  elaborating 
the  new  religion.  With  the  establishment  of  this 
religion  the  Christian  calendar  is  to  be  superseded 
by  a  scientific  calendar.  The  temples  are  to  be 
turned  toward  Paris  —  the  Mecca  of  "modern 
thought."  Jehovah  is  to  give  place  to  a  new  god- 
dess, the  goddess  of  Collective  Humanity.  Thrice, 
daily,  shall  men  pray,  everywhere,  to  deified  woman. 
Worship,  dogmas,  discipline,  architecture,  altars, 
priesthood,  symbolism,  gestures,  sacraments, — all 
the  details  are  minutely  given  in  the  ritual  of  posi- 
tive religion,  even  to  directions  for  closing  and 
opening  the  eyes,  in  this  worship  of  woman.  Mad- 
ame Clotilde — or  whatever  woman — is  to  be  exalted 
over  him  whose  name  is  above  every  name ;  and 
*'  soon  the  knee  of  man  will  never  bend,  except  to 
woman."  The  deification  of  mortals  according  to 
Comte,  or  the  worship  of  the  unknowable  according 
to  Spencer,  or  blank  materialism  excluding  all  wor- 
ship   and   all   religion,  is   offered  to  us  by  modern 


256  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

thought  to  supersede  the  Christian   religion  and  the 
worship  of  the  ever-Hving  and  true  God. 

Mr.  Spencer  feels  the-need  of  conciliation,  not  of 
conflict,  between  science  and  religion,  and  points  to 
a  common  ground,  which  both  may  harmoniously 
occupy.  Comte,  the  Corypheus  of  positivism,  whom 
Lewes  devoutly  hails  -as  a  scientific  apostle,  and 
proclaims  as  a  leader  not  only  for  himself,  but  for 
such  impatient  followers  as  Mill  and  Huxley  and 
Spencer — Comte,  suffering  the  horrors  of  divorce 
between  science  and  religion,  penitently  besought 
a  reconciliation,  and  strove  to  effect  a  union  between 
his  emasculated  system  and  a  religion  if  not  wholly 
earth-born,  at  least  not  divine.  Even  Strauss,  after 
forty  3^ears  of  Titanic  struggle  to  scale  the  heavens 
and  dethrone  the  old  faith,  repented  of  his  folly,  and 
turned  beseechingly  toward  a  new  faith,  to  which 
he  sought  to  win  his  vacillating  disciples.  Mill,  left 
alone  with  his  philosophy,  became  a  devotee  at  the 
grave  of  departed  love.  The  school  of  nescients 
worship  an  unknown  God  ;  while  the  more  advanced 
of  the  advanced  thinkers,  who  have  pushed  their 
analysis  to  its  scientific  limit,  and  have  found  the 
primal  being — the  source  of  all  phenomena — return 
with  synthetic  fervor,  crying  "  Aha  !  we  have  found 
a  God !  "  and  reverently  place  a  fetich  upon  the 
altar  of  science  ;  and,  with  worship  *'  for  the  most 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  2$/ 

part  of  the  silent  sort,"  bow  the  knee  to  force, — 
bHnd,  unconscious,  unintelligent,  unknowable  force. 
Mr.  Spencer,  we  repeat,  feels  the  need  not  of  conflict 
but  of  conciliation,  between  science  and  religion,  as 
did  Bacon  and  Locke,  and  Newton  and  Descartes, 
and  Galileo  and  Copernicus,  and  Tully  and  Plato  and 
Socrates,  and,  as  we  believe,  most  men  who  have  been 
capable  of  profound  thought,  earnestly  feel.  How 
can  this  be  made  not  only  possible,  but  permanent? 

We  have  already  described  the  threefold  presen- 
tation of  knowledge  to  the  mind  by  the  sense,  by 
the  understanding,  by  the  reason.  Now  science, 
however  restricted,  need  not,  can  not,  legitimately 
conflict  with  religion.  If  science  be  theoretically 
confined  within  the  narrow  limit  of  sense,  as  it  is  by 
many,  it  can  not  oppose,  it  can  at  most  only  stand 
self-silenced  in  the  presence  of  religion.  Its  strong- 
est assertion  can  only  be,  it  does  not  know.  Its 
comprehensive  objection  must  be  its  own  ignorance. 
In  the  pathway  of  religion  experimental  science  has 
come  thus  far  ;  because  of  self-imposed  limits  it  can 
go  no  farther.  By  no  means,  however,  can  it  legiti- 
mately forbid  religion  to  advance. 

If  science  be  enlarged  to  the  field  of  the  under- 
standing, as  is  its  right  and  its  duty,  logical  deduc- 
tions from  ten  thousand  thousand  indications  confirm 
the  claim  of  religion,  and  follow  far  in  the  pathway 


258  FAITH  AND  MODERN  THOUGHT. 

of  her  advance  ;  and  if  pausing  at  any  time,  it  is  not 
with  disbeHef  but  with  prompt  admission  that  the 
course  however  long,  is  right,  and  with  an  earnest 
good-speed  to  reHgion  along  the  brightening  way  in 
which  it  would  fain  accompany  her. 

But  if  science  advance  to  the  province  of  the 
reason,  which  is  its  chief  right  and  duty,  it  beholds 
not  only  things  seen  and  temporal  through  the 
intuitions  of  sense,  but  the  things  unseen  and  eter- 
nal through  the  intuitions  of  reason.  Reason  looks 
out  upon  space,  and  reports  it  limitless ;  upon  time, 
and  reports  it  endless  ;  surveys  the  realm  of  phe- 
nomena, and  reports  of  every  effect — as  does  the 
sense,  so  far  as  it  can  feel  or  hear  or  see, — reports 
that  every  effect  has  a  cause,  and  more,  that  every 
effect  must  have  a  cause  ;  and  applies  this  rule 
with  unqualified  assurance  to  every  positive  effect 
in  space,  and  to  every  positive  effect  in  time  ;  and, 
as  certainly,  that  every  effect  must  have  an  adequate 
cause,  e.  g.  that  while  the  weight  of  fifty  pounds 
requires  a  power  sufficient  to  raise  it,  a  weight  of  one 
hundred  pounds  requires  twice  that  power  to  raise 
it  ;  and  that  variation  of  cause  is  required  for  varia- 
tion of  effect,  not  only  in  degree,  but  also  in  kind. 
Moral  effects  require  moral  causes ;  for  there  can  be 
no  morality  without  mental  choice,  and  no  responsi- 
bility without  rational  freedom.     By  the  same  intui- 


MODERN    THOUGHT.  259 

tion  of  reason,  it  is  a  positive  knowledge  that 
an  intelligent  effect  must  have  an  intelligent  cause. 
Every  design  put  forth  into  effect  must  have  a 
designer.  The  author  oi  all  things  must  be  adequate 
to  what  is.  Who  shall  dare  deny  that  these  intui- 
tions of  reason  reported  to  the  human  mind  and 
carefully  arrayed  in  classified  knowledge — who  shall 
deny  that  this  is  science  ?  Shall  he,  especially,  who 
in  the  same  breath  asserts  that  intuitions  of  sense 
reported  to  the  mind  and  then  classified  constitute 
science  ? 

Intuitively  to  the  individual  mind,  and  with  au- 
thority, reason  presents  this  as  most  rational.  Not 
only  has  the  common  consciousness  of  the  world 
confirmed  this  affirmation  of  reason,  but  natural  re- 
ligion rests  in  confidence  upon  this  rational  support. 
In  this  higher  and  surer  realm  of  science,  religion  may 
best  expatiate  and  feel  most  at  home.  With  no 
fanatical  frenzy  and  no  superstitious  devotion,  but  in 
the  calm  and  cheerful  light  of  rational  beholding, 
religion  and  reason  have  thus  accompanied  each 
other  sympathetically  and  harmoniously.  On  the 
way  have  the  physical  senses  failed  ?  Has  the 
eye  grown  dim?  the  ear  dull  and  heavy?  Religion 
has  pressed  forward  ;  for  she  walks  not  by  physical 
sight.  Have  tongues  ceased  ?  Has  the  understand- 
ing completed   its  deductions   from  what  has  been 


26o  FAITH  AND   MODERN    THOUGHT. 

seen  and  heard  and  felt  of  sensible  things,  and 
paused  in  its  prophecies  ?  Religion  has  pressed 
forward  ;  for  something  there  is  in  the  human  soul 
that  has  never  failed  it, -the  presence  and  the  sup- 
port of  reason. 

But  is  there  no  end  ?  no  beginning?  Are  reason 
and  religion  doomed  forever  to  tread  the  unsatisfy- 
ing pathway  of  development,  never  to  find  what  is, 
only  to  meet  what  is  becoming — the  phenomenal, 
the  transitory?  Is  there  no  comprehension  to  the 
field  of  rational  science  ?  While  the  field  of  sense  is 
comprehended,  and  the  field  of  the  understanding  is 
comprehended,  is  there  no  comprehension  to  the 
field  of  rational  science  ?  Reason  itself  comprehends 
this  field  by  a  right  as  complete,  at  least,  as  does 
the  sense  or  the  understanding  comprehend  its 
field.  And  reason  evermore  affirms  not  only  that 
phenomena  come  and  go  in  endless  succession  and 
variety,  but  that  something  is — eternal.  Though 
phenomena  pass  by  and  vanish,  this  remaineth  ; 
although  all  else  should  wax  old  and  be  changed, 
yet  this  shall  remain  the  same,  and  never  fail.  This 
ultimate  ground  not  only  has  Spencer  reached  in 
the  pathway  of  rational  science,  which  he  would 
harmonize  with  rehgion ;  but  the  same  ultimate 
ground  Paul  has  reached  in  the  pathway  of  religion, 
which  he  promptly  harmonizes  with  reason.      So  far 


MODERN    THOUGHT.  26 1 

forth,   there  has  been  no   conflict  between   science 
and  rehgion. 

ReHgion  would  find  in  this  eternal  source  of  all 
things  adequate  cause  for  every  effect,  in  one  word, 
eternal  power  and  Godhead,  in  which  it  may  confide, 
on  which  it  may  rely,  with  which  it  may  commune. 
Does  reason  reject  as  irrational  the  declaration  of  an 
old  and  familiar,  but  by  no  means  dishonored  writer, 
whom  we  have  just  mentioned,  who,  in  a  remarkable 
letter  to  the  Romans,  says  :  ''  The  invisible  things  of 
him  from  the  creation  of  the  world  are  clearly  seen, 
being  understood  by  the  things  that  are  made  ";  and 
in  another  letter,  no  less  remarkable,  addressed  to 
the  Hebrews,  says  :  "  Thoii  remainest,  and  tJwii  art 
forever  the  same  !  "  Does  it  not,  rather,  devoutly 
accept  and  confirm  this  statement? 

If  an  issue  is  raised,  it  is  at  this  point:  Shall 
mind  be  secondary  and  subordinate  to  matter  ? 
This  is  the  real  issue.  One  or  the  other  is  original 
and  dominant.  We  shall  be  pardoned  for  adverting 
to  it,  for  it  is  the  real  issue  presented  and  pressed  by 
"  modern  thought."  Mr.  Spencer  postulates  an 
ultimate  force,  persistent,  unconscious,  unintelligent, 
physical  force.  This,  then,  he  assumes  is  original 
and  dominant — the  source  of  all  that  is.  Mind, 
therefore,  according  to  Spencer,  is  secondary  and 
subordinate  to  matter. 


262-  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

Tyndall  looks  "  across  the  boundary  of  experimen- 
tal evidence,"  beyond  which,  according  to  the  experi- 
mental system  of  ''  modern  thought,"  he  has  no 
right  to  look,  ''  and  discerns  in  matter  the  promise 
and  the  potency  of  every  form  and  quality  of  life." 
Mind,  then,  according  to  Tyndall,  is  secondary  and 
subordinate  to  matter.  And  yet  Tyndall  is  com- 
pelled to  say  that  all  true  men  of  science  "  will 
frankly  admit  their  inability  to  point  to  any  satis- 
factory, experimental  proof  that  life  can  be  devel- 
oped save  from  demonstrable  antecedent  life." 

Avowed  materialists,  with  whom  Spencer  and 
Tyndall  are  unwilling  to  be  classed  — avowed  mate- 
rialists assume  that  matter  is  primary -and  all-prev- 
alent. Hence  mind,  if  there  is  any,  is  secondary  and 
subordinate  to  matter  ;  in  its  final  analysis,  is  indeed 
material. 

Now,  we  do  not  for  a  moment  stop  to  speak  of 
blank  materialism,  which  precludes  the  existence  of 
mind  by  reducing  it  and  all  things  to  matter,  and 
thus  contradicts  our  fundamental  belief,  the  univer- 
sal distinctions  of  language,  and  the  common  con- 
sciousness of  mankind.  To  avowed  materialists,  who 
assume  that  mind  itself  is  material,  this  issue  must 
be-  utterly  irrelevant  and  impossible.  The  issue  with 
them  is  upon  entirely  another  ground.  Science 
itself    is    impossible,    where     mind     is     ruled     out 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  263 

as  material ;  for  matter  can  know  nothing,  a  fortiori 
it  can  not  construct  science. 

But  to  advance  to  the  narrowest  field  of  science, 
— that  of  sense,  the  experiential — we  affirm  that 
those  who  confine  themselves  within  this  narrow  field 
are  by  self-limitation  excluded  from  this  discussion. 
The  problem  does  not,  at  least,  lie  within  that  field. 
The  issue  is  not  a  phenomenon,  for  the  eye  or  ear  or 
touch  to  decide.  If  there  is  no  science  but  this  pos- 
sible, as  some  scientists  pretend,  then  the  problem  is 
ruled  out  forever,  and  the  issue  must  be  pronounced 
nugatory.  But  the  issue  does  not  await  the  permis- 
sion of  positivism.  It  spurns  such  scientific  imperti- 
nence. Ruled  out  forever  as  nugatory  and 
impossible,  it  returns  with  ten  thousand  thousand 
voices  to  assert  its  real  presence,  and  confront  and 
contradict  the  partial  ruling.  If  this  restricted  tri- 
bunal is  incompetent  to  do  it  justice  and  secure  its 
rights,  it  is  but  a  confession  of  the  incompetency  of 
positivism.  There  is  an  appeal  to  a  court  of  larger 
jurisdiction  and  higher  competency.  We  make  no 
special  plea  against  the  modern  school  of  science. 
We  point  to  its  confession  as  conclusive  proof  of 
weakness.  Within  its  own  field  it  is  doing  industri- 
ous and  legitimate  service  to  religion  and  progress. 
But  it  is  not  comprehensive,  therefore  it  must  not  be 
exclusive.     It    may    be    positive    in   regard   to   its 


264  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

knowledge  ;  it  should  be  positive,  also  in  regard  to 
its  ignorance.  On  other  and  essential  grounds  we 
have  already  shown  its  fatal  defect.  Its  confession 
here  confirms  our  criticism.  The  issue  is  not  only 
between  religion  and  partial  science,  but  also  between 
partial  science  and  true  philosophy. 

We  repeat,  the  real  issue  remains.  It  will  not 
down  at  the  bidding  of  positive  science.  It  has  the 
life  of  humanity,  and  the  vigor  of  faith  reappearing 
in  every  form  of  religion  since  the  world  began. 
Shall  mind  be  secondary  and  subordinate  to  matter? 
Or  is  mind  itself  superior  and  primary — the  source 
of  all  that  is,  and  the  sovereign  ?  We  say  to  positiv- 
ism, as  we  say  to  every  sense-theory,  it  is  incompe- 
tent to  assert ;  it  is  incompetent  to  deny.  All  it  can 
say  is,  that  there  are  antecedents  and  sequents, 
phenomena  succeeding  phenomena  ;  but  it  can  not 
affirm,  it  certainly  can  not  deny,  that  there  is  any- 
thing abiding.  Hence  we  dismiss  objections  from  any 
such  quarter,  as  unauthorized  and  groundless.  But 
there  is  a  larger  field  of  science, — the  field  of  the  un- 
derstanding, where  true  logic  has  its  legitimate  sphere, 
and  conclusions  may  be  valid,  e.g.,  that  there  can  not 
be  phenomena  without  something  to  appear,  nor 
effects  without  something  to  produce  them.  And  so 
Mr.  Tyndall  admits  that  all  phenomena  have  a  causa- 
tive source  in  the  potency  of  matter  ;  although  he  does 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  26$ 

not  tell  US  what  matter  is,  nor  whence  or  what  is  its 
potency.  Till  these  questions  be  answered,  he  has 
thrown  but  a  dim  and  unsatisfactory  light  upon  the 
problem.  Yet  Tyndall  disclaims  atheism — a  dis- 
claimer certainly  significant  in  regard  to  the  real 
question  at  issue. 

Mr.  Spencer,  with  greater  boldness,  tells  us  that 
force  is  the  ground  of  all  phenomena,  and  that  force 
is  unknowable.  This  is  the  farthest  analysis  of 
"  modern  thought." 

And  this  is  proposed  as  the  common  ground 
of  reconciliation  between  science  and  reHgion.  Is 
science,  w^hose  very  office  is  to  know — is  science 
satisfied'  with  this  proposed  reconciliation  in  the 
unknowable  ?  Can  it  consent  to  a  postulate  which 
is  suicidal — an  ultimate  which  would  swallow  up 
every  scientific  labor  and  success  in  fathomless 
nescience? 

Can  religion  accept  this  theory  as  sufficient  to 
satisfy  the  longing  of  the  human  soul— a  longing 
not  only  to  rely  upon,  but  to  trust  in  and  commune 
with,  the  Eternal  Being— not  only  to  fear,  but  to 
w^orship  and  love,  the  Eternal  ?  In  this  final  ques- 
tion, important  above  all  others,  does  ratiocination 
repudiate  or  confirm  faith  ?  Does  reason  still  accom- 
pany and  support  religion?  Can  science  give  us 
any  knowledge  of  force  which  will  help  decide  the 


266  FAITH  AND  MODERN   THOUGHT. 

case?  In  our  own  consciousness  does  force  appear 
as  the  offspring  of  mind,  the  result  of  will-power 
and  not  vice  versa  ?  Is  not  Mr.  Spencer's  notion  of 
force  derived  from  mind  ?  ''  Force,  as  known  to  us, 
is  an  affection  of  consciousness."  *  **  The  force  by 
which  we  ourselves  produce  changes  serves  to  sym- 
bolize the  cause  of  changes  in  general,  and  is  the 
final  disclosure  of  analysis."  f  Is,  then,  his  final 
analysis  final,  when  he  postulates  force  as  ultimate? 
Or  does  it  look  directly  beyond,  to  the  will-power 
or  personality  which  exerts  that  force  ?  Is  not  his 
final  analysis,  then,  really  an  indication  and  admis- 
sion oi  2.  personal  First  Cause  as  Author  of  force,  and 
thus  Creator  of  the  universe  ?  Religion  does  not 
discard  the  reconciliation  proposed  by  Mr.  Spencer 
because  it  is  too  scientific,  but  because  it  is  too  little 
scientific.  Religion  admits  the  right  of  science  to 
go  thus  far,  whether  Mr.  Spencer's  system  would 
authorize  it  to  do  so  or  not.  But  religion  denies  the 
right  to  go  thus  far,  and  then  stop  at  this  point. 

Faith  raises  the  same  question  in  behalf  of  relig- 
ion which  reason  asks  in  behalf  of  science  :  Why 
stop  with  force  as  the  ground  of  all  phenomena, 
when  force  itself  is  phenomenal  as  meeting  and  re- 
sisting the  senses,  e.  g.,  in  hearing,  touch,  etc.  ?  Why 
stop  with  force,  when  force  itself,  according  to  our 

*  First  Principles,  p.  58.  f  Ibid.  p.  235. 


MODERN    THOUGHT.  26 J 

consciousness,  testifies  of  will  as  its  source  ?  Why 
call  it  unknown,  when  in  the  sanrie  breath  it  is  de- 
clared known,  as  having  persistence  and  power  and 
causality,  etc. — attributes  which  belong  to  person- 
ality ?  Why  call  it  unintelligent,  when  confessedly 
its  doings  are  the  most  intelligent  (according  to 
'*  modern  thought  ")  in  the  universe  ;  comprehending, 
indeed,  by  the  theory,  all  the  intelligence  in  the  uni- 
verse ?  Why  call  it  unconscious,  when  it  manifests 
not  only  the  highest  intelligence,  but  the  highest  wis- 
dom in  the  adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  in  relating 
causes  to  effects,  in  harmonizing  forces  and  phenom- 
ena throughout  the  universe  ?  so  that  science  itself 
asserts  the  universal  order  ;  and  science  and  reliorion 
agree  in  tracing  all  phenomena  and  all  effects  to  one 
ultimate  cause.  Why  call  this  ultimate  and  eternal 
cause  force, — blind,  unconscious,  unintelligent  force, 
— and  thus  exclude  God  from  the  universe,  and  deny 
his  existence,  when  *'  modern  thought  "  itself  invol- 
untarily admits  that  such  effects  as  have  been  pro- 
duced demand  the  highest  type  of  causation?"^ 
Why  call  it  unknown,  when  in  the  same  breath  it 
is  declared  persistent,  and  so  known  as  enduring  ? 
when  it  is  declared  "  the  ultimate  of  ultimates,"  and 
so  known  as  the  ground  of  all  appearances,  "  the 
cause  of  all  phenornena,"  the  ultimate  or  first  cause? 
*  See  Tyndall's  Address. 


268  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

If  science  can  know  so  much  about  this  ■*  unknow- 
able "  as  to  clothe  it  with  attributes  of  personality, 
why  not  frankly  admit,  as  some  of  the  most  candid 
and  able  scientific  thinkers  affirm,  and  as  faith  will 
admit  and  our  consciousness  asserts,  that  force  is 
the  product  of  will-power,  and  so  the  primal  or  ulti- 
mate force  is  the  product  of  an  eternal,  almighty, 
intelligent,  and  wise  will,— the  infinite  and  holy  will 
of  a  personal  God  ? 

This  may  be  common  ground  for  science  and 
religion.  Thus  is  the  First  Cause  not  only  ultimate, 
but  adequate  to  the  production  of  mental,  as  well 
as  material,  phenomena — adequate,  which  according 
to  Mr.  Spencer's  theory  it  confessedly  is  not.  Thus 
all  things  centre  harmoniously  in  God.  Mind  as  a 
free,  personal  activity  is  his  offspring ;  and  force, 
though  unseen,  is  his  material  creation — the  product 
of  his  will — the  ground  of  all  material  phenomena. 
So  that,  in  the  higher  light  of  rational  science,  as 
well  as  in  the  clear  vision  of  faith,  God  appears  as 
the  Author  of  all  things,  and  reason  confirms  the 
affirmation  of  faith,  that  "  The  worlds  were  framed 
by  the  word  of  God  ;  so  that  things  which  are  seen 
were  not  made  of  things  which  do  appear." 

Thus  both  by  the  authority  of  reason  and  of 
faith  is  the  universe  wrested  from  the  false  and 
fearful  dominion  of  fate,  and  the  capricious  and  still 


MODERN   THOUGHT.  269 

more  fearful  dominion  of  chance.  Moral  govern- 
ment is  restored  to  the  world.  Not  only  power,  but 
wisdom  and  goodness,  belong  unto  God.  Hence- 
forth, forever,  science,  as  well  as  religion,  may  rest 
by  faith  in  God.  He  is  our  dwelling-place  in  all 
generations  ;  the  universe  is  secure  under  his  al- 
mighty and  everlasting  and  holy  government.  Nei- 
ther necessity  nor  chance  shall  wreck  or  crush  it. 
The  field  of  science  securely  opens  into  the  alluring 
and  widening  future.  Newton  was,  indeed,  as  a 
child  gathering  pebbles  on  the  shore  of  the  bound- 
less ocean  of  knowledge.  Bacon  was  but  the  trum- 
peter to  sound  the  inspiring  call  in  the  triumphant 
march  of  thought  ;  while  faith  surveys  the  expanding 
fields  of  science  and  the  bright  and  interminable 
field  of  religion,  and  with  rapture  recalls  the  promise 
of  God  :  "  All  are  yours." 

Here  we  find  the  clue  to  a  true  theory  of  evolu- 
tion, which  runs  throughout  all  material  nature,  and 
inductively  and  securely  leads  us  back  to  force,  and 
up  to  God  as  the  Creator  of  force  and  the  Author  of 
nature — an  evolution  originated  by  a  divine  mind, 
controlled  by  divine  power,  guided  by  divine  wisdom, 
and  consummated  by  divine  benevolence. 

On  the  other  hand,  this  clue  saves  us  from  wan- 
dering in  the  endless  mazes  of  the  false  theory  of 
evolution   presented  by   ''  modern   thought,"   based 


270  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

Upon  the  false  theory  of  force  as  ultimate.  Besides 
this  fundamental  defect,  this  theory  of  evolution 
declares  force  to  be  absolute,  yet  becoming  condi- 
tioned ;  to  be  homogeneous,  yet  becoming  heteroge- 
neous— the  one  evolving  into  the  many,  not  only, 
and  the  multifarious,  but  into  the  contradictory  and 
superior,  in  endless  succession.  How,  we  ask,  can 
evolution  start  with  the  homogeneous, — force,  and 
force  only, — without  spontaneity  or  will?  How, 
then,  can  the  homogeneous  become  unstable  and 
heterogeneous,  and  force  become  forces?  It  is  im- 
possible, according  to  the  system  ;  and  evolution 
can  not  begin.  It  is  only  by  an  illicit  process  that 
Spencer's  system  can  change  the  homogeneous  into 
the  heterogeneous, — by  surreptitiously  introducing 
motion.  If  force  is  first,  and  at  first  is  ah,  how  is  it 
that  it  evolves  so  as  to  produce  consciousness  and 
self-consciousness  ;  so  as  to  produce  knowledge, — 
knowledge  of  itself,  and  knowledge  of  all  things, 
amounting  even  to  omniscience  ? 

By  Spencer's  *'  positive  "  legerdemain  not  only 
does  his  unknown  and  unknowable  make  itself 
familiar  to  mortals  in  these  new  and  curious  forms, 
as  blind  force  playing  fantastic  tricks  that  rival  the 
capricious  antics  of  the  Grecian  Pan  ;  but  more  than 
this,  the  unknown  and  the  unknowable,  grown  famil- 
iar in  the   skillful  hands  of   Mr.  Spencer,  outrivals 


MODERN    THOUGHT.  2/1 

Pan,  who  indeed  became  all  things,  but  by  hypoth- 
esis was  himself  all  things.  Mr.  Spencer's  blind 
force  evolves  into  more  than  it  was,  and  what  it 
was  not.  This  ultimate  force  in  itself  unconscious, 
makes  itself  conscious  by  whirling  ;  in  itself  unintel- 
ligent, makes  itself  inteUigent,  by  whirling  and 
whirling ;  without  wisdom  or  purpose  in  itself,  it 
makes  itself  the  centre  of  all  wisdom  and  the  perfec- 
tion of  all  purpose  by  fortuitous  whirling  and  whirl- 
ing ;  in  itself  merely  physical,  at  a  single  bound  it 
leaps  into  the  metaphysical.  Material,  blind,  and 
unseeing,  at  a  bound  it  evolves  into  the  mental ;  at 
another  bound  it  evolves  into  the  rational  ;  by  con- 
tinued evolution  the  blind,  unconscious,  physical  force 
evolves  into  mind, — rational,  moral,  spiritual — until 
in  a  maze  of  wonder,  the  multitude  cry  out :  "  It  is  a 
God ";  and  the  high-priests  of  positivism,  with 
reverential  recognition,  standing  aloof  from  the 
wondering  crowd,  bow  down,  "  for  the  most  part  in 
worship  of  the  silent  sort."  Such  is  the  wonder- 
working of  "  modern  thought."  In  phenomenal 
theorizing,  verily,  nothing  serves  so  well  as  a  skillful 
prestidigitator. 

If  force  be  declared  ultimate, — force  persistent, 
unconscious,  unintelligent — then  matter  must  be 
primary  and  superior,  and  evolution  must  be  unorig- 
inated  and  uncontrolled  by  a  divine  mind,  subject 


2/2  FAITH  AND  MODERN    THOUGHT. 

to  blind  fate  or  capricious  chance.  Either  horn  of 
the  dilemma  would  prove  fatal.  With  chance  su- 
preme, science  were  impossible  ;  with  fate  supreme, 
moral  freedom  and  moral  government  were  im- 
possible. 

If  mind  is  declared  ultimate, — mind  infinite, 
eternal, — then  mind  is  primary  and  superior  ;  then 
evolution  is  originated  and  controlled  by  divine  wis- 
dom and  power,  and  nature's  laws  are  at  the  same 
time  efficient  and  uniform  ;  efficient,  because  sus- 
tained by  divine  authority  ;  and,  although  variable 
according  to  the  divine  behest,  yet  uniform  because 
of  the  divine  faithfulness,  which  "  is  unto  all 
generations." 


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